Next comes the bribe—for we can call it nothing else—implied in the Emperor’s statement, already quoted, that he saw no reason why, in the event of the dissolution of the Ottoman empire, Great Britain should not obtain possession of Egypt and Candia! And so completely does he seem to have considered that point settled, that a few days afterwards, and without any further intercourse with Britain (for so we are given to understand), a confidential memorandum, dictated by the Czar, and containing the following passage, was placed in the hands of Sir Hamilton Seymour:—
“In short, the Emperor cannot but congratulate himself at having given occasion for this intimate interchange of confidential communications between Her Majesty and himself. He has found therein valuable assurances, of which he takes note with a lively satisfaction. The two Sovereigns have frankly explained to each other, what in the extreme case of which they have been treating, their respective interests cannot endure. England understands that Russia cannot suffer the establishment at Constantinople of a Christian Power sufficiently strong to control and disquiet her. She declares, that for herself she renounces any intention or desire to possess Constantinople. The Emperor equally disclaims any wish or design of establishing himself there. England promises that she will enter into no arrangement for determining the measures to be taken in the event of the fall of the Turkish empire, without a previous understanding with the Emperor. The Emperor, on his side, willingly contracts the same engagement. As he is aware that in such a case he can equally reckon upon Austria, who is bound by her promises to concert with him, he regards with less apprehension the catastrophe which he still desires to prevent, and avert as much as it shall depend on him to do so.”
This is, perhaps, the most extraordinary note that was ever issued. If founded upon nothing else than Lord John Russell’s single despatch of 9th February 1853, it is an attempt to make a memorandum supply the place of a treaty, and that not with regard to existing circumstances, but to a contingency involving the destruction of an ally. The Emperor must, indeed, have had great faith in the subserviency of the British Cabinet to his views, before he could have ventured on such a step. Lord Clarendon now comes into action, as the successor of Lord John Russell in the Home Office; but we need not pursue the correspondence further than to say, that it was conducted on the same principle of remonstrance, though very feeble on the part of the British Minister, against the assumption that Turkey was absolutely in a critical state, and of assertion to the contrary on the part of the Czar. His object was to alienate Britain from France—to keep the latter power out of any arrangement which might be made for the partition of the Turkish territories—and to hasten the crisis as fast as possible, in order that Britain might be compelled to come to definite terms. Lord Clarendon’s despatches are couched in terms quite unworthy of his position. Lord John Russell, who had primarily to state the views of the British Cabinet, may be excused for a certain weakness of expression; but no such apology can be made for Lord Clarendon, who was bound emphatically to have informed the Czar that this country disdained his proposals, and was prepared, at any hazard, to maintain the integrity of Turkey. We say that he was bound to have done so, on the supposition that the Aberdeen Ministry disapproved of the partition of Turkey, and were prepared, by force of arms, to oppose it. Disapproval is of two kinds: There is the faint remonstrance, which is usually considered to imply reluctant consent; and there is strong distinct denial, which cannot possibly be misinterpreted. We find no such strong distinct denial in Lord Clarendon’s despatches. They are filled with almost fulsome adulation of the Czar, who had previously tendered a bribe. Thus, in the despatch of 23d March, we find the following passage:—
“The generous confidence exhibited by the Emperor entitles His Imperial Majesty to the most cordial declaration of opinion on the part of Her Majesty’s Government, who are fully aware that, in the event of any understanding with reference to future contingencies being expedient, or indeed possible, the word of His Imperial Majesty would be preferable to any convention that could be framed.”
Scarce less miserably sycophantish are the terms of the despatch of April 5th. “My despatch of the 23d ult. will have furnished you with answers upon all the principal points alluded to in the memorandum which Count Nesselrode placed in your hands; but it is my duty to inform you that that important and remarkable document was received by her Majesty’s Government with feelings of sincere satisfaction, as a renewed proof of the Emperor’s confidence and friendly feelings; and her Majesty’s Government desire to convey their acknowledgments to his Imperial Majesty for having thus placed on record the opinions he expressed at the interview with which you were honoured by his Imperial Majesty.”
We do not profess to know much about the language of diplomacy; but if these are the sort of terms to be addressed to an avowed disturber of the peace of Europe, who has attempted to engage us in a conspiracy by offer of a bribe, we are at a loss to know what language can afford by way of adequate encomium to a really honest ally. The excuse of sincere belief in the sincerity of the Czar is entirely precluded by the terms of the previous communications from Sir Hamilton Seymour, which not only indicate but demonstrate the game which the Autocrat was playing. It is certainly remarkable to observe the extreme cordiality with which the Emperor greeted the accession of his old friend, Lord Aberdeen, to power, and the fervency of his wishes for his long continuance in office. Immediately thereafter—or rather on the same occasion—he begins to develop his designs upon Turkey, states his prognosis of the condition of the sick gentleman, and requests to be informed what are our views as to the partition of his property. Our Ministers demur as to the fact of the sickness; but the Imperial Doctor assures them that it is so, or shall immediately be so, and states that he will be contented with a temporary occupation of the dying man’s domicile—the catastrophe to be hastened by a bolus of his own administration—but that we are perfectly welcome to seize upon certain outlying hereditaments! And in return to such proposals, which, if agreed to, would have made us deservedly infamous throughout Europe, the Ministers of Queen Victoria think fit to beslaver the Czar! Since the days of Charles II. England has seen no similar instance of adulation to a foreign potentate.
The correspondence is now before the world, and the public must decide whether it is such as to justify Lord Aberdeen’s assertion, in reply to Lord Derby, “that if he thought it would be found to contain anything on which a charge could be founded against the Government, he would find himself egregiously mistaken.” Undoubtedly they are not chargeable with connivance—but they are chargeable with incapacity and misconduct so gross, that even connivance could not have produced effects more disastrous. If they did not play directly into the hands of the Czar, they failed to make him aware of the part which they were bound to take should he persist in his nefarious designs. They manifested no kind of honourable indignation at his offers; they received his cajolements with complacency, and paid him back with compliments and assurances not one whit more sincere than his own. If this really is the style in which our diplomatic intercourse is usually conducted, there is ample room for a reform. They cannot with justice assert that the Emperor was keeping them in the dark as to the nature of his own projects. He was, on the contrary, particularly frank. He insisted, over and over again, that Turkey was on the eve of dissolution; he even indicated that he might himself be the agent to force on that catastrophe—and yet Lord Aberdeen and his colleagues are now maintaining that he had deceived them! How, where, and when were they deceived? He showed them the victim, prophesied his immediate death, intimated that the fatal deathblow might be given by his hand, told them that he was in accord with Austria, invited them to declare their wishes as to the subsequent partition, and emphatically assured them that there was no time to be lost. Let us call things by their proper names. Stigmatise the conduct of the Czar, if you will, as ambitious, tyrannical, unprincipled, or nefarious—but do not accuse him of having concealed his purpose from the British Ministry.
Were the Ministers then so blind that they failed to perceive his purpose? Of course they were not. The Cabinet which contained Lords Aberdeen and Palmerston, both of them experienced in foreign affairs, could be at no loss to divine his meaning, even if that had been more obscurely expressed; and consequently we must conclude that so early as March 1853 they were put thoroughly on their guard. They were aware that the Czar meditated the destruction of the Ottoman empire, and having that knowledge, every movement of his in the East, whether diplomatic or military, could only be regarded as progressive means towards the end proposed.
Now there were two courses open to Ministers. The one was to have intimated at once, without any circumlocution or compliment, that Great Britain would not submit to any invasion of the Turkish territories on the part of a European power, but would be prepared, by force of arms, to resist any such attempt. That would have been a manly and honourable course; and we are satisfied that, if adopted, the Czar would not have had the temerity to provoke a crisis. Unfortunately no declaration was made. A faint dissuasive, accompanied by an immense deal of complimentary sugar, was all that our Ministers ventured to tender; and the Czar was accordingly allowed to proceed, under the evident impression that Great Britain would not actively interfere to prevent his designs upon Turkey, any more than she interfered to prevent those of his ancestress upon Poland.
The other course was to have maintained a strict neutrality, and to have treated the Eastern question as an affair entirely between Russia and Turkey. To that, however, it is more than doubtful whether the people of this country would have submitted. The appetite of Russia for territorial aggrandisement is so insatiable, and her advances have been pushed so far, that the virtual cession to her of so fair and fertile a country as Turkey, and the entire command of the entrance to the Black Sea, would, very justly, have been deemed an act of culpable cowardice. Setting aside the position of India, and the facilities which the occupation of Turkey would afford for any hostile demonstration upon that part of our dominions, we have now, in consequence of Free Trade, a direct interest in the Danubian Principalities, as so many granaries for our home consumption. Since we ceased to act upon the principle of growing corn for our own population, and made ourselves dependent upon foreign supplies, it would be suicidal to give Russia the power of cutting us short both in the north and on the south—in the Baltic and the Black Seas. Still that was the only other course which Ministers could consistently have adopted, if they wished to avoid or postpone the terrible calamity of a war.