But on this same 27th day of July, Grey, submitting to the intrigues of Russian and French diplomacy, had committed one very fateful step (Telegram to Buchanan, July 27):
I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression must produce. This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the first fleet which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland not to disperse for manoeuvre leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised.—(British "White Paper" No. 47.)
For Russia this order to the fleet meant very much more than a diplomatic action. Sazonof saw that the wind in London was turning in his favor and he made use of it. Among themselves the Russian diplomatists seem to have for a long time been clear and open in their discussion of their real object. You find among the documents of the Russian "Orange Book" the following telegram of Sazonof of July 25 to the Russian Ambassador in London:
In case of a new aggravation of the situation, possibly provoking on the part of the great powers' united action, [des actions conformes,] we count that England will not delay placing herself clearly on the side of Russia and France, with the view to maintaining the equilibrium of Europe, in favor of which she has constantly intervened in the past, and which would without doubt be compromised in the case of the triumph of Austria.—(Russian "Orange Paper" No. 17.)
There is no mention of Servia here, but Austria should not triumph. Russia's real intention, of course, was not placed so nakedly before the British Secretary of State, hence to him the appearance was maintained that the little State of the Sawe was the only consideration, although the Russian Army was already being mobilized with all energy.
On the 28th he wires to the Russian Ambassador, Count Benckendorff, to London to inform the British Government:
It seems to me that England is in a better position than any other power to make another attempt at Berlin to induce the German Government to take the necessary action. There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.—(British "White Paper" No. 54.)
The opinion subtly suggested upon him by Paris and Petersburg diplomacy, namely, that he should not use any pressure upon Russia, but upon Germany, now takes hold of Grey more and more. On July 29 he writes to the German Ambassador as follows:
In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would "press the button in the interests of peace."—(British "White Paper" No. 84.)
Petersburg, now assured of the support of Grey, becomes more and more outspoken for war. On the 28th Grey again expressed one of his softhearted propositions for peace. Mr. Sazonof hardly made the effort to hide his contempt. Buchanan telegraphs on the 29th as follows: