"In the old days these squadrons would have charged and ridden down the infantry. The change is the result of the improvement in fire arms." During the early stages of a battle, advanced parties, under officers selected for the purpose, must be kept out from the cavalry division to watch the enemy's movements, and the information they should be able to afford should be invaluable to the general-in-chief. An engagement with the enemy's cavalry should not be sought unless they are much weaker; but should the necessity arise, the ground should be reconnoitered, and every advantage of position taken to insure success. The attack being determined on, the preparations for it should be carried out rapidly. Echelon movements have many advantages. They favor the formation of oblique lines, they also insure in a charge direct to the front the bringing up of squadron after squadron in support. The attack of Vivian's Hussar Brigade upon the French reserves at Waterloo gives a brilliant illustration of this, and has been termed by Siborne the "crisis of Waterloo." This celebrated charge, intended to be in line, became virtually a charge in echelon of squadrons in consequence of the rapid pace of the head of the column.
"The movement of cavalry must be rapid and unexpected, and bear the character of determined confidence; an effort should be made by maneuvering to come suddenly on the enemy's flank. A gentle declivity for the final charge must be sought. The rapid, vigorous, and determined charge in line on to cavalry, riding knee to knee, is what is required." The charge to be made effectual, the horses must be brought up in wind, the gallop must not be begun too early; when begun it must gradually be increased to a fast gallop, the final charge for the last sixty yards made with every horse extended. "Nothing, then, must be left undone to excite the spirit of enthusiasm, even to ferocity; then, and only then, the 'cheer' to be raised." At Waterloo the charge of the heavy brigade, the 1st and 2d Life Guards and King's Dragoon Guards, with the Blues in support, is a good example of a successful attack on cavalry. The French line of cavalry as it advanced presented an imposing appearance.
They had ascended the brow of the ridge, when a vigorous fire from Ross' Horse Artillery was opened on to them. In the next moment their trumpets sounded the charge and they rushed to the attack, and as cuirassiers approached the British squares, the Heavy Brigade dashed into them. The shock was terrific. The right of the Life Guards being thrown forward, came first into collision. The right of the French was suddenly thrown out by coming unexpectedly on to a hollow way, and as they passed it the 2d Life Guards came full speed upon them. The French cuirassiers were driven back and pursued until the English brigade came under infantry fire.
The charge of the Heavy Cavalry Brigade at Balaklava, under Gen. Scarlett, is another good example, when the Russian cavalry, receiving the British charge at a halt, were entirely overthrown. One of the greatest difficulties after the charge is to know when and how to stop, and it is then that the squadron and troop leaders, well in front of their men, must use all their efforts to carry out the ends of their commander. I think this is the time when a strong whistle carried by the commanding officer and the squadron leaders can be used with good effect. Being an unusual sound, it would attract attention. The battle being over, some of the most serious duties of cavalry commence. If the enemy is victorious, the pursuit has immediately to follow. History points out the difficulty of carrying this out. Uncertainty of the victory, or how far it can be counted on, often delays its commencement. Battles are often ended by nightfall, valuable time is lost, and the golden opportunities are past. An active cavalry leader will, however, without further orders at least, follow with his advanced parties and not lose touch of the enemy. He will soon learn the condition of the enemy, act accordingly, harass his flanks and rear and play upon him with his artillery.
An example of another manner in which cavalry may be employed after a victory can be taken from the Egyptian campaign of 1882, when, after the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, by a rapid advance of the cavalry some fifty miles ahead of the infantry, the capital of the country was captured by the English cavalry division.
If the battle is lost, still greater are the responsibilities of the cavalry. Detached squadrons with scouts must be sent round the flanks to ascertain the strength of the enemy sent in pursuit. Every available position must be taken up by the horse artillery, and every advantage seized for counter attack. Above all, accurate information must be obtained for the general-in-chief of the nature of the pursuit, in order that he may not harass his main body by falling back further than necessary. This subject, however, is beyond the scope of this lecture, and is one of study of past campaigns.
Of the action of cavalry in savage warfare, the recent campaigns in Africa have given some experience. In the presence of an enemy met with in such enormous numbers as in the desert, cut off from all help, knowing that unless you win you die, it seems to be decided that our infantry must adopt the square as the most suitable formation. In the Zulu war, the cavalry at the battle of Ulundi was placed inside the square. The experience met with there was exceptional, and from the swarms of savages surrounding the square in all directions it was considered desirable to keep the 17th Lancers in the center of it, in order that they should not interfere with the infantry fire, and that when the enemy was repulsed, they should be launched out upon them, and this was done with perfect success. It is, however, contrary to the instincts and traditions of cavalry to be shut up in a square, and, where practicable, I should think cavalry outside a square, even at some distance out of the way of the infantry fire, acting with horse artillery, would very much disturb the attacking bodies of the enemy, and perhaps attract away a portion of them, and they could be brought up, when called upon to do so, to carry out the pursuit.
In the first campaign on the east coast of the Soudan, on the advance to El Teb and afterward to Tokar, squadrons were sent in front and on the flanks of the square with scouts thrown out to feel the way and obtain information, while the main body of the cavalry was echeloned on the rear and flank opposite an angle of the square in the most suitable manner to avoid any interference with its fire. During the action it remained in this position until after the first attack on the square, when it moved away past the square on the outward flank and acted on the enemy's rear and engaged their reserves until the action was over. During the desert march in the Nile expedition, the 19th Hussars, by its scouting, protected the square and gave it timely notice of the approach of the enemy.
In a country where a great deal of bush abounds the effective charge of cavalry on to groups of savages is very much curtailed. The Arabs throw themselves on to the ground behind the prickly bushes, the ranks are opened out as the horses avoid the thorns, and the men get no chance of using their swords; but although much execution is not achieved under these circumstances, the natives have great fear of cavalry, and they are prevented from attacking elsewhere. When their attention is thus occupied, horse artillery and machine guns might make great havoc among them. At the action of Tamai, where the ground, from the rocks and ravines of the neighboring mountains, was unsuitable for cavalry charges, when one of the infantry squares was broken, the cavalry advanced, and one squadron of the 10th Hussars, dismounting, helped to create a favorable diversion by pouring fire into the flanks of the attacking Arabs.
My remarks would, I think, be considered incomplete if I did not touch on the question of cavalry charging squares, as this point is always made very prominent in all discussions on the action of cavalry. I therefore must not pass it by. I will say at once that I think it most undesirable, even under favorable circumstances, that cavalry should charge a formed square and men armed with the breech loader. At best the gain can be but local and partial, while the loss to the cavalry—an arm so difficult to keep up in numbers—must be disastrous, and it seems to me that if cavalry by its appearance can force infantry to form square, it has done enough, and that the artillery, infantry, and machine guns should do the rest. The necessity might, however, arise, and by looking at the past we see its possibility. At Langensalza two Prussian squares were broken by the Hanoverian cavalry, and the major part taken prisoners.