Prince Kraft says: "At Sedan the divisional cavalry were employed during the battle, charging by single squadrons, patrolling and reconnoitering to obtain information of the enemy and the ground. Every infantry body is accompanied by patrols, however small." An instance of the too early employment of cavalry in a battle occurred at Waterloo, when Napoleon at the commencement launched his cavalry into the fight. The result was that although it far outnumbered the English at first, it became so reduced, depressed, and worn out, that it was unable afterward to offer full resistance to the British squadrons, who were comparatively fresh. Wellington, on the contrary, after his first successes, kept his cavalry, as much as possible, in reserve. The field of battle itself shows the proper situation of cavalry, but the divisional cavalry on the defensive side must always be at hand to fall upon the flanks of the enemy's infantry when in extended order, while that of the attacking side must be equally at hand to prevent the flanks of its own infantry being so attacked.
In discussing the action of divisional cavalry, the most advantageous time for its assisting in the combat must be considered. At what moment, if any, can infantry be attacked by cavalry? When opposed to a force acting on the defensive, divisional cavalry has its operations limited, and probably in the earlier part of an engagement, confined to watching, and, if possible, guarding the flanks of its own attacking infantry from surprise. It is the cavalry on the defenders' side that has the greatest opportunities. In both cases, however, a rule must be made not to attack infantry when it has taken up a favorable position, or before its ranks have been shaken by artillery or musketry. Prince Kraft, in speaking of Mars-la-Tour, says: "This same day took place a series of cavalry charges of greater or less importance, which all showed practically to the cavalry the limits of their effective action against infantry. The advancing infantry were brought to a stand, infantry who gave way were ridden down, but where the cavalry attacked infantry intact, the cavalry were unable to prevail."
The precision of modern fire arms has necessitated great changes in infantry tactics. To advance against the murderous fire of the present rifle, infantry is compelled to adopt scattered formations in small lines, and to move forward with sudden rushes. All this lends itself to the attacks of an active cavalry. When these infantry attacks take place, it may be presumed that they have already been under arms some hours, have marched some distance, and been exposed to considerable loss from artillery and musketry fire. Their advance in extended formation will have commenced at about 1,000 yards, or earlier. By this time the squadrons opposing them will have been brought to a more advanced position, to the nearest point to their flank where cover is afforded, and to carry this out successfully requires skillful handling. Files must be extended, and short rushes made with small bodies, say half a troop if over exposed ground, into sheltered places. It is true that cavalry cannot hide themselves over exposed ground as infantry can, but they have one advantage that nothing can deprive them of—rapidity of motion; and the distance that would take them say 10 seconds to traverse, viz., 150 yards, would take infantry a minute.
Prince Kraft writes: "No battle field is a tabula rasa, for in the most exposed country there are depressions. If strong skirmishing lines of infantry can advance directly over a country devoid of cover, cavalry can undoubtedly do the like, if by making use of the lie of the ground they can gain the enemy's flank. A skilled cavalry leader will thus undoubtedly find an opportunity to get close to the enemy." Having arrived at this more advanced position, say from 500 to 1,000 yards, according to the formation of the ground, the nearer the better, the most favorable moment to assail the flanks of the attacking infantry would probably be immediately before the last belt of the fighting line, and before the main body had re-enforced them, as they are preparing for their last united rush, and as their supports are doubling up to join them.
At this moment the men would be to some extent out of breath, their attention would be fixed on the point about to be attacked, and their flanks would be neglected. Cavalry should then descend upon them at the utmost speed that can be extracted from the horses, with a good interval from knee to knee. If there is only one squadron, one troop should take the flank or fighting line, while the other throws itself upon the support. As the distance to be covered in the open will probably be not more than from 200 to 400 yards, they will be exposed to fire, supposing none of the ground is undulating, for fifteen to thirty seconds when at full speed. As they close on the infantry neither the supports nor those in rear of them or their artillery will dare to fire, on account of their own men. If the infantry run to get into small squares, as is most likely, the cavalry must endeavor to catch them before they assemble. If they get together it may be too late for the cavalry to stop. They must then throw themselves upon them and trust to the supporting squadron to complete the attack.
Although it is rare that a battle field is on such ground that there are no undulations to afford shelter for cavalry in an advanced position, this may be the case, and if so the enemy's infantry attack must be allowed to take place, but even then, by cavalry showing itself on the flanks for a moment, infantry would get together and afford a better mark for fire, and the progress of the attack would be delayed. The very appearance of cavalry frequently frightens infantry into masses. If the ground was too much exposed for the charge, men might be dismounted, with their carbines, at a safe distance to assist the infantry. If mounted infantry were at hand, they would be utilized in the same way, and the machine guns of the cavalry would also pour in their volleys. If the enemy's attack is successful, cavalry must then advance on their flanks and take its chance, and if necessary sacrifice itself to give its own infantry time to rally. If it is unsuccessful, the cavalry must be ready to take every favorable opportunity of molesting its broken ranks.
Speaking of Mars-la-Tour, Prince Kraft says: "During the battle a German infantry brigade was forced to retire with heavy loss, and ran some danger of being annihilated by the pursuing enemy. But the First Dragoons of the Guards threw themselves on the pursuers. The enemy's infantry massed round the eagles and ceased to press on, while the thin ranks of our infantry were able to rally, and our guns were saved and brought into position. The losses were heavy; half a regiment of cavalry (250 horses) were sacrificed in order to save the brigade." At Waterloo a French division of infantry fled before three regiments of dragoons (the Union Brigade). The Royal Dragoons and the Inniskillings in first line, the Scots Greys on their left rear, the whole under Sir William Ponsonby, acting in support of the Highland Infantry Brigade, were awaiting the attack of the whole of the 1st French Division under Gen. Alix. The three Scotch regiments threw into them a concentrated fire, and as they were staggered by the shock Ponsonby gave the order to advance. Passing through the Highlanders, the Greys having come up into line, the three regiments charged the leading portion of the French column, which yielded, and those in rear were hurled back. The dragoons having the advantage of the descent of the hill appeared to mow down the mass, the Greys on the left pressed on through the supporting brigade of the French, while the Royals drove back the right, giving no time for fire. Many threw down their arms, while hundreds of prisoners were hurried off to the rear of the line. At the same time the Inniskillings forced their way through the center, when the remainder of the French division broke and fled.
It may be said that this took place before the introduction of the rifle, and is therefore no example, but it took place within the range of the weapon then in use, and at that distance it was equally effective. The celebrated charge of Bredow's brigade at Vieuville (Mars-la-Tour) also shows what an energetic attack may do. It had become necessary to demand a sacrifice from the cavalry for the good of the army, to enable Prince Frederick Charles, with only 24,000 infantry, to hold in check Bazaine's army of 180,000 until his own main body came up. Bredow's cavalry brigade consisted of six squadrons of the 7th Cuirassiers and the 16th Uhlans. They were ordered to make a breach in the front of the 16th French Army Corps.
The six squadrons advanced in column, the cuirassiers leading, when they received the word to change direction to the right, then to form line, which was done under heavy fire. The cuirassiers getting into line first, charged at once, the 16th following in echelon. In a moment the batteries, vomiting flames, were reached with a loud hurrah, and the gunners cut down at their guns, when the whole brigade, which had now got into one line, charged the long lines of infantry in rear, who received them with a heavy fire from their chassepots. These lines, too, were broken through, and the main object of the charge was attained, but, carried away by the ardor of the combat, they charged and took the mitrailleuses, when the French cuirassiers, with a dragoon brigade in support, come down upon them, and compelled them to fall back. This they did, having to force their way back through the enemy's masses of infantry with enormous loss. The object, however, was gained, and the attack of the French corps checked and never resumed. The cavalry division covers the advance of the whole army, and is a day or two in front of it. It conceals and guards the army, while finding out the movements of the enemy. It collects information, and is also used with horse artillery on great enterprises on the enemy's communications. Having finished the reconnaissance and covering the army on the day of battle, it falls back as the two opposing sides come in contact, and awaits further orders. On the battle field it should be placed so as to suffer as little loss as possible—as a rule, in rear of the flanks. How far must depend on the formation of the ground; if shelter is to be obtained nearer the front, the better. If not, then some 2,000 yards in rear of one flank would seem advisable. Its duties are to guard the exposed flank or flanks and rear of the army, while it watches the cavalry of the enemy. If within range of artillery, it should be kept on the move from front to rear. Its strength should not be wasted or frittered away on doubtful enterprises, as it maybe required for some decisive blow, in pursuit, or in covering the retreat.
Prince Kraft, speaking of the battle of St. Privat, says: "On the 18th of August the gigantic fight of St. Privat took place. The cavalry divisions were held back in reserve, but the divisional cavalry took an active part. During the battle a squadron of hussars advanced and sent information of the enemy making a flank movement." He also says: "At Sedan the cavalry division was kept in reserve." The massing of artillery at the commencement of a battle must expose a long line with some weak spot to attack. If protected by cavalry, then probably a cavalry combat will ensue. Prince Kraft says: "The action of the masses of German cavalry at Mars-la-Tour excited wonder and admiration; they surprised the enemy's cavalry when in bivouac, they met and surrounded the hostile infantry in a threatening manner, and thus 8,000 cavalry occupied 65,000 infantry, until the Prussian infantry came up. The cavalry made no charges which could not have been successful, but carried out their task of occupying the enemy almost without loss.