The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in your telegram of the 28th inst. was one of secondary importance. Under altered circumstances of situation he did not attach weight to it.... Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me to understand that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing frontier immediately, and a week or more would in any case elapse before mobilization was completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous situation it was necessary that we should in the meanwhile all work together.—(British "White Paper" No. 78.)
Naivete or Cynicism?
Here it really becomes impossible to judge where the naïveté of the British Secretary of State ends and cynicism begins, for Sazonof could not have told to him more plainly than in these lines that all Russia's ostensible readiness for peace served no other purpose than to win time to complete the strategical location of the Russian troops.
This point is emphasized by one document coming from a writer presumably unbiased, but presumably distrustful of Germany, wherein the confirmation is found that England and Russia had come to a full agreement during these days.
On July 30 the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires de l'Escaille in Petersburg reported to the Belgian Government upon the European crisis. Owing to the fast developing events of a warlike nature, this letter did not reach its address by mail, and it was published later on. The Belgian diplomatist writes:
It is undeniable that Germany tried hard here [that is, in Petersburg] and in Vienna to find any means whatsoever in order to forestall a general conflict....
And after M. de l'Escaille has told that Russia—what the Czar and his War Minister with their highest assurances toward Germany had denied—was mobilizing its own army, he continues:
Today at Petersburg one is absolutely convinced, yes, they have even received assurances in that direction, that England and France will stay by them. This assistance is of decisive importance and has contributed much to the victory of the [Russian] war party.
This settles Grey's pretended "attempts at mediation." The truth is that British politics decided to prevent a diplomatic success of Germany and Austria, now worked openly toward the Russian aim. "The exertion of pressure upon Berlin" included already a certain threat, mingled with good advice.
On July 23 Grey had only spoken of four possible powers in war; hence when on the German side some hope of England maintaining neutrality was indulged in, this impression rested upon Grey's own explanations. On July 29, however, after a political conversation with Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London, he adds an important personal bit of information. He wires concerning it to Berlin, to Goschen: