“Upon the whole, then, Her Majesty’s Government are persuaded that no course of policy can be adopted more wise, more disinterested, more beneficial to Europe, than that which His Imperial Majesty has so long followed, and which will render his name more illustrious than that of the most famous sovereigns who have sought immortality by unprovoked conquest and ephemeral glory.
“With a view to the success of this policy, it is desirable that the utmost forbearance should be manifested towards Turkey; that any demands which the Great Powers of Europe may have to make should be made matter of friendly negotiation rather than of peremptory demand; that military and naval demonstrations to coerce the Sultan should as much as possible be avoided; that differences with respect to matters affecting Turkey, within the competence of the Sublime Porte, should be decided after mutual concert between the great powers, and not be forced upon the weakness of the Turkish Government.”
To this succeeds a passage which we cannot help considering as unfortunate, because it gives decided colour to the Russian pretext, that a protectorate over Turkey was necessary for securing the rights of the Christian inhabitants. There was no occasion whatever for its introduction, especially as the Emperor had not thought it necessary to ask advice upon the subject:—
“To these cautions Her Majesty’s Government wish to add, that in their view it is essential that the Sultan should be advised to treat his Christian subjects in conformity with the principles of equity and religious freedom which prevail generally among the enlightened nations of Europe. The more the Turkish Government adopts the rules of impartial law and equal administration, the less will the Emperor of Russia find it necessary to apply that exceptional protection which his Imperial Majesty has found so burdensome and inconvenient, though no doubt prescribed by duty and sanctioned by treaty.
We observe that the Times, notwithstanding its notorious ministerial leaning, has declined awarding praise to this state document, and we are not surprised at it. It is dissuasive and declinatory, but it is altogether feeble. We should have expected to find in it, not hypocritical acknowledgments of Imperial moderation and so forth, but a distinct, firm, and energetic protest against any attempt to disturb the peace, or to violate the integrity of Turkey. The infamous proposals made to Britain—for they were infamous not only as regarded Turkey but other European powers—should have been rejected in a manner that could have left no doubt in the mind of the Czar as to the part which the British Government was prepared to take in the event of his entering into hostilities with the Sultan. From the beginning to the end of this despatch there is not a single word which can be construed into a plain warning to the Czar, that any attempt made by him upon Turkey would provoke the hostility of Britain. On the contrary, the declinature to participate in the scheme is mainly founded on the fact that no “actual crisis” has yet arrived; but there is nothing said to indicate that Britain would oppose the forcing on of such a crisis, if Russia thought proper to precipitate it; and a more unlucky expression than “that the event which was contemplated is not definitely fixed in point of time” it is utterly impossible to conceive. The perusal of this despatch could leave no other impression upon the mind of the Czar, than that the British Ministry were afraid to commit themselves by entering into any secret or separate treaty with Russia for the disposal of the Turkish dominions, until a crisis actually should occur. That they would have preferred the maintenance of the status quo to a disturbance of it, was tolerably clear; but it was not in the least degree clear that they would take umbrage at an act of aggression, or be indisposed to treat with Russia after the aggression was made, and the weakness of the Ottoman empire exhibited by its being forced to succumb to the attack of the northern Colossus. The despatch, in short, was not couched in such manly, distinct, and positive terms as a British Secretary of State for foreign affairs should have employed on such an occasion. It is weak, timid, and almost subservient; and we are not in the least degree surprised to find that the Czar considered that it gave him sufficient encouragement again to renew his attack. Here is an extract from his next conversation with the British envoy, Sir Hamilton Seymour.
“‘I think your Government does not well understand my object. I am not so eager about what shall be done when the sick man dies, as I am to determine with England what shall not be done upon that event taking place.’
“‘But, sir,’ I replied, ‘allow me to observe, that we have no reason to think that the sick man (to use your Majesty’s expression) is dying. We are as much interested as we believe your Majesty to be in his continuing to live; while, for myself, I will venture to remark that experience shows me that countries do not die in such a hurry. Turkey will remain for many a year, unless some unforeseen crisis should occur. It is precisely, sir, for the avoidance of all circumstances likely to produce such a crisis that Her Majesty’s Government reckons upon your generous assistance.’
“‘Then,’ rejoined the Emperor, ‘I will tell you that, if your Government has been led to believe that Turkey retains any elements of existence, your Government must have received incorrect information. I repeat to you, that the sick man is dying; and we can never allow such an event to take us by surprise. We must come to some understanding; and this we should do, I am convinced, if I could hold but ten minutes’ conversation with your Ministers—with Lord Aberdeen, for instance, who knows me so well, who has full confidence in me, as I have in him. And, remember, I do not ask for a treaty or a protocol; a general understanding is all I require—that between gentlemen is sufficient; and in this case I am certain that the confidence would be as great on the side of the Queen’s Ministers as on mine.’”
The despatch, containing the report of this conversation, was written on the 21st February, and received at the Foreign Office on 6th March 1853; so that the Emperor Nicholas, whatever may be thought of his conduct otherwise, cannot be justly charged with deliberate perfidy in concealing his views from our Government. Indeed, Sir Hamilton Seymour, in this very document, gave Lord John Russell a distinct intimation of the real objects of the Czar.
“It can hardly be otherwise but that the Sovereign, who insists with such pertinacity upon the impending fall of a neighbouring state, must have settled in his own mind that the hour, if not of its dissolution, at all events for its dissolution, must be at hand.