BAGDAD RAILWAY TREATY
[This portion is translated from the Stockholm Politiken of March 26.]
At the same time, while the African agreement was under discussion, I was negotiating, with the effective co-operation of Herr von Kühlmann, the so-called Bagdad Railway Treaty. This aimed, in fact, at the division of Asia Minor into spheres of interest, although this expression was carefully avoided in consideration of the Sultan's rights. Sir Edward Grey declared repeatedly that there was no agreement between England and France aiming at a division of Asia Minor.
In the presence of the Turkish representative, Hakki Pasha, all economic questions in connection with the German treaty were settled mainly in accordance with the wishes of the Ottoman Bank. The greatest concession Sir Edward Grey made me personally was the continuation of the line to Basra. We had not insisted on this terminus in order to establish connection with Alexandretta. Hitherto Bagdad had been the terminus of the line. The shipping on the Shatt el Arab was to be in the hands of an international commission. We also obtained a share in the harbor works at Basra, and even acquired shipping rights on the Tigris, hitherto the monopoly of the firm of Lynch.
By this treaty the whole of Mesopotamia up to Basra became our zone of interest, whereby the whole British rights, the question of shipping on the Tigris, and the Wilcox establishments were left untouched, as well as all the district of Bagdad and the Anatolian railways.
The British economic territories included the coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Smyrna-Aidin railway, the French Syria, and the Russian Armenia. Had both treaties been concluded and published, an agreement would have been reached with England which would have finally ended all doubt of the possibility of an Anglo-German co-operation.
GERMAN NAVAL DEVELOPMENT
Most difficult of all, there remained the question of the fleet. It was never quite rightly judged. The creation of a mighty fleet on the other shore of the North Sea and the simultaneous development of the Continent's most important military power into its most important naval power had at least to be recognized by England as uncomfortable. This presumably cannot be doubted. To maintain the necessary lead and not to become dependent, to preserve the supremacy of the sea, which Britain must have in order not to go down, she had to undertake preparations and expenses which weighed heavily on the taxpayer. A threat against the British world position was made in that our policy allowed the possibility of warlike development to appear. This possibility was obviously near during the Morocco crisis and the Bosnian question.
People had become reconciled to our fleet in its definite strength. Obviously it was not welcome to the British and constituted one of the motives, but neither the only nor the most important motive, for England's joining hands with Russia and France. On account of our fleet alone, however, England would have drawn the sword as little as on account of our trade, which it is pretended called forth her jealousy and ultimately brought about war.
From the beginning I adopted the standpoint that in spite of the fleet it would be possible to come to a friendly understanding and reapprochement if we did not propose new votes of credit, and, above all, if we carried out an indisputable peace policy. I also avoided all mention of the fleet, and between me and Sir Edward Grey the word was never uttered. Sir Edward Grey declared on one occasion at a Cabinet meeting: "The present German Ambassador has never mentioned the fleet to me."