The Captain of the Normandy told the survivors that he would have liked to signal their danger to them, but that he dared not do so, because his uninsured ship would then have been instantly sunk.
In a Washington dispatch to The New York Times, sent July 13, appeared the following:
The State Department received a short dispatch late this afternoon from Consul General Washington at Liverpool, confirming the report that three Americans were among those rescued by the American bark Normandy at the time of the sinking of the Russian merchant steamer Leo by a German submarine off the Irish coast Friday night. This is the case in which press dispatches asserted that the submarine commander forced the Captain of the Normandy to use his bark as a shield behind which the submarine hid before firing the torpedo which sank the Leo.
The cablegram from Consul General Washington makes no mention of this phase of the affair, and does not show whether the German submarine gave any warning to the commander of the Russian merchant ship before firing the shot which destroyed the latter vessel. The official message says that the Normandy was stopped by the submarine, that the Normandy's papers were examined, and that she was allowed to proceed. The message added that the Normandy rescued three American citizens who were members of the crew of the Leo, and names them as Walter Emery, seaman, of Swan Quarter, N.C.; Harry Whitney, steward, of Camden, N.J., and Harry Clark, fireman, of 113 East Fifty-second Street, Seattle, Wash.
THE ORDUNA
This is the official statement of Captain Thomas M. Taylor of the Cunard liner Orduna, concerning the attack made on his vessel by a German submarine off Queenstown, westbound, on the morning of July 9:
At 6.05 A.M., July 9, the lookout man on the after bridge rang the telegraph, at the same time pointing his hand downward and out on the port beam. The third officer was immediately sent aft to inquire what was seen. He returned quickly and reported both men had seen a torpedo pass across the stern from port to starboard, only ten feet clear of the rudder. In the meantime both the chief officer and myself distinctly saw the trail of the torpedo, extending from the stern to about 200 yards out on the port beam. About eight minutes afterwards the chief officer and I saw the submarine come to the surface about two points on the starboard quarter, a distance of about three-quarters of a mile, with five or six men on her deck, getting her guns ready.
I immediately ordered all possible steam, altered the course, and brought her right astern, when they began shelling us. The first shot struck the water abreast of the forecastle on the starboard side, about thirty feet off. The second dropped just under the bridge; third, abreast of No. 5 hatch, quite close alongside; fourth, under the stern, sending up a volume of water forty feet high; fifth and sixth and last shells all fell short. The firing then ceased, and the submarine was soon left far astern.
Marconi distress signals were sent out at once. We were thirty-seven miles south of Queenstown. I got a reply that assistance would be with us in an hour, but it was four hours before the small armored yacht Jennette appeared. I account for the torpedo missing the ship to their misjudging the speed, allowing fourteen knots instead of sixteen, which we were doing at the time. The torpedo passed only ten feet clear.
It was an ideal day for torpedo attack—light wind, slight ripple, clear weather. The periscope could only have been a few inches above water, for a very strict lookout was being kept at the time by chief and third officers and myself and four lookout men. However, we failed to see her before she fired the torpedo.