“But it does not seem possible”—these are his words—“that any animal, until its mental powers had been developed to an equal or nearly equal degree with those of man, would have closely considered and been sensitive about its own personal appearance” (p. 364).
Thus far we perfectly agree with him. Blushing is an act predicable only of an intelligent being. Hence, it is quite logical to say that animals could not possess it, unless almost as perfect as man. But we by no means so readily coincide with his conclusion, namely: “Therefore, we may conclude that blushing originated at a very late period in the long line of our descent” (p. 364).
If this were true, it would likewise follow that man ought to become more prone to blushing as he advances in years. This, however, it will be confessed, is not the case. Quite the reverse frequently happens. Youth and innocence blush, while age and vice grow daily more barefaced and unblushing. Now, if blushing were a mere habit acquired and developed by physical evolution, how does it come to pass that full-grown men who are given to immorality lose that blush which rose to their cheeks when young and innocent? Daily experience only too well tells the tale how the maiden blush becomes dimmer and fades entirely when the career of sin and shame has been once entered upon. Where, then, is the philosophy of Darwin’s principle?
It is quite true, he tells us, that “we cannot cause a blush by any physical means. It is the mind which must be affected” (p. 310); “that the causes of blushing are shyness, shame, and modesty; the essential element in all being self-attention” (p. 326). Again, he continues: “Many reasons can be assigned [as causes of blushing] for believing that originally self-attention directed to personal appearance in relation to the opinion of others was the exciting cause. Moral causes are only secondary; the same effect being subsequently produced through the force of association by self-attention in relation to moral conduct” (p. 326).
This shows that, with Darwin, morality is a mere matter of etiquette. “But modesty,” he continues, “frequently relates to acts of indelicacy; and indelicacy is an affair of etiquette, as we clearly see with the nations that go altogether or nearly naked. He who is modest, and blushes easily at acts of this nature, does so because they are breaches of a firmly and wisely established etiquette” (p. 335).
From this, then, it is clear that morality, chastity, and every species of virtue are nothing more than the external code of regulations which society has agreed upon in its social intercourse. In other words, all virtue and morality consist in what we call good breeding. We blush, not because we break the law of God, but because we violate the precept of man. Darwin’s ten commandments, we think, might well be summed up as follows: First commandment: Society is the Lord God of man; thou shalt adore it alone, by minutely observing all its external regulations, called etiquette. 2d. Thou shalt not take its name in vain by saying that man and society can commit any wrong, or be anything but perfect. 3d. Thou shalt keep holy the Sabbath; that is, go to church on Sunday, because others do so, and etiquette demands it. 4th. Honor thy father and thy mother, because it is customary to do so. 5th. Thou shalt not be so common a criminal as to kill a man by direct physical means; but remember that thou must hold every man to be a rogue and a knave until he proves the contrary. Thou mayest even, especially when thou art a congressman, take an oath, without being particular as to the truth of thy statement. 6th and 9th. Thou shalt not commit adultery. Now, as marriage is merely an ordinary contract, that can of course be dissolved when the parties mutually agree, go to court, obtain a divorce, and thou canst marry the wife of another. As to thoughts against the sixth commandment, thou must not trouble thy head too much about them. They are nature’s legitimate ebullitions. 7th. Thou shalt not steal in open daylight, but get as much as thou canst without being detected. This would constitute the moral code of Darwin. If morality is reduced to etiquette, it is evident that its obligation is merely external.
Finally, we come to another point in the book on The Expressions, etc. It is a curious instance of our former propensities in a primeval state. At some time or other, we are told, we were possessed of long ears, and movable at that, such as we see in the mule and dog. The elephant, also, would afford a pretty good specimen, its ears being long and quite flexible.
But let us hear him: “If our ears had remained movable, their movements would have been highly expressive, as is the case with all the animals which fight with their teeth; and we may infer that our early progenitors thus fought” (p. 365). Well, we do not by any means doubt that these movables would be highly expressive in man. Just imagine, for instance, Mr. Darwin going through the streets of New York with a pair of long ears, moving and flapping to his heart’s content! Why, the New York papers would hail it as a godsend, and the urchins on Broadway would go in ecstasies over it.
Our interesting author winds up his somewhat lengthy dissertations with the inference that his reasonings on the “expression of emotions” afford another confirmatory proof of his theory that man is the offspring of the monkey. His two volumes on the Descent of Man were intended as the corner-stone of his building. This later work was to finish it. The great pity is that he is building a castle in the air. He gives no proof. Similarities in man and animals may afford ground for suppositions, but can never cause conviction.
“We have seen,” he says, “that the study of the theory of ‘expression’ confirms, to a certain limited extent, the conclusion that man is derived from some lower animal form, and supports the belief of the specific or sub-specific unity of the several races” (p. 367).