H.M. GEORGE V.
King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions
Beyond the Seas, Emperor of India
(Photo from W. & D. Downey)

H.I.M. NICHOLAS II.
Czar of All the Russias, and the Grand Duke Alexis Nicholaievitch,
the Heir Apparent
(Photo from Underwood & Underwood)

Such, indeed, was the actual case; a determined malevolence on the part of the King, the English statesmen, and that newspaper trust organized by Pearson and Harmsworth, began to mobilize Europe against Germany, and to incense, by means of cable and telegraph, the judgment of the world against our Emperor and against the German policy. No means seemed too infamous if it served this purpose. Over a private letter which Emperor William had sent to Admiral Lord Tweedmouth for the purpose of checking false rumors that were maliciously being spread abroad regarding our naval policy, The Times made a terrible fuss in order to disseminate the notion that Emperor William was interfering with the internal policy of Great Britain with a view to injuring English military power. The excitement of public opinion in England was then utilized by the press for the purpose of creating a sentiment in favor of a concentration of the British fleet in the North Sea. That, however, was certainly done at the instigation of the Government, which was fond of attributing resolutions it had already adopted to the pressure of public opinion throughout the country. The naval manoeuvres which in July, 1908, were carried out in the North Sea, close to our coastline, were participated in by a combination of the canal fleet and the so-called home fleet, and they bore a very provocative and demonstrative character. At this time, moreover, appeared that widely read book by Percival A. Hislam, entitled "The Admiralty of the Atlantic," the expositions of which culminated in the statement that a war between England and Germany was unavoidable, and that the sooner it broke out the shorter it would be and the less money and blood it would cost. All this, however, is rendered easily intelligible by the fact that the Balkan crisis, in consequence of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had at that time assumed a very dangerous aspect, and was threatening to bring on a war between Austria and Russia and perhaps a world war, wherein England expected to gain its own particular ends. It was therefore a severe disappointment to English statesmen that Nicholas II., despite the vociferous protests of the Serbs, and despite the decidedly warlike attitude of the Russian people on March 25, 1909, recognized the annexation. The disappointment was all the more severe for the reason that shortly before that time, despite the still menacing conflict over Casablanca, the Morocco difficulties between Germany and France were also settled. On Feb. 9, 1909, the day on which King Edward made his first visit in Berlin, a German-French agreement regarding Morocco was signed, and in the latter part of May the Casablanca conflict was also adjusted by arbitration to the tolerable satisfaction of both contestants.

It is not too much to say that King Edward, in so far as he was able, did his best to bring about another outcome, and in England this was generally recognized. "There must be a definitive stopping of the King's interference in foreign politics," declared Mr. Sidebotham, M.P., in the Reform Club at Manchester during this crisis. His words were loudly approved by his hearers, but his voice, as well as the voice of other men in favor of establishing good relations with Germany, was drowned without effect under the influence of the panic which from the end of the year 1908 until well on into the Summer of 1909 kept all England in a state of excitement. Watchwords denoting the necessity of taking immediate action against the German fleet, as they were published in The Standard, The Morning Post, and in the great monthly periodicals, The Nineteenth Century, the Fortnightly Review, and The National Review, were echoed in the negotiations of Parliament, and they dominated the Maritime Law Conference held in London. The naval manoeuvres of July, 1909, brought together all three English fleets, and the plan was conceived of summoning the fleets of the larger colonies. A meeting of newspaper publishers, called in London, was designed to carry on propaganda for these ideas, and the Imperial Defense Conference, also held in London, proposed that England should be supported by its large colonies, though, to be sure, with certain reservations. In order to weaken the impression which Russia's recognition of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had created, the Czar visited the English fleet at Spithead, and for the same reason, probably, the Russian Army manoeuvres in the Fall were considered a rehearsal of the measures that would be adopted to check the advance of an enemy toward St. Petersburg. Finally, on Oct. 23, agreements were made in Racconigi between Iswolski, who was accompanying the Czar on a new trip abroad, and Tittoni, which agreements were to make it possible for Russia, as a Russian newspaper put it, "to liberate itself from the necessity of friendly relations with Germany."

During this excitement in the political atmosphere the Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, endeavored to bring about a turn for the better by effecting an understanding with England, in whose attitude he correctly recognized the real cause of the political insecurity. At this point attention must be called to the fundamental difficulty with which all negotiations at that time, and subsequently, were confronted, and necessarily confronted. In Germany it was seen very clearly from the start that the probability of a combined French-Russian attack, for which influential political groups in St. Petersburg, as well as in Paris, were working, was very slight, so long as England's entrance into this anti-German combination could be left out of consideration. What we hoped to insure, therefore, was England's neutrality in the event of war, inasmuch as a German-English alliance, which might have definitely insured world peace, could not be effected. In order to win England over to the idea of neutrality, the Imperial Chancellor declared his willingness to decrease the rate at which our war vessels were being constructed. Both nations, moreover, were to give assurances that neither intended to attack the other, nor actually would make an attack. A second clause in the German proposal formulated the neutrality obligation. These negotiations continued until the Autumn of the year 1909, and were accompanied by the threatening chorus of the English anti-German press: "German dreadnoughts must not be built." [Black and White—"The Writing on the Wall.">[ The positive refusal on the part of Germany to abandon the naval program adopted by the Reichstag, and the fixed idea designedly fostered by the British Government that we were cherishing the intention of attacking France, gave England a pretext for rejecting the German efforts to effect an understanding between the two countries. But it is impossible to believe in the honesty of these arguments, which were recently defended, in dialectic perversion of the truth, by Sir Edward Cook in an article entitled "How Britain Strove for Peace." England's aggressive tendency is clearly shown by its above-mentioned agreements with France and Russia, which are today publici juris. Regarding that point there was no self-deception in those English circles which did not belong to the conspiracy; Edward Dicey, one of the most eminent of English publicists, expressed it in point-blank form in February, 1910, when he wrote in The Empire Review: "If England and Germany are friends, the peace of Europe is assured; but if the two nations fall apart, it will be a very unfortunate day for humanity." At that time, when Delcassé tendencies were again asserting themselves in France and a new political storm was brewing in the Balkan countries, King Edward died, on May 6. The hope could now be cherished, the leader of the anti-German policy of England being gone, that the moment had come when it would be possible to effect an understanding.

Dicey again began to argue for peace, the English-German Friendship Committee, the Albert Committee, the Archbishop of Canterbury, The Manchester Guardian, and The Economist advocated this idea, and Prime Minister Asquith found it profitable under these circumstances to strike the note of peace in a report which he submitted to the lower house regarding the frustrated German-English negotiations. But he included in this report false and disquieting statements regarding the German fleet. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg replied to these statements in the Reichstag, and this led to the resumption of negotiations regarding a permanent political agreement on the basis of the existing German naval program, provided we would decrease our rate of building war vessels, as we had already offered to do. It soon became evident, however, with what little sincerity these negotiations were entered into on the part of England. With the direct encouragement of England, which renewed its promises regarding its attitude in the event of war, France, in the latter part of April, and in outright violation of the treaty, began its advance again Fez; and at the same time, as if it was desired that no doubt should arise regarding the solidarity of England and France, The Fleet Annual published an illustration representing the German high sea fleet under full steam, and under it were printed the words "The Enemy." As a sign of our disapproval of the French violation of the treaty we sent the Panther to Agadir, and in place of German-English negotiations German-French negotiations were commenced. Meanwhile England, cherishing the hope that a German-French war would now break out with certainty, armed itself against us in August and September with might and main. This fact was placed beyond all doubt by the well-known disclosures of Captain Faber, (before his electors in Andover.) The Times said later on that the year 1911 had brought three German-English crises, the first in the third week of July, the second in the week ending on Aug. 19, (that was the time of the enormous and very disillusioning labor strikes,) and the third in September. It is amazing that Sir Edward Cook dared to assert under these circumstances that Great Britain had facilitated the conclusion of the French-German Morocco agreement, which was ratified on March 12, 1912. In the "Open Letter on Foreign Policy," which on Nov. 24, 1911, was submitted to the members of the English Parliament, and was signed with the initials E.D.M. and F.W.H., (which is to be resolved into Edmund D. Morel and Francis W. Hirst,) it is expressly stated by these esteemed and honorable politicians:

"Our attitude was determined exclusively by the ostensible interests of France, which were directly opposed to the interests of British commerce and of British enterprise.... From this it follows that alliances, nay, even political agreements, with Continental powers, which may coerce us to take steps that are, at a given moment, harmful to our national interests, should be avoided."

Sir Edward Grey took pains to conceal these facts from the lower house and passed lightly over the disclosures of Faber—when the Imperial Chancellor vigorously opposed him—with skillful legerdemain. In the upper house Grey's policy also met with severe criticism, and from his declarations, as well as from those of Lloyd George made at the same time, only one conclusion could be drawn—that official England was determined to remain steadfast in the form of its political co-operation with France and Russia. Precisely to this was to be attributed the insecurity of the European situation. It has not become publicly known but has been reliably ascertained that the English Naval Attaché in Rome at that time pointed out that England, in the event of a war, which he expected to come, would have to occupy either Belgium or Copenhagen. That, he added, was very brutal, to be sure, but at the same time was rendered necessary by historic developments and by circumstances.