The diet of 1807 was more remarkable. To the usual demands was added the royal proposition, that the "insurrection," or levée en masse, should be organised, and ready to march at the first signal. The patience of the nation was exhausted. The diet represented to the king, in firm but respectful addresses, the disorder in the finances produced by the amount of paper-money issued in disregard of their remonstrances, and called upon the government to repair the evil. They said that, during many years, the country had done enough to prove its fidelity to the sovereign, whose royal promises had not been fulfilled; and that henceforth the Hungarians could not expend their lives and fortunes in the defence of his hereditary states, unless he seriously took in hand the interests of their native country. They demanded the revision of the commercial system, and liberty freely to export the produce of the country, and freely to import the productions of other countries. They complained of a new depreciation of the currency, demanded a reduction of the duty on salt, (the produce of their own mines,) which had recently been augmented, and denounced "the injustice of paralysing the industry of a people, while requiring of them great sacrifices."
The justice of these representations was admitted, but no satisfactory answer was returned; and the murmurs at Presburg became loud enough to cause alarm at Vienna. The advance of Napoleon to the frontiers of Hungary turned the current of the national feeling. It was now the sacred soil of Hungary that was threatened with desecration, and the diet not only voted all the subsidies and 20,000 recruits, but the whole body of the nobles or freemen spontaneously offered one-sixth of their incomes, and a levée en masse was decreed for three years. Napoleon's attempts to detach the Hungarians from the cause of their king were unavailing, and their devotion to his person was never more conspicuous than when he had lost the power to reward it.
In 1811 the royal propositions, in addition to the usual demands, requested the diet to vote an extraordinary supply of twelve millions of florins, and to guarantee Austrian paper money to the amount of one hundred millions, (about ten millions sterling.) The diet called for the account of the previous expenditure, and were told that the details of the budget were secrets of state. This answer excited the greatest indignation, and they refused to vote any extraordinary supply till the accounts were produced. They complained that the finances of Hungary were administered by Austrians—foreigners, who were excluded by law from a voice in their affairs—and that the cabinet of the emperor had illegally mixed up the finances of Hungary with those of the hereditary states of Austria. Some members of the diet even threatened to impeach the ministers. In their addresses to the throne, the financial administration of the imperial government was roughly handled; and the cabinet, perceiving that the debates at Presburg had inconveniently directed attention, even in the Hereditary States, to financial questions, hastily withdrew their propositions.
The peace of 1815 restored to Europe the repose she had long desired, and to Hungary many of her sons who had long been absent. In the midst of war, her diet had never ceased to attend to the internal administration of the country, to the improvement of her resources, and the advancement of her population in material prosperity and intelligence. All the comprehensive measures prepared with this view had been postponed or neglected by the king, acting by the advice of his Austrian cabinet, and supported by a powerful party of the magnates of Hungary. But though her hopes had been disappointed, Hungary had never failed, in any moment of difficulty or danger, to apply her whole power and resources to the defence of the empire. She never sought, in the embarrassments, the defeat, and misfortunes of Austria, an opportunity to extort from her king the justice he had denied to her prayers. She never for a moment swerved from devoted allegiance to her constitutional monarch. "After all, she had too much honour to allow the majesty of the King of Hungary to be insulted by his enemies." She forgave the frequent delays and refusals, by which the most salutary measures had been frustrated or rejected, because she knew that the thoughts and the energies of her sovereign and his Austrian cabinet had been directed to the defence of the empire, and the preservation of its independence. But now that these were no longer threatened, that the good cause for which she had fought with so much gallantry and devotion had triumphed, she had a right to expect a grateful return for her services—or at least that the promises, on the faith of which she had lavished her blood and her treasure in defence of her king and of his Austrian dominions, would be fulfilled. But the republican outbreak in France had led to long years of war and desolation; the triumph of monarchy and order over anarchy had at length been achieved, and men had not only abjured the doctrines from which so much evil had sprung, but monarchs had learned to look with distrust on every form of government that permitted the expression of public opinion, or acknowledged the right of the people to be heard. Even the mixed government of England, to which order owed its triumph, was regarded as a danger and a snare to other countries. The Holy Alliance was formed, and the Austrian cabinet, which for more than twenty years had flattered the hopes of Hungary when it wanted her assistance, now boldly resolved to govern that kingdom without the aid of its diet. In vain did the county assemblies call for the convocation of the national parliament, which the king was bound, by the laws he had sworn to observe, to summon every three years. Their addresses were not even honoured with an answer. In 1822, an attempt was made to levy imposts and troops by royal edicts. The comitats (county assemblies) refused to enforce them. In 1823, bodies of troops were sent—first to overawe, and then to coerce them. The county officers concealed their archives and official seals, and dispersed. Royal commissioners were appointed to perform their functions, and were almost everywhere resisted. The whole administration of the country, civil and judicial, was in confusion; and, after an unseemly and damaging contest, the cabinet found it necessary, in 1825, to give way, and to summon the diet, after an interval of twelve years. One personal anecdote will convey a more correct impression of the feelings with which the Hungarians, who were most attached to the emperor-king, viewed these proceedings, than any detail we could give. John Nemet, Director Causarum Regalium of Hungary, at a personal interview with the king, denounced the proceedings of the cabinet. "Do you know," said the irritated monarch, "that I am emperor and king; that you may lose your head?" "I know," replied Nemet, "that my life is in your majesty's hands; but the liberty of my country, and the honour of my sovereign, are dearer to me than my life."
When the diet met in 1825, the king, in his reply to the address, admitted that "things had happened which ought not to have occurred, and which should not occur again." The diet did not conceal its resentment. The comitat of Zala, through its representatives, demanded the names of the traitors who had misled the king; and the representatives of all the other counties supported the proposition. One of the royal commissioners came in tears to apologise to the diet; another, who attempted to justify himself on the ground of obedience to the king, was told that a faithful subject honoured his sovereign when he reminded him of his duty. The articles of 1790 were declared to have been openly violated, and the diet complained that the public security had been outraged by arrests and prosecutions, founded on anonymous denunciations. The address to the king, in which they set forth their grievances, concluded with the following petition:—
"Convinced that these acts do not emanate from your Majesty, but that they proceed from a system constantly pursued for several centuries, we entreat your Majesty henceforth not to listen to evil counsels—to despise anonymous denunciations—not to exact any impost or any levy of soldiers without the concurrence of the diet—to reinstate the citizens disgraced for having legally resisted the royal commissioners, and regularly to convoke the states, with whom you share the sovereign power."
In his answer, Francis blamed the diet for their proceedings, but wisely conceded their demands. By article 3d of 1825, he engaged to observe the fundamental laws of the kingdom. By article 4th, never to levy subsidies without the concurrence of the diet; by article 5th, to convoke the diet every three years.
The attempt of Francis II. to subvert the constitution of Hungary terminated, as the similar attempt of Joseph II. had terminated thirty-five years before—in renewed acknowledgments of the independence of Hungary, and the constitutional rights of the Hungarians.
After three centuries of contention, the cabinet of Vienna now appeared to have abandoned the hope it had so long entertained, of imposing upon Hungary the patriarchal system of Austria. Relinquishing the attempt to enforce illegal edicts, it relied upon means more in accordance with the practice of constitutional governments. It could command a majority at the table of Magnates, and it endeavoured, by influencing the elections, to strengthen its party in the Deputies. But in this kind of warfare the cabinet of an absolute monarch were far less skilful than the popular leaders of a representative assembly. The attempts to influence the elections by corrupt means were generally unsuccessful, and, when exposed, exhibited the government in a light odious to a people tenacious of their liberties and distrustful of Austria.
There had long been two parties in the diet, of which one, from supporting the views of the court, was considered Austrian; the other, from its avowed desire to develop the popular institutions and separate nationality of Hungary, was considered Hungarian, and took the designation of the patriotic party. There was thus a government party and an opposition, which, in 1827, was systematically organised. But as Hungary had not a separate ministry, responsible to the diet, that could be removed from office by its votes, there was little ground for the usual imputation of a struggle for place. The patriotic party could expect no favour from the court; their opposition was, therefore, so far disinterested, and was, in fact, founded upon the instructions of the counties they represented.