This is the entire force, so far as European troops are concerned, which is on foot to protect the immense British dominions in the four quarters of the globe! And as the entire regular force in Great Britain and Ireland is only 61,848 men, with 40 guns equipped for the field—and at least a fifth of every military force must always be deducted for sick, absent, and deserters—it follows that 50,000 men, with 40 guns, is the very utmost of regular troops that could be relied on in both islands to meet an enemy. Of this at least 20,000 would require to be left in Ireland; so that 30,000 men alone could be assembled in the last extremity for the defence of Great Britain! As to the pensioners and yeomanry, they would be entirely absorbed in forming garrisons, keeping up the communications, and preserving tranquillity in the manufacturing towns in the interior.
Formidable as this state of matters is, it becomes doubly serious when the state of our naval force is considered.
In 1792, before the war broke out, and when our population was not a half, nor our commerce and colonial dominions a fourth of what they now are, the naval force of Great Britain was—
| Ships of the line, of which 115 were effective, | 156 |
| Frigates, | 97[5] |
At this moment our naval force stands as follows:—
| Ships of the line, and building, of which 65 are serviceable, | 93 |
| 50 to 70 gun ships, | 39 |
| Frigates, | 110 |
| War-steamers, | 56 |
The forces of the principal maritime powers of the globe, Spain being effete, stand thus:—
| FRANCE. | |
|---|---|
| Line, | 46 |
| Frigates, | 50 |
| Steamers of war, | 102 |
| RUSSIA. | |
| Line, | 45 |
| Frigates, | 30 |
| AMERICA. | |
| Line, | 11 |
| Frigates, | 14 |
| War-steamers, | 14[6] |
Thus Russia and France could produce 85 ships of the line, 80 frigates, and 102 war-steamers, against our 65 or 70 of the line, 147 frigates, and 56 war-steamers. A disproportion sufficiently great for a country which boasts of being mistress of the waves: the more especially when it is recollected that both these hostile nations are actuated by the greatest jealousy of our naval power, and envy of our commercial greatness, and that we have so managed our foreign policy that, not six months ago, we were within a hairsbreadth of a war with both united. We are aware of the resources which, if the contest were prolonged for any considerable period, would arise to this country from the steam-packets to America and the West Indies, which their owners are taken bound, on an emergency, to place at the disposal of the Admiralty. But this provision, though a most wise and judicious one, and of very great moment in a lengthened conflict, would obviously be of little or no avail if war surprised us, as to all appearance it will do, in our usual state of fancied security and entire want of preparation, and a Russian fleet of twenty-five ships of the line from the Baltic anchors off the Nore, simultaneously with a French one of ten off Portsmouth, with as little warning or intimation as Admiral Parker gave to the Russians when he appeared at the mouth of the Dardanelles, or to the Greek Government when he cast anchor off the harbour of the Piræus.
But the danger becomes incomparably greater, and assumes the most portentous aspect, when two other circumstances connected with our naval situation are taken into consideration, of vital importance in this question, but which the advocates for reduction studiously keep out of view in its discussion.