The first is, the immense extent of the colonial empire we have to defend, and the consequent unavoidable dispersion of our naval force, such as it is, over the whole globe. This appears in the most decisive manner from the table quoted below, taken from the United Service Gazette for December 1850, showing the distribution of our ships of the line in commission up to 25th November last.

GREAT BRITAIN: ON COMMISSION, AND GUARDSHIPS.MEDITERRANEAN.COLONIES, AND EXPERIMENTAL SQUADRON.
Guns. Guns. Guns.
Bellerophon,78Albion,90Asia,84
Britannia,120Caledonia,120Hastings,72
Cumberland,72Ganges,84Imaum,72
Hogue,60Powerful,84Indefatigable,50
Impregnable,104Superb,80Leander,50
Monarch,84Queen,110Phæton,50
Ocean,80Portland,50
Saturn,72Prince Regent,92
St George,120Southampton,50
Trafalgar,120Wellesley,72
Vengeance,84
Victory,101
Blenheim,56
Line and Guardships,136 10

This shows that out of twenty-eight line-of-battle ships and fifties in commission at that period, only thirteen were in the British harbours, and even including the Experimental Squadron, only fifteen. Of these, at least a half are mere guardships—such as the Victory at Portsmouth—of little real use but to furnish a mast for the Admiral on the station to hoist his flag. Of the six or seven that really are fit for sea, not more than one half are fully manned. Accordingly, it is universally known among naval men, that there are not more than three or four ships of the line that could on a sudden emergency be got ready for sea in the British harbours: being not half the force which the Danes had when they were suddenly attacked by Nelson in 1801, and by Lord Cathcart in 1807. On the first occasion, they had nine ships of the line and floating batteries moored off Copenhagen: on the last, eighteen ships of the line were taken by the victors, and brought to the British shores.

We are often told of the immense force which England now has in her steam-vessels—more numerous, it is said, and unquestionably better manned and navigated than any in Europe; and the "Excellent," at Portsmouth, is referred to as able at a moment's warning to furnish the requisite amount of experienced gunners. Fully admitting the high discipline and training of the gunners on board the Excellent, of whose merits we are well aware, they cannot do impossibilities. They amount only to five hundred men; and what are they to the forces requisite to defend the British shores against a combined French and Russian fleet, such as we all but brought upon us last April, when the French ambassador left London? What could four or five hundred trained gunners do when scattered over fifteen or twenty sail of the line, and as many steamers, the crews of which were suddenly huddled together—supposing them got at all—from the merchant service, where they had received no sort of training in naval warfare? What could the peace steam-boats, not pierced for a single gun, do against the broadsides of the Russian line-of-battle ships, or the huge war-steamers which excited such astonishment among our naval men, when exhibited at the late review at Cherbourg? The thing is quite ridiculous. They would furnish, in Napoleon's words, ample chair au cannon, and nothing more.

Contrast this now with the state of preparation in which the French and Russian navies are kept, in consequence of their having both a regular force raised by conscription, and constantly paid and under arms like their land forces, wherewith to commence the conflict. The Czar has always twenty ships of the line and ten frigates in the Baltic, completely equipped and ready for sea, with 30,000 soldiers ready to step on board of them; and it would be surprising if, in passing the Sound, they were not reinforced by the six ships of the line and steam-frigates at the disposal of Denmark,[7] who would desire nothing better than to return, in a manner equally unexpected, the sudden visits we paid her in 1801 and 1807. France, in addition to sixteen ships of the line in commission, and double that number of war-steamers, has no less than 55,000 seamen ready to be called on, like the national guard, at a moment's warning, perfectly trained to gunnery and warlike duties, who could man double that number of line-of-battle ships and war-steamers.

"The French nation, however, deeming it unsafe to rest on any such frail contingency as voluntary enlistment, has wisely, as well as justly, decreed that her maritime districts and commercial marine shall be subject to the same obligation to serve their country as the other classes of the community; and, accordingly, by the laws of France, every boy who goes to sea is required to register his name on the 'Inscription Marine.' After one year's probation, he enters into the class of 'Mousses' until he is sixteen, when he becomes a 'novice' or apprentice till eighteen, when he is classed as a marine or seaman, and he is thenceforward at the service of the state till he is fifty years of age. Besides this, about 1/20 of the general conscription throughout the inland provinces are by law liable to serve in the navy. By the above arrangements, it appears that between the year 1835 and 1844, both inclusive, 55,517 seamen answered the calls of the annual Levée permanente, and, moreover, that very nearly the whole of the French merchant seamen, amounting altogether to upwards of 100,000 men, must have passed successively through the royal navy.

"Under this admirable system—which, while it flatters the passions, cultivates the mind, and comfortably provides for the sailor,—the French nation are prepared, by beat of drum, to march from their various quarters to their respective ships, compagnies permanentes of well-trained gunner seamen; and thus, at a moment's warning, even in time of peace, to complete the manning of sixteen sail of the line."—Sir Francis Head, 184, 185.

It is no exaggeration, therefore, but the simple truth, to say, that France and Russia could, in ten days from the time that their respective ambassadors left London, appear with a fleet of thirty ships of the line and forty frigates or war-steamers in the Channel, with which they could with ease blockade the Thames, Portsmouth, and Plymouth, where not more, at the very utmost, than eight or ten line-of-battle ships, and ten or twelve war-steamers, most of them only half manned, could be collected to oppose them. We have no doubt the crews of this diminutive fleet would do their duty as nobly as they did at the Nile and Trafalgar; but we shudder at the thought of the national blindness and infatuation which would expose them, and with them the existence of England as an independent nation, to such fearful odds.

In any such conflict, it is by the forces which can suddenly be rendered available that everything will be determined. It may be quite true that England possesses resources in the vast extent of her mercantile navy and steam-vessels, and the undaunted character of her seamen, which, in any prolonged contest, would give her the same superiority which she maintained throughout the last war; but it is not the less true, that this contingent ultimate superiority would be of no avail to avert disaster—it may be conquest—if the enemy, by having their forces better in hand, and available in the outset, were in a situation to gain an advantage which could never be recovered from in the commencement. It is impossible to overestimate the shock to credit, and ruin to the best interests of the empire, which would arise from a blockade of our harbours even for a single fortnight. Of what would it avail us that we had six noble sail of the line, and double that number of war-steamers in the Mediterranean, and as many scattered through the world, from China to California, if the Thames, the Mersey, and the Clyde, were blockaded by hostile fleets, and Portsmouth and Plymouth could only furnish five or six half-manned line-of-battle ships to raise the blockade? Russia has no colonies; France, next to none: thus the whole naval forces of both these Powers could be brought to bear, without deduction or defalcation of any sort, on Great Britain, more than half of whose navy is necessarily scattered over the globe. Our distant fleets would, in such a crisis, avail us as little as an army of pawns, with bishops and knights, would a chess-player who had received checkmate.

In the next place, these considerations become doubly powerful when it is recollected how very peculiar and tardy is the mode of collecting men, which alone is now thought of in the British navy. It is not generally known by landsmen—though hereafter they may come to know it to their cost—that in England at present there is neither any standing royal naval force, nor any compulsory means of levying it. By our great naval establishment and right of impressing seamen, we had, practically speaking, both during the war: but these days are past. The navy sailors are changed as ships come into harbour, and the right of impressment has virtually become obsolete. When a ship, after two or three years' service, comes into port, she is immediately paid off, and a new set of sailors, wholly ignorant of war, are slowly got together by the next captain who gets that or a corresponding ship; who in their turn, when they begin to become expert at their new duties, are displaced to make way for a third body of untrained men! What should we say to a manufacturer, a merchant, or a general, who should conduct things in this manner? Yet, such as it is, it is the system of the British navy. This subject, of vital importance, has been so well illustrated by two gallant naval officers, that we cannot do better than quote their admirable observations on it.