By Dr. Th. Schiemann.
The writings of Professor Schiemann of the University of Berlin, who is also the leading editorial writer of the Kreuz Zeitung, are regarded as inspired by the Kaiser's Government, and in some degree by the Kaiser himself. Dr. Schiemann is often spoken of as an intimate personal friend of the Kaiser. The subjoined article was, in the original, sent by Dr. Schiemann to Professor John Bates Clark of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, with the special request that it be translated and forwarded for publication in The New York Times Current History.
AFTER the great crisis of the first world war, which terminated in the Congress of Vienna, the relations of England to the German States were fairly good. People lived in the protecting shade of the great alliance; England was busy digesting the enormous prey which it had seized at the expense of all the other powers that had taken part in the war; Continental Europe was endeavoring, as best it could, to heal the wounds and sores which had remained behind as mementos of oppressive but, despite all, glorious years. France recuperated most rapidly; by the Treaties of Paris there had been recovered from it only part of the abundant harvest which it had gathered in consequence of the victories and the coercive policy of Napoleon; the national soil was still fertile and the national consciousness was still imbued with the "gloire" which the Corsican General, with the help of his own and of foreign troops, had won for the French name. The great disturbances of world peace that marked the years 1830, 1854, and 1870 were attributable to an incessant pursuit of new "gloire," to which all other aims were subordinate. Parallel with this French striving for new "gloire" was England's endeavor to keep the Continent in a feverish condition; this was the policy of Lord Palmerston, and with it was combined a hysterical fear of attack on the part of possible enemies that were thought to exist in Russia, and especially in France. At the same time an arrogant challenge was constantly held forth to all the nations of the earth, and an almost uninterrupted war was carried on against the small States adjoining England's colonies in Asia and Africa. Between the years 1856 and 1900 England waged no less than thirty-four such wars, and by so doing acquired 4,000,000 square miles of land and 57,000,000 subjects. In Europe after the year 1815 England, for the most part, kept peace; the Crimean war, which was a coalition war, constitutes an exception, and it was not England's fault that Prussia, too, was not drawn into that war, which concerned a specifically English interest. At that time English threats were quite as numerous as they were in the year 1863, when The Daily News declared King William I. an outlaw, and The Daily Mail proclaimed for him the fate of Charles I. The cause of this, however, was that in London it was looked upon as an interference with English interests that Bismarck, by his attitude during the Polish insurrection, had prevented the effectuation of a coalition directed against Russia. During the war of 1864 over Schleswig-Holstein the threats were renewed, and even then we began to hear the watchwords with which public opinion in England for a decade has been mobilized against us: A Germany organized on a military basis, and with a fleet at its command besides, indicates that the goal of that State's policy, even more than in the case of France, is world rule. At that time, too, however, France and Russia were regarded by English war makers as the country's real enemies, and this conviction, rather than ideal considerations of any kind whatsoever, accounts for the fact that in the years 1870 and 1871 English policy followed a neutral course. England wished to see France weakened, had not foreseen Germany's great success, and had reserved for future opportunities the settlement of accounts with Russia, its very annoying rival in Asia.
In other respects, however, Bismarck was by no means satisfied with the way in which England pursued its policy of "neutrality." He had expected, at least, that the English would condemn the war, begun, as it was, in such a criminal manner, and not that they would carry on with France a flourishing trade in weapons. "It is a surprising fact, pregnant with warning," he wrote in May, 1874, "that Mr. Gladstone succeeded so easily in holding the country to an attitude directly opposed to the traditional hostility of the English masses toward France." He had all the more reason to expect a different attitude in view of the fact that, as was well known in England, it had been out of regard for England that Bismarck in December, 1870, had refused an offer of peace from Thiers, which rested on the condition that Belgium should be united to France under the rule of King Leopold. After the battle of Sedan Lord Odo Russell and Disraeli aroused the fears of the English people over the possibility of a German invasion; but Bismarck, nevertheless, was thinking of an English-German alliance, which, on account of the blood relationship of the two dynasties, was by no means impracticable, and which to Queen Victoria would have seemed a natural combination. Subsequently, in the years 1873 and 1874, Bismarck negotiated with Lord Odo Russell in Berlin regarding a German-English alliance, and through Münster he also took up the matter with Disraeli, who denied very emphatically that he had French sympathies. Nothing, he said, was more incorrect. The two peoples, he alleged further, who alone could proceed hand in hand, and who must become more and more cognizant of that fact, were Germany and England. The power of France, he added, was on the wane, a fact regarding which the demoralization of the empire, the decrease of population, and the course of recent events left no room for doubt. Notwithstanding Disraeli's views, however, the alliance with England, as is well known, was never formed. The most serious obstacle was created by the fact that party government in England rendered binding obligations extraordinarily difficult. Then came all sorts of pinpricks, as, for instance, Derby's advocacy in the year 1875 of Gortchakoff's famous rescue campaign. But despite all Bismarck held fast to the idea of bringing about closer relations with England, and the formation of the alliance with Austria-Hungary confirmed him in that purpose. "We shall have to adjust our attitude more and more," he wrote to Schweinitz in March, 1880, "with the object of increasing the security of our relations with Austria and England." It was this political desire that prompted him to reject a Russian proposal to unite the four Eastern powers in a common protest against England's isolated procedure in connection with the occupation of Egypt. He wished to prevent England from being humiliated by a prearranged coalition. A letter from Bismarck to Salisbury (July 8, 1885) has been preserved, which is very characteristic of this friendly attitude of German policy. "As to politics," he writes, "I have not the slightest doubt that the traditional friendly relations between the two dynasties, as well as between the two nations, will give sufficient security for settling every existing or arising question in a conciliatory way."
With respect to the question of the Egyptian loan that was being discussed at that time, as well as with respect to the burning Afghan question, Bismarck adhered tenaciously to this policy, and later on, too, he was determined to spin the threads further. In the latter part of the Autumn of 1887 an exchange of letters again took place between Lord Salisbury and Prince Bismarck, wherein the latter gave expression to the idea that Austria and England were the natural allies of Germany. If they were opposed to an alliance it would be necessary for Germany to alter its policy entirely and to think about establishing more intimate relations with Russia. This, properly considered, was an invitation to enter into negotiations regarding an alliance treaty. But Salisbury, who hoped for a conflict of the Continental powers which would insure England's position of power for another generation, answered evasively, and Bismarck justly regarded his reply as a rejection. But such a conflict did not arise. The menacing danger brought about by Alexander III. was overcome by the publication of the German-Austrian treaty of alliance. Even then, however, Bismarck did not give up the idea of bringing about closer relations with England. In December, 1888, he wrote: "The promotion of common feeling with England is primo loco to be encouraged." If Bismarck had left behind a political testament this sentence would in all probability be contained in it. Such was also the attitude which our Emperor has consistently maintained from his accession to the throne until the outbreak of the present war. He was a favorite of the old Queen, and the treaty signed on July 1, 1890, whereby we obtained possession of Heligoland by relinquishing our claims to Witu and Zanzibar, was an outward sign of an honest endeavor on the part of both nations to bring about closer mutual relations. The mutual limitation of spheres of interest in East and West Africa in the year 1893, and the friendly adjustment of the conflict which Article III. of the British Agreement with the Congo Free State of the year 1894 had threatened to bring about, might be considered additional symptoms of this general disposition or tendency.
The year 1896, however, brought disturbances; the telegram which Emperor William on Jan. 5 sent to President Kruger, after the predatory invasion of Dr. Jameson had been fortunately repelled, was received very unfavorably in England, and led to demonstrations on the part of the British fleet, which, although they had a very provocative character, remained finally without lasting effect. The impression was created, however, that public opinion in England was very easily excited; it saw itself disturbed in the execution of a thoroughly considered political plan, and, as it were, caught in flagranti. But the fact that there were still deeper reasons for a gradually increasing mistrust of Germany is brought to light by Wilson's book, published in 1896, which, under the title "Made in Germany," developed a program of battle against Germany's rapidly growing economic power. Since then all steps taken by Germany in the pursuit of its internal as well as its external policy have been viewed with extraordinary disapprobation on the part of England. The adoption of our Naval bill by the Reichstag on March 28, 1898, the foundation of the Naval League two days later, the new East-Asiatic policy of Germany, which in the leasing of Kiao-Chau was exemplified in a manner not at all to the liking of the English politicians, the Emperor's trip to the Orient, which led to friendly relations between Turkey and Germany—all this was looked upon with the more displeasure in view of the fact that Emperor William in the Summer of 1895 had emphatically rejected a plan, proposed to him by Lord Salisbury, to divide up Turkey. In August, 1898, nevertheless, when the Fashoda crisis had strained the relations of England and France to the utmost, and when, at the same time, English-Russian relations were becoming critical in the Far East, an understanding between Germany and England, which might perhaps have the character of an alliance, seemed to be quite possible. Secretary of State von Bülow and the English Ambassador, Sir Frank Lascelles, took up the matter very earnestly, but it was impossible to secure from England the assurance that the entire English Government and Parliament would sanction an alliance. Russia warded off the menacing danger of a war with England by means of the well-known proposal which on May 18, 1899, led to the holding of the Disarmament Conference in The Hague, and Delcassé on Jan. 20, 1899, began, with reference to the Fashoda affair, the policy of retreat, which excluded France from the Nile territory. Then came England's war against the Boers. It is well known how the German Government during this war scrupulously maintained its neutrality (not according to the English method) despite the fact that all the sympathies of the German people were with the Boers in their struggle for freedom. It is not so well known, on the other hand, that the Imperial Government rejected a Russian proposal to form an alliance against England. That, too, was a service for which England has not thanked us. Of the tragedy in South Africa it has retained in mind only one incident, the so-called "Kruger Message," which it regarded as an interference with its right to do violence to a weaker power, figuratively speaking, as a slap in the face.
In the course of the war the old Queen died, and Edward VII. entered upon his fateful reign. Emperor William had gone over to London to attend the funeral of his grandmother, and Prince Henry had accompanied him, so that the dynastic relationship was made most conspicuous. After that the political relations of the two States seemed about to shape themselves most propitiously. Of the fact that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, concluded on Jan. 30, 1902, was directed against Russia, there was never for a moment any doubt; indeed it was Japan, not England, which took the initiative in bringing it about. On the other hand, the co-operation of English and German war vessels in adjusting the difficulties which both powers had with Venezuela was in complete harmony with the political wishes and convictions of Emperor William, who, like Bismarck at an earlier date, was of the opinion that the interests of the two nations could readily be reconciled. But in England that co-operation resulted in an excited anti-German campaign on the part of the press. The Times, The National Review, The Daily News, The Daily Telegraph, The Daily Express, and other newspapers vehemently attacked the Government for acting conjointly with us, and there can be no doubt that in so doing they gave expression, not to the ideas of the Balfour Ministry, but to the sentiments which, as was well known in those journalistic circles, were held by King Edward. Balfour, in an address which he delivered in Liverpool on Feb. 13, 1903, had opposed with great emphasis the arousing of English public opinion against Germany. "We wish," he said, "to bear in mind an old ideal, namely, that all the nations which stand in the front ranks of civilization should learn to work together in the interest of the whole, and that nothing any longer stands in the way of the realization of this high ideal save those national bitternesses, jealousies, and hostilities.... As far as Venezuela is concerned, that is passing over ... but with respect to the future it fills me with anxiety when I think how easy it is to stir up the fire of international jealousy, and how hard it is to quench it." It was all the harder in view of the fact that the King, from the very beginning of his reign, adhered tenaciously to the political idea of using the old French revanche notion as the cardinal point of English policy.
In April, 1903, the King began a series of political trips to Portugal, Spain, France, and Austria, while Berlin, very strangely, was not visited by him. Each one of these visits resulted in political agreements, into which Vienna alone declined to enter, and which, after a return visit on the part of Loubet, at that time President of the French Republic, and after a surprising visit in Paris on the part of certain members of the English Parliament, led to the significant English-French agreement of April 8, 1904, a treaty which culminated in the balancing of Morocco against Egypt and made it possible for the English Government, as soon as it chose, to regulate the Morocco question in such a way that it would necessarily bring about a conflict between France and isolated Germany. The ally of King Edward was the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Delcassé, who, on the basis of the agreements made with England, had likewise concluded treaties with Spain and Italy, which, as he confidently assumed, insured the pénétration pacifique, i.e., the conquest, unhindered by Europe, of Morocco. How this plan presently fell through and how Delcassé was overthrown shall not be related here; on the other hand, attention should be called to the intimidating efforts to which England resorted for the purpose of exerting pressure upon Germany. The first effort of this nature took the form of an address delivered on Feb. 3, 1905, by Arthur Lee, a Civil Lord of the English Admiralty, who threatened the German fleet with destruction; the second effort came after Emperor William had landed in Tangier on March 31 and after Delcassé had been overthrown, and took the form of an appearance of an English fleet before Swinemünde, on which occasion it was officially asserted that the resolution had been adopted back in May, that is, at a time when the intrigues of Delcassé were culminating and when a war between Germany and France seemed likely to break out at any time. For even after Delcassé's overthrow England did not give up the game as lost; it declined to take part in a conference regarding Morocco and considered in all seriousness the question of an invasion. England's naval superiority was so great that the success of such an invasion could not seem doubtful, and in London it was thought that they could even do without the support of France. These plans were finally given up; for some time it was not known very well in London what decisions had been reached in the meeting between the Czar and Emperor William at Bjorkö, and there was a feeling of uncertainty. Accordingly, England also sent delegates to the conference at Algeciras, wherein we were obliged to deal solely, except for the Austrian delegates, with friends of the English-French combination.
The result, therefore, could only be a vague understanding, wherein was concealed the germ of subsequent conflicts. The first consequence, nevertheless, was a relaxation of German-English relations. In December, 1905, a Liberal Ministry had taken the helm, and the idea was conceived of diverting Germany by other means from the pursuit of a "world policy." Sir Edward Grey championed the contention that more intimate relations between England and Germany were, to be sure, desirable, but could only be effected if we swallowed France's Morocco policy unflinchingly, like bitter medicine. For this event Mr. Haldane, the new Minister of War, proposed an understanding between us similar to that which England had reached with France. This constituted the preliminary step toward an endeavor to effect more intimate relations, an endeavor which at first had a non-official character. German Burgomasters visited the City of London and were cordially received by King Edward himself. This was followed, in August, 1906, by a meeting between the King and his imperial nephew, in Homburg vor der Höhe, which, as was to be expected, passed off in a satisfactory manner. It should, nevertheless, be recalled to mind that the King expressed himself very ironically on the subject of The Hague Conference, which, he asserted, was a humbug. And Sir Charles Hardinge, who entered into negotiations with Secretary of State von Tschirschky, also voiced the opinion that the conference should offer no opportunity for serious interference with England's naval policy. On this point English and German views concurred, though from different motives. In the following September the English Minister of War, Mr. Haldane, was our guest. He came for the purpose of studying German military organization, and every conceivable courtesy was extended to him. In the addresses which he delivered after his return to England he referred many times to his sojourn in Berlin. He also made the assertion that the relations of England to France were closer and more intimate than ever before, that to Russia they were friendly, and that to Germany they were better than they recently had been. We now know—a fact which the Liberté also divulged at that time—that an English-French military convention had then been signed with reference to future possibilities. This fact was immediately denied, but it was merely a question of word quibbling. No convention, to be sure, was actually signed by the Government, but the "inner circle" of the Cabinet undoubtedly agreed that "conversations" between the military authorities of the two nations should take place, and these military conversations were held regularly, just as if a secret alliance existed, until the outbreak of the present war. Parallel with these political preparations were efforts that stood in sharp contrast to the irritating activities carried on without interruption by the above-mentioned anti-German press, which we embrace under the name "Pearson and Harmsworth Press." In England, as well as in Germany, societies were organized with the object of mitigating and, if possible, entirely abolishing the differences and antagonisms which existed between the two nations; these were the so-called "Friendship Committees." In England the Duke of Argyll and Lord Avebury were at the head of such a committee, and a visit made to London by representatives of our press initiated a well-meant movement which found enthusiastic representatives on both sides. English and German clergymen traveled back and forth between England and Germany, representatives of the English press paid a return visit to Germany, English and German workingmen's representatives endeavored to cement feelings of friendship by making personal observations and acquaintances, and in a similar way representatives of the Parliamentary groups of both countries thought and acted, while the leaders of science were working together at congresses held in Berlin and London. In this way were formed a number of valuable personal relations which led to political friendships and resulted in a conscious co-operation toward an honest English-German understanding.
These efforts continued until shortly before the month of August, 1914. One may safely say, moreover, that nobody has interceded more zealously and more constantly for English-German friendship and co-operation and for the removal of the difficulties that are ever cropping up anew than our Emperor. The enthusiasm with which Emperor William was always received in England on occasion of his numerous visits, especially in November and December, 1907, again in 1910, when he went to London to attend the funeral of Edward VII., and again in 1911, when he visited King George, would be absolutely inconceivable hypocrisy, which we regard as out of the question, had it not been the spontaneous expression of popular sentiment. Official English policy, however, followed other channels. As early as the year 1907 Sir Edward Grey had succeeded in securing from Russia an agreement which united England and Russia in co-operation at the expense of Persia, but which, indirectly, also affected German interests, the injury to which was later happily warded off by the Treaty of Potsdam. It soon became evident, moreover, that England, in concluding the agreement relating to Persia, was in reality less concerned about protecting its Asiatic interests than it was about including Russia in that coalition by means of which it expected to put a stop to the "world policy" of Germany and to check the further development of the German fleet. This became very distinctly evident on June 9, 1908, when a meeting took place at Reval between Edward VII. and Nicholas II. At that time it was agreed and decided between Hardinge and Iswolski, not officially, but in an oral exchange of views, that Russia would be ready to proceed hand in hand with England in European affairs (i.e., in the policy directed against Germany) as soon as it had sufficiently recovered from the after-effects of the war with Japan and the revolution. It was thought that this regeneration of Russia's military power would take six or eight years. The scope of this agreement is very obvious. Whereas Germany, during the persistent danger of a war with France over Morocco, had hitherto considered it highly probable that England would maintain a neutral attitude, it was obliged, as soon as England drew nearer to the Dual Alliance, to figure at all events upon a malevolent neutrality and very likely indeed upon open hostility. Sir Edward Grey, to be sure, who had not yet escaped from the anxiety with which English friends of peace were following the King's trip to Russia, in order to cover up his game, on July 7 had declared in the lower house, in reply to a question directed to the Government, that the visit of the King by no means had any diplomatic significance which might lead to an alliance or to an agreement or to any kind of a convention; no negotiations were being entered into, he asserted, for the purpose of concluding a treaty or a convention with Russia, nor would any such treaty or convention be concluded during the King's visit. But he went on to say that the visit would have some political effect, and it was very true that political effect was desired. "We wish that the visit shall exert a beneficent influence upon the mutual relations of both empires." Public opinion in England allowed itself to be satisfied with this equivocal, oracular statement. In other countries, however, a keener insight was displayed. The New York Times judged the situation correctly when it said: "It is always a mistake to force a warm friend, who is at the same time a business friend, a blood relative, out of intimate and useful friendship into bitter antagonism, and this mistake, according to the judgment of all non-partisan observers of contemporary history, has been committed by King Edward." When Edward VII. acceded to the throne, it went on to say, England was a warm friend of Germany and of the German Emperor, who had given numerous proofs of his friendship, and was not only willing but anxious to become England's ally; now, however, the guns of the two nations were, so to speak, pointed at each other.