After Aristotle we have, as regards logic, what the verdict of after times has rightly characterized as an age of Epigoni. So far as the Aristotelian framework is accepted we meet only minor corrections and extensions of a formal kind. If there is conscious and purposed divergence from Aristotle, inquiry moves, on the whole, within the circle of ideas where Aristotelianism had fought its fight and won its victory. Where new conceptions emerge, the imperfection of the instruments, mechanical and methodological, of the sciences renders them unfruitful, until their rediscovery in a later age. We have activity without advance, diversity without development. Attempts at comprehensiveness end in the compromises of eclecticism.
Illustrations are not far to seek. Theophrastus and in general the elder Peripatetics, before the rise of new schools with new lines of cleavage and new interests had led to new antagonisms and new alliances, do not break away from the Aristotelian The Peripatetics. metaphysic. Their interests, however, lie in the sublunary sciences in which the substantive achievement of the school was to be found. With Theophrastus, accordingly, in his botanical inquiries, for example, the alternatives of classification, the normal sequence of such and such a character upon such another, the conclusion of rational probability, are what counts. It is perhaps not wholly fanciful to connect with this attitude the fact that Aristotle’s pupils dealt with a surer hand than the master with the conclusions from premises of unlike modality, and that a formal advance of some significance attributable to Theophrastus and Eudemus is the doctrine of the hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms.
The Stoics are of more importance. Despite the fact that their philosophic interests lay rather in ethics and physics, their activity in what they classified as the third department of speculation was enormous and has at least left ineffaceable The Stoics. traces on the terminology of philosophy. Logic is their word, and consciousness, impression and other technical words come to us, at least as technical words, from Roman Stoicism. Even inference, though apparently not a classical word, throws back to the Stoic name for a conclusion.[87] In the second place, it is in the form in which it was raised in connexion with the individualistic theory of perception with which the Stoics started, that one question of fundamental importance, viz. that of the criterion of truth, exercised its influence on the individualists of the Renaissance. Perception, in the view of the Stoics, at its highest both revealed and guaranteed the being of its object. Its hold upon the object involved the discernment that it could but be that which it purported to be. Such “psychological certainty” was denied by their agnostic opponents, and in the history of Stoicism we have apparently a modification of the doctrine of φαντασία καταληπτικὴ with a view to meet the critics, an approximation to a recognition that the primary conviction might meet with a counter-conviction, and must then persist undissipated in face of the challenge and in the last resort find verification in the haphazard instance, under varying conditions, in actual working. The controversy as to the self-evidence of perception in which the New Academy effected some sort of conversion of the younger Stoics, and in which the Sceptics opposed both, is one of the really vital issues of the decadence.
Another doctrine of the Stoics which has interest in the light of certain modern developments is their insistence on the place of the λεκτόν in knowledge. Distinct alike from thing and mental happening, it seems to correspond to “meaning” as it is used as a technical phrase now-a-days. This anticipation was apparently sterile. Along the same lines is their use of the hypothetical form for the universal judgment, and their treatment of the hypothetical form as the typical form of inference.
The Stoical categories, too, have an historical significance. They are apparently offered in place of those of Aristotle, an acquaintance with whose distinctions they clearly presume. Recognizing a linguistic side to “logical” theory with a natural development in rhetoric, the Stoics endeavour to exorcise considerations of language from the contrasted side. They offer pure categories arising in series, each successive one presupposing those that have gone before. Yet the substance, quality, condition absolute (πῶς ἔχον) and condition relative of Stoicism have no enduring influence outside the school, though they recur with eclectics like Galen. The Stoics were too “scholastic” in their speculations.
In Epicureanism logic is still less in honour. The practical end, freedom from the bondage of things with the peace it brings, is all in all, and even scientific inquiry is only in place as a means to this end. Of the apparatus of method the less Epicureans. the better. We are in the presence of a necessary evil. Yet, in falling back, with a difference, upon the atomism of Democritus, Epicurus had to face some questions of logic. In the inference from phenomena to further phenomena positive verification must be insisted on. In the inference from phenomena to their non-phenomenal causes, the atoms with their inaccessibility to sense, a different canon of validity obtains, that of non-contradiction.[88] He distinguishes too between the inference to combination of atoms as universal cause, and inference to special causes beyond the range of sense. In the latter case alternatives may be acquiesced in.[89] The practical aim of science is as well achieved if we set forth possible causes as in showing the actual cause. This pococurantism might easily be interpreted as an insight into the limitations of inverse method as such or as a belief in the plurality of causes in Mill’s sense of the phrase. More probably it reflects the fact that Epicurus was, according to tradition through Nausiphanes, on the whole dominated by the influences that produced Pyrrhonism. Democritean physics without a calculus had necessarily proved sterile of determinate concrete results, and this was more than enough to ripen the naturalism of the utilitarian school into scepticism. Some reading between the lines of Lucretius has led the “logic” of Epicurus to have an effect on the modern world, but scarcely because of its deserts.
The school of Pyrrho has exercised a more legitimate influence. Many of the arguments by which the Sceptics enforced their advocacy of a suspense of judgment are antiquated in type, but many also are, within the limits of the individualistic The Sceptics. theory of knowledge, quite unanswerable. Hume had constant recourse to this armoury. The major premise of syllogism, says the Pyrrhonist, is established inductively from the particular instances. If there be but one of these uncovered by the generalization, this cannot be sound. If the crocodile moves its upper, not its lower, jaw, we may not say that all animals move the lower jaw. The conclusion then is really used to establish the major premise, and if we still will infer it therefrom we fall into the circular proof.[90] Could Mill say more? But again. The inductive enumeration is either of all cases or of some only. The former is in an indeterminate or infinite subject-matter impossible. The latter is invalid.[91] Less familiar to modern ears is the contention that proof needs a standard or criterion, while this standard or criterion in turn needs proof. Or still more the dialectical device by which the sceptic claims to escape the riposte that his very argument presumes the validity of this or that principle, viz. the doctrine of the equipollence of counter-arguments. Of course the counter-contention is no less valid! So too when the reflection is made that scepticism is after all a medicine that purges out itself with the disease, the disciple of Pyrrho and Aenesidemus bows and says, Precisely! The sceptical suspension of judgment has its limits, however. The Pyrrhonist will act upon a basis of probabilities. Nay, he even treats the idea of cause[92] as probable enough so long as nothing more than action upon expectation is in question. He adds, however, that any attempt to establish it is involved in some sort of dilemma. That, for instance, cause as the correlate of effect only exists with it, and accordingly, cause which is come while effect is still to come is inconceivable.[93] From the subjectivist point of view, which is manifestly fundamental through most of this, such arguments suasory of the Pyrrhonist suspense of judgment (ἐποχή) are indeed hard to answer. It is natural, then, that the central contribution of the Sceptics to the knowledge controversy lies in the modes (τρόποι) in which the relativity of phenomena is made good, that these are elaborated with extreme care, and that they have a modern ring and are full of instruction even to-day. Scepticism, it must be confessed, was at the least well equipped to expose the bankruptcy of the post-Aristotelian dogmatism.
It was only gradually that the Sceptic’s art of fence was developed. From the time of Pyrrho overlapping Aristotle himself, who seems to have been well content to use the feints of more than one school among his predecessors, while showing that none of them could claim to get past his guard, down through a period in which the decadent academy under Carneades, otherwise dogmatic in its negations, supplied new thrusts and parries, to Aenesidemus in the late Ciceronian age, and again to Sextus Empiricus, there seems to have been something of plasticity and continuous progress. In this matter the dogmatic schools offer a marked contrast. In especial it is an outstanding characteristic of the younger rivals to Aristotelianism that as they sprang up suddenly into being to contest the claims of the Aristotelian system in the moment of its triumph, so they reached maturity very suddenly, and thereafter persisted for the most part in a stereotyped tradition, modified only when convicted of indefensible weakness. The 3rd century B.C. saw in its first half the close of Epicurus’ activity, and the life-work of Chrysippus, the refounder of Stoicism, is complete before its close. And subsequent variations seem to have been of a negligible where not of an eclectic character. In the case of Epicureanism we can happily judge of the tyranny of the literal tradition by a comparison of Lucretius with the recorded doctrine of the master. But the rule apparently obtains throughout that stereotype and compromise offer themselves as the exhaustive alternative. This is perhaps fortunate for the history of doctrine, for it produces the commentator, your Aspasius or Alexander of Aphrodisias, and the substitute for the critic, your Cicero, or your Galen with his attempt at comprehension of the Stoic categories and the like while starting from Aristotelianism. Cicero in particular is important as showing the effect or philosophical eclecticism upon Roman cultivation, and as the often author and always popularizer of the Latin terminology of philosophy.
The cause of the stereotyping of the systems, apart from political conditions, seems to have been the barrenness of science. Logic and theory of knowledge go together, and without living science, theory of knowledge loses touch with life, and logic becomes a perfunctory thing. Under such circumstances speculative interest fritters itself and sooner or later the sceptic has his way. Plato is full of the faith of mathematical physics. Aristotle is optimistic of achievement over the whole range of the sciences. But the divorce of science of nature from mathematics, the failure of biological inquiry to reach so elementary a conception as that of the nerves, the absence of chemistry from the circle of the sciences, disappointed the promise of the dawn and the relative achievement of the noon-day. There is no development. Physical science remains dialectical, and a physical experiment is as rare in the age of Lucretius as in that of Empedocles. The cause of eclecticism is the unsatisfying character of the creeds of such science, in conjunction with the familiar law that, in triangular or plusquam-triangular controversies a common hatred will produce an alliance based on compromise. A bastard Platonism through hostility to Stoicism may become agnostic. Stoicism through hostility to its sceptical critics may prefer to accept some of the positions of the dogmatic nihilist.
Of the later schools the last to arise was Neoplatonism. The mathematical sciences, at least, had not proved disappointing. For those of the school of Plato who refused the apostasy of the new academy, there was hope either in the mathematical Neoplatonism. side of the Pythagoreo-Platonic tradition, or in its ritual and theological side. Neoplatonism is philosophy become theosophy, or it is the sermon on the text that God geometrizes. It is of significance in the general history of thought as the one great school that developed after the decadence had set in. In its metaphysic it showed no failure in dialectical constructiveness. In the history of logic it is of importance because of its production of a whole series of commentators on the Aristotelian logic. Not only the Introduction of Porphyry, which had lasting effects on the Scholastic tradition, but the commentaries of Themistius, and Simplicius. It was the acceptance of the Aristotelian logic by Neoplatonism that determined the Aristotelian complexion of the logic of the next age. If Alexander is responsible for such doctrines as that of the intellectus acquisitus, it is to Porphyry, with his characteristically Platonist preference for the doctrine of universals, and for classification, that we owe the scholastic preoccupation with the realist controversy, and with the quinque voces, i.e. the Aristotelian predicables as restated by Porphyry.