Lichnowsky states that a few days after the Serajevo murder of June 28, 1914, he was in Berlin, and from interviews with Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg he found that the latter did not share the Prince's belief that peace might be maintained, and complained of Russian armaments. The memorandum continues:
I then went to Dr. Zimmermann, who was representing Herr von Jagow, [Foreign Secretary,] and from him learned that Russia was about to raise 900,000 fresh troops. His words showed an unmistakable animosity toward Russia, which, he said, was everywhere in our way. Of course, I was not told that General von Moltke was pressing for war. I learned, however, that Herr von Tschereschky [the German Ambassador in Vienna] had received a rebuke because he reported that he had advised moderation in Vienna toward Serbia.
Subsequently I learned that at a decisive conversation in Potsdam July 5 an inquiry addressed to us by Vienna found positive assent among all personages in authority. Indeed, they added that there would be no harm if war with Russia were to result. I received instruction that I was to induce the English press to take up a friendly attitude if Austria gave the deathblow to the Great Serbian movement, and as far as possible I was, by my influence, to prevent public opinion opposing Austria.
I gave warning against the whole project, which I described as adventurous and dangerous, and I advised that moderation be recommended to the Austrians because I did not believe in localization of conflict.
Herr von Jagow answered me that Russia was not ready, that there doubtless would be a certain amount of bluster, but that the more firmly we stood by Austria the more would Russia draw back. He said Austria already was accusing us of want of spirit and we must not squeeze her; and that, on the other hand, feeling in Russia was becoming ever more anti-German and so we must simply risk it.
I knew that Sir Edward Grey's influence in Petrograd could be turned to use in favor of peace, so I used my friendly relations with Sir Edward, [British Foreign Secretary,] and in confidence begged him to advise moderation in Russia if Austria demanded satisfaction from Serbia.
At first the attitude of the English press was calm and friendly to the Austrians because the murder was condemned, but gradually more and more voices were heard to insist that, however necessary it was to punish the crime, exploitation of crime for political purposes could not be justified. Austria was strongly urged to show moderation.
When the ultimatum appeared, all the papers, except The Standard, which was always like slow water and apparently was paid by the Austrians, were as one in their condemnation. The whole world, except in Berlin and Vienna, understood that it meant war, and indeed a world war.
The British fleet, which chanced to be assembled for review, was not demobilized.
England and Russia for Peace