His note on the Monroe doctrine will well repay perusal, as it is a subject on which much apprehension exists in the public mind. This enunciated of American policy, he shows to have consisted of two points: 1. That inasmuch as the whole of the American continent is now within the territorial limits of some one or other civilized power, it is no longer open to colonization by European nations. 2. That the United States will view, as an unfriendly act, any attempt on the part of European powers to interfere for the purpose of controlling the political affairs of any of the American States, or to extend to them the operation of the European political system. The question is well worth the study of the statesman, and it is ably treated in this work.
Another question of more than common interest, especially to our naturalized citizens, is the extent to which the government of the United States will afford them protection in foreign lands. The doctrine extracted by Mr. Dana from the cases of Martin Koszta, Simon Tousig, and others, is, that the government will afford protection to a domiciled resident of the United States whilst travelling in a foreign country, under her passport, against any arrest or seizure by the government of his native sovereign, in any event except that of a voluntary return to his place of birth; but in such case he will not be protected against military service owing by him to his native sovereign at the time of his emigration.
The case of the Trent, in which Messrs. Mason and Slidell, the rebel commissioners to Great Britain and France, were removed from that vessel, at sea, by the commander of an armed vessel of the United States, and brought in as prisoners of war, is the subject of a learned note by Mr. Dana. He considers this case to have settled but one principle: "that a public ship, though of a nation at war, cannot take persons out of a neutral vessel, at sea, whatever may be the claim of her government on those persons." A doctrine always held by the government of the United States, and one which they were glad to see authoritatively established on a claim made by that of England.
We have not space to point out in detail the many interesting questions discussed in Mr. Dana's learned notes, such as those of Intervention, Mediation Extradition, etc. But we cannot, injustice to him, omit a reference to the question now agitating the public mind, arising out of our reclamation on Great Britain for compensation for the ravages of the Alabama and other Confederate privateers, fitted out in the ports of that country. The question at issue is a somewhat different one from what is generally supposed. Our own supreme court has decided that it is no breach of neutrality, in the absence of any treaty stipulation, or local statute, to build, arm, and equip a vessel of war, and send her, under American colors, to the port of a belligerent, with the bonâ fide purpose of there offering her for sale as a commercial enterprise; though she may be subject to capture by the other belligerent, as contraband of war. Mr. Dana, after a thorough examination of the authorities and of the diplomatic correspondence between the two governments, thus sums up the points at issue:
The United States claims reparation from Great Britain for injuries done to her commerce by cruisers under the rebel flag, for the following reasons:
1. Because Great Britain made a precipitate and unwarranted recognition of belligerency of the rebel power, and thereby established in law, and to some extent brought about in fact, a state of things which made possible and probable the illegal acts of individuals complained of.
2. Because the measures taken by the British Government to prevent the sailing of vessels from British ports, fitted and equipped therein in violation of her neutrality, were tardy and feeble, as well as ineffectual; whether this arose from mistakes of law in the advisers of the crown, or bad faith, or incapacity in inferior officials, or from the insufficiency of the Acts of Parliament, being purely an internal question, with which the United States were not bound to deal.
3. Because Great Britain did not seize and detain or disarm these vessels, or refuse them asylum, or otherwise deal with them in such manner has the law of [{285}] nations authorized her to do, after their fraudulent escape from the original ports.
4. Because the British Government refused even to suggest amendments of her Acts of Parliament in any respect whatever, or to introduce the subject to Parliament when their inefficiency had been proved, and the government had then requested so to do, not only by the United States, on terms of reciprocity, but by citizens interested in preserving neutrality.
5. Because the government had neglected or refused to prosecute citizens of the so-called Confederate States who work openly residing in England as agents for that power, and notoriously engaged in fitting out vessels in violation of British neutrality, though abundant evidence had been furnished to authorize proceedings.
6. Because, by reason of this course of the British Government, the rebels had been able to set forth and maintain an effective force of steamers cruising against American commerce, having asylum and making repairs and getting coal and supplies in British ports; built, fitted out, armed, and manned in and from England, and never even expecting, or pretending to visit a port of the confederacy, when otherwise they would scarcely have had a single cruiser; the result of which had been a most effective belligerent aid to the rebellion, and the great advantage to England and detriment to the United States of driving from the seas the greater part of the American mercantile marine, heretofore the equal and rival of Great Britain, and transferring the commerce of the world to the British flag.
The British Government replies:
1. That the recognition of belligerency was justifiable, and made necessary at the time it was done, and dictated by a duty to the United States as well as to Great Britain: and that the United States gained by it the rights of blockade and search.
2. That the government acted in good faith and with reasonable diligence in in enforcing its laws for the preservation of it's neutrality; and that, if subordinate officials failed in capacity or diligence in particular cases, their acts or failures being but a part of the entire proceedings otherwise proper and effective, the nation cannot be expected to hold itself responsible their remote consequences, in the way of making compensation for acts done by belligerents out of the jurisdiction.
3. That the government did seize and prosecute, in her colonial ports, vessels which were charged with being fitted out at home in violation of neutrality; and that she was not bound by the law of nations to refuse asylum to, or seize or disarm or insist on the disarmament of vessels afterward commissioned as public ships of war of a belligerent visiting her ports, on the ground that they had been originally, and before their commissioning as vessels of war, fitted out in her jurisdiction in violation of her neutrality.
4. That the government was not satisfied that the Acts of Parliament had proved inadequate to such an extent, and after so full trial, or that any amendment would be likely to improve them so materially as to justify the United States in charging the refusal to attempt their amendment as a want of good faith.
5. That the government had judged in good faith, on the advise of competent counsel, whether, in cases suggested, prosecutions against individuals should be instituted.
6. That if vessels fitted out and dispatched from Great Britain ever so clearly in violation of her neutral rights, had fraudently escaped, without bad faith on the part of the government. Great Britain was not responsible for acts of hostility done by such vessels beyond her jurisdiction. Her duty was fulfilled if she restored any prizes such vessels might bring within her jurisdiction.
7. That it was inconsistent with the dignity and honor of the government to submit to arbitration claims of another government, the decision of which involved a question whether the advisers of the crown had correctly interpreted the law, or the executive officers of the crown had acted with diligence, good judgment, or good faith.
The points we have thus briefly noticed are but a few of the most important ones which are fully discussed by Mr. Dana; for a proper appreciation of his labors we must refer the reader to the book itself, with the assurance that it will well repay the time devoted to its perusal. It is no ephemeral production, but a good, solid, and deeply interesting work, which will long preserve its place as a landmark in the literature of the nineteenth century.
LIFE OF SAINT CECILIA, VIRGIN AND MARTYR. By the Reverend Prosper Guéranger, Abbé de Solesmes. Translated from the French. 12mo, pp. 404. Philadelphia: P. F. Cunningham. 1866.