They followed neither the one course nor the other. They did not tell the Czar that, if he persisted in the schemes which he had disclosed to them, he must be prepared to meet Britain in the field; nor did they tell him that, in so far as they were concerned, he might do what he pleased with Turkey. They halted between two opinions. In full knowledge of his designs, they allowed him to commit himself—to pick a quarrel with Turkey about some rubbish relating to the keys of the Holy Places—to march his forces across the Pruth—to occupy the Principalities,—to do, in short, the work of one effective campaign. They never intimated to the country that the religious questions,—on which Russia, with scandalous hypocrisy, rested her justification of invasion,—were mere pretexts to mask the avowed intentions of Nicholas. They did not even send a fleet at once to Constantinople, but kept it hovering between Malta and Besika Bay, in the attitude of observation, long after the Russian guns were roaring upon the Danube. Is it fair to suppose that Nicholas,—after having frankly communicated to them his intentions more than a twelvemonth ago; after having told them that the sick gentleman was sure to die immediately; and after having taken measures to secure the fulfilment of that prophecy,—could consider their late hesitating and dilatory movement as otherwise than a convenient sham? It must have appeared to him that if the British Government was determined to oppose his project, they would at once have said so, with the same openness which he manifested in his communications to them. They said nothing of the kind. They gave him fulsome compliments. Of course he went farther, and marched into the sick man’s territory. What did our Ministers then? They concealed what they knew, and entered into negotiations about the Russian Protectorate of Christian subjects in Turkey, as if that were the sole point which had occasioned the disturbance! What, under such circumstances, could the Czar conceive, but that they were playing into his hands? He had apprised them, in almost as many words, that he intended to take possession of Turkey, so that they knew perfectly well that the question involved was not one of religion, but of political aggrandisement. It was, however, his policy to make it appear to the uninitiated that religion was his paramount motive; and when the British Cabinet began to negotiate and issue notes upon that footing, he was, after the confidential correspondence which had taken place, fairly entitled to believe that they were not in earnest. The Czar is a remarkably able man—we question whether, politically speaking, he is not the ablest man in Europe—but his own extraordinary position precludes him from understanding the effect of public opinion in such a country as our own. He is accustomed to deal with Cabinets, not with nations or parliaments; and he attributes more power to the former than they possess, at least according to the constitution of Great Britain. The British Cabinet cannot, like that of Prussia or Austria, commit the country to a course which is inconsistent with or derogatory to its honour.
In consequence of this irresolution on the part of our rulers, we are now precipitated into war, and are already beginning to feel some of its inconveniences. Let us now endeavour to ascertain the causes which have led to so very serious a denouement as the disruption of the peace of Europe. It is important that we should do so now, and not leave the question entirely to the future speculation of historians.
During Lord Derby’s short tenure of office, relations of peculiar amity had been established between Britain and France. Lord Malmesbury, than whom no more able or judicious minister ever held the seals of the Foreign Office, saw that the interests of civilisation not only in the west, but throughout the whole of Europe, could only be maintained by a close and permanent co-operation, and mutual good understanding between these two countries; and he addressed himself to the task with equal discretion and success. It is not too much to say that Britain and France never were more cordially united and confidentially allied than during the period we refer to. This, of course, was anything but agreeable to the Czar, whose opportunity lay in a separation of the interests of the two great powers of the West.
The dissolution of Lord Derby’s Government and the accession of the Aberdeen Ministry effected a material alteration. The new Premier, Lord Aberdeen, had been for a great many years on the most intimate footing with the despotic Courts and Cabinets. He had not, it was true, the ability of the Nesselrodes or Metternichs; but he was considered in the highest diplomatic circles as a person who might easily be led, and upon whom a certain show of deference would not be thrown away. It was supposed, also, that he regarded with particular dislike the recent changes in France, and was not favourable to the re-establishment of the Empire under the rule of Napoleon III. This veteran ally of the despotic powers was now associated with men whose former political opinions had differed greatly from his, but who were openmouthed and unscrupulous in their attacks upon the Emperor of the French. We need hardly remind our readers of the highly reprehensible language which was employed by Sir James Graham, and Sir Charles Wood—both of them Cabinet Ministers—in respect to the Emperor Napoleon, or of the foul and scurrilous attacks upon him with which, about the beginning of last year, the columns of the Liberal press abounded. All that is changed now. There is, indeed, plenty of invective and abuse, but it is directed towards another quarter. The French Emperor, formerly pilloried by the Coalitionists, has become the object of their laudation. The Russian Emperor, whom they formerly lauded, is now put into the pillory.
Such being the declared views of the Coalitionists in regard to France, it very naturally occurred to the Czar, that a more favourable opportunity could not possibly arise for detaching Britain from the side of France, and so rendering a future combination between these two powers impracticable. Accordingly, as the published correspondence shows, he did not lose a moment in opening his views to the British envoy at St Petersburg: France, as we have seen, was not to be consulted at all regarding the disposal of Turkey. Provided Britain and Russia were of accord, it mattered nothing what view might be taken by any other European power. France might do as she pleased, but the others would be an overmatch for her. Here are the expressions which the Emperor used on the 21st February:—
“His Imperial Majesty spoke of France. ‘God forbid,’ he said, ‘that I should accuse any one wrongfully, but there are circumstances both at Constantinople and Montenegro which are extremely suspicious; it looks very much as if the French Government were endeavouring to embroil us all in the East, hoping in this way the better to arrive at their own objects, one of which, no doubt, is the possession of Tunis.’
“The Emperor proceeded to say that, for his own part, he cared very little what line the French might think proper to take in Eastern affairs, and that little more than a month ago he had apprised the Sultan that if his assistance was required for resisting the menaces of the French, it was entirely at the service of the Sultan!”
But for the temptation held out by the accession of the Coalition Ministry to power in Great Britain, it is more than improbable that the Czar would have made any overtures of the kind. But at the head of that Ministry he saw Lord Aberdeen, “who knows me so well, who has full confidence in me as I have in him”—the extent of that confidence being marked by the statement, that he was convinced he could bring his lordship to an understanding in the course of ten minutes’ conversation. He had also remarked that at least two members of the Cabinet, in violation both of decency and of their duty as Ministers of the Crown, had been indulging in coarse and unmannerly invective against the Sovereign of France; and, as a matter of course, he arrived at the conclusion that they would be more ready to coalesce with him than to ally themselves cordially with a government which they had spoken of in public in such unexampled terms of contempt. In this calculation, however, he was deceived. Wrong-headed as Lord John Russell is, we do not believe that he would, for one moment, have allowed himself to become a consenting party to such a flagitious transaction as the partition of Turkey; and the same thing may be said of Lord Palmerston, whose exclusion, through short-sighted jealousy, from the Foreign Office at that particular time, we must regard as a national misfortune. But that matters not in the consideration of the point before us. Both circumstance and time concur to show that it was the accession of the Coalition Ministry to power, and the unwarrantable language used by some of its members towards the Emperor of France, that encouraged the Czar to bring forward, and to put into shape, the project which, no doubt, he had long entertained, but which could not be previously pursued for the want of a fitting opportunity.
We regard, therefore, the formation of the Coalition Ministry in Britain as the event which directly led to the original overture—the hopes of the Czar being founded upon the political connections and understood tendencies of Lord Aberdeen, and also on the declared aversion of some of his colleagues to the head of the French Government. But for the formation of that Ministry the designs of Russia upon Turkey would have been postponed.
We have already commented upon the course which was pursued by the Ministry from the time when they were apprized of the designs of the Czar, down to that when the Danubian Principalities were invaded. We have expressed our opinion that a serious remonstrance, coupled with a plain intimation that Great Britain would not permit an occupation of the Turkish territory, would have sufficed during the earlier part of last year, and before any overt step was taken, to have deterred the Czar from proceeding with his project. We ground that view upon the policy which has been invariably pursued by Russia—which is to bully and cajole, not to fight. Let us grant that the possession of Constantinople is the darling project of the Czar—let us grant that, in order to attain it, he would run considerable risk, and submit to extraordinary sacrifices; still we are of opinion that had he been aware, before utterly committing himself, that he would be opposed by the combined forces of Britain and France, he never would have plunged into the contest. See what he risks. First, the annihilation of his fleets, both in the Baltic and in the Black Sea, for he can hardly hope to contend with Britain and France upon the waters. Next, the derangement and stoppage of trade, so vital to the real interests of Russia, and equivalent to a sentence of bankruptcy against many of her nobles and merchants, who depend entirely upon the amount and continuance of their exports. Then there are the chances of insurrection in Poland, and revolt in Finland; and the certainty that Russia, if worsted, will be so dismembered as to prevent her from again disturbing the peace of Europe. These are very serious considerations; and we may be certain that the Czar, great as his appetite undoubtedly is for appropriation, would rather have foregone his purposes upon Turkey, than have proceeded had he believed that the two Western powers would be firm and united in their resistance. Indeed, singular as it may appear, we are about to engage in a war for which no one country in Europe is desirous. Britain, with her eight hundred millions of debt, is by no means desirous to increase the burden of taxation, or to imperil or impede that commerce to which she owes so much of her greatness. In like manner France has no interest to go to war, for she also is heavily burdened, and the present Emperor has nothing so much at heart as to restore the state of the finances. Austria has anything but an interest that war should take place, for in that event, if she takes the side of Russia, there will be immediate insurrection both in Hungary and Lombardy; and if she takes the other side, she must quarrel with a very old partner in iniquity. Prussia has no interest, for the age of subsidies has gone by, and she is likely to suffer to whichever side she adheres; but most especially if she adopts the cause of Russia. Neutral she cannot remain. We need not say that Turkey, the state which is attacked, does not desire war; and we are thoroughly convinced that the Czar, were he not committed so deeply, would be glad to withdraw his pretensions. Now, who suffered him to commit himself so deeply? We answer, the Coalition Ministry.