At first I pressed for a conciliatory answer as far as possible on the part of Serbia, since the attitude of the Russian Government left no further doubt of the seriousness of the situation. The Serbian reply was in accordance with the British efforts, and everything actually had been accepted except two points, about which a readiness to negotiate had been expressed.
If Russia and England had wanted war in order to fall upon us a hint to Belgrade would have been sufficient, and the unheard of [Austrian] note would have remained unanswered. Sir Edward Grey went through the Serbian reply with me and pointed to the conciliatory attitude of the Government at Belgrade. We then discussed his mediation proposal, which was to arrange an interpretation of the two points acceptable to both parties.
Cambon, [French Ambassador in London,] Marquis Imperiali, [Italian Ambassador in London,] and I should have met under Sir Edward Grey's presidency, and it would have been easy to find an acceptable form for the disputed points which, in the main, concerned the participation of Austrian officials in the investigation at Belgrade.
Given good will, everything could have been settled in one or two sittings, and mere acceptance of the British proposal would have relieved the tension and would further have improved our relations to England. I urgently recommended the proposal, saying that otherwise a world war was imminent, in which we had everything to lose and nothing to gain.
In vain! I was told that it was against the dignity of Austria and that we did not want to interfere in the Serbian business but left it to our ally. I was told to work for localization of conflict. Of course, it would only have needed a hint from Berlin to make Count Berchtold, Austrian Foreign Minister, satisfy himself with a diplomatic success and put up with the Serbian reply, but this hint was not given.