The treaty was practically complete at the time of the King's visit to Berlin in May, 1913. A conversation then took place in Berlin under the Presidency of the Imperial Chancellor, (Herr von Bethmann Hollweg,) in which I took part, and at which special wishes were laid down. On my return to London I succeeded, with the help of my Counselor of Embassy, von Kühlmann, who was working upon the details of the treaty with Mr. Parker, in putting through our last proposals also. It was possible for the whole treaty to be initialed by Sir Edward Grey and myself in August, 1913, before I went on leave. Now, however, new difficulties were to arise, which prevented the signature, and it was only a year later, shortly before the outbreak of war, that I was able to obtain authorization for the final settlement. Signature, however, never took place.
Sir Edward Grey was willing to sign only if the treaty was published, together with the two treaties of 1898 and 1899; England has no other secret treaties, and it is contrary to her existing principles that she should conceal binding agreements. He said, however, that he was ready to take account of our wishes concerning the time and manner of publication, provided that publication took place within one year, at latest, after the signature. In the [Berlin] Foreign Office, however, where my London successes aroused increasing dissatisfaction, and where an influential personage, [the reference is apparently to Herr von Stumm,] who played the part of Herr von Holstein, was claiming the London Embassy for himself, it was stated that the publication would imperil our interests in the colonies, because the Portuguese would show their gratitude by giving us no more concessions. The accuracy of this excuse is illuminated by the fact that the old treaty was most probably just as much long known to the Portuguese as our new agreements must have been, in view of the intimacy of relations between Portugal and England; it was illuminated also by the fact that, in view of the influence which England possesses at Lisbon, the Portuguese Government is completely powerless in face of an Anglo-German understanding.
WRECKING THE TREATY
Consequently, it was necessary to find another excuse for wrecking the treaty. It was said that the publication of the Windsor Treaty, which was concluded in the time of Prince Hohenlohe, and which was merely a renewal of the treaty of Charles II., which had never lapsed, might imperil the position of Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, as being a proof of British hypocrisy and perfidy! On this I pointed out that the preamble to our treaties said exactly the same thing as the Windsor Treaty and other similar treaties—namely, that we desired to protect the sovereign rights of Portugal and the integrity of its possessions!
In spite of repeated conversations with Sir Edward Grey, in which the Minister made ever fresh proposals concerning publication, the [Berlin] Foreign Office remained obstinate, and finally agreed with Sir Edward Goschen [British Ambassador in Berlin] that everything should remain as it was before. So the treaty, which gave us extraordinary advantages, the result of more than one year's work, had collapsed because it would have been a public success for me.
When in the Spring of 1914 I happened, at a dinner in the embassy, at which Mr. Harcourt [then Colonial Secretary] was present, to mention the matter, the Colonial Secretary said that he was embarrassed and did not know how to behave. He said that the present state of affairs was intolerable, because he [Mr. Harcourt] wanted to respect our rights, but, on the other hand, was in doubt as to whether he should follow the old treaty or the new. He said that it was therefore extremely desirable to clear matters up, and to bring to a conclusion an affair which had been hanging on for so long.
"A DISASTROUS MISTAKE"
When I reported to this effect I received a rude and excited order, telling me to refrain from any further interference in the matter.
I now regret that I did not go to Berlin in order to offer his Majesty my resignation, and that I still did not lose my belief in the possibility of an agreement between me and the leading [German] personages. That was a disastrous mistake, which was to be tragically avenged some months later.
Slight though was the extent to which I then still possessed the good-will of the Imperial Chancellor—because he feared that I was aiming at his office—I must do him the justice to say that at the end of June, 1914, in our last conversation before the outbreak of war, he gave his consent to the signature and publication. Nevertheless, it required further repeated suggestions on my part, which were supported by Dr. Solf, [German Colonial Secretary,] in order at last to obtain official consent at the end of July. Then the Serbian crisis was already threatening the peace of Europe, and so the completion of the treaty had to be postponed. The treaty is now one of the victims of the war.