We are now done with Darwin. In perusing the volume, we confess it was not without a feeling of deep sadness at so much blindness combined with no ordinary degree of learning and research. Darwin is a student of no mean class. His research shows that no pains were spared. His numerous examples demonstrate that he is perfectly at home in natural sciences. Mixed up with error, there is in his book a great deal both interesting and highly instructive. His conclusions might perhaps be correct if there existed no God, no revelation, and no eternity. He is a striking example of men who set aside the revealed Word of God, and take reason as their sole guide and standard in the search after wisdom.
It may not be amiss to subjoin a few general principles that will refute even more fully the sophisms of the author.
We lay it down as a certain proposition that sensation is essentially distinct from intelligence. Sensation is defined: “A certain impression present to the mind, caused by an external agent on an animated body.”[176]
This external impression is received by five sensible organs, viz.: touch, taste, smell, hearing, and sight. These are evidently material organs, having size, weight, figure, extension, distance, number, motion, and rest. The same is the case with the object causing the impressions.
Now, is there any specific difference between sensation and intelligence? Is the understanding of man entirely different from the sensation of the brute? Or is it merely a development of the latter? If we believe Darwin, there is no real difference, except that the one is more perfect than the other. In the monkey, there exists the same faculty of intelligence as in man. In the former, however, it is in its incipient stage; in the latter, it is matured and developed. Can such a theory be reconciled with philosophy? We believe not. In fact, the difference between sensation and intelligence can be given as follows: 1. Sensations are external impressions which are not produced by the mind, but merely received; hence they are passive; whilst the understanding of man is essentially the actor, and not merely the recipient. 2. Again, “Sensations are particular facts which never leave their own sphere.”[177] Intelligence forms ideas that are universal and absolute, being applicable to all individuals.
Moreover, sensation does not distinguish one object from the other, neither does it compare them. The illustrious Spaniard whom we have already quoted illustrates this by saying: “The sensation of the pink is only that of the pink, and that of the rose only that of the rose. The instant you attempt to compare them you suppose in the mind an act by which it perceives the difference; and, if you attribute to it anything more than pure sensation, you add a faculty distinct from sensation, namely, that of comparing sensations, and appreciating their similarities and differences.”[178]
This, indeed, is evident. Sensation is simply the external impression received. As such, it is an isolated act. It does not compare or judge.
The idea, for instance, of the triangle is one, and is common to all triangles of every size and kind; the representation or sensation is multiple, and varies in size and kind.
Again, the idea or thought of the mind is fixed and necessary; the representation changeable.
The idea, e.g., of the triangle is “the same to the man born blind, and to him who has sight; and the proof of this is that both, in their arguments and geometrical uses, develop it in the same manner.”[179]