[6] Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe, p. 225.
[7] Yet he leaves open the question whether the Deity has annexed thought to matter as a faculty, or whether it rests on a distinct spiritual principle.
[8] Locke half playfully touches on certain monsters, with respect to which it is difficult to determine whether they ought to be called men. (Essay, book iii. ch. vi. sect. 26, 27.)
[9] A similar coincidence between the teleological and the modern evolutional way of viewing things is to be met with in Locke’s account of the use of pain in relation to the preservation of our being (bk. ii. ch. vii. sect. 4).
[10] Philosophy of History (1893), p. 103, where an interesting sketch of the growth of the idea of progress is to be found.
[11] G.H. Lewes points out that Leibnitz is inconsistent in his account of the intelligence of man in relation to that of lower animals, since when answering Locke he no longer regards these as differing in degree only.
[12] Both Lewes and du Bois Reymond have brought out the points of contact between Leibnitz’s theory of monads and modern biological speculations (Hist. of Phil. ii. 287, and Leibnitzsche Gedanken in der modernen Naturwissenschaft, p. 23 seq.).
[13] For Herder’s position in relation to the modern doctrine of evolution see F. von Bärenbach’s Herder als Vorgänger Darwins, a work which tends to exaggerate the proximity of the two writers.
[14] Kant held it probable that other planets besides our earth are inhabited, and that their inhabitants form a scale of beings, their perfection increasing with the distance of the planet which they inhabit from the sun.
[15] Kant calls the doctrine of the transmutation of species “a hazardous fancy of the reason.” Yet, as Strauss and others have shown, Kant’s mind betrayed a decided leaning at times to a more mechanical conception of organic forms as related by descent.