“The criterion of certitude is the sign by which certitude is perfectly distinguished from error” (p. 52). We remark, that there are criteria of truth, but not properly of certitude. Certitude is the firm adhesion of the mind to the truth made known to it, and needs no criterion, because it certifies itself by its very existence. The author says that “certitude is at the same time a state and an act of the mind. As a state, it may be defined to be a disposition by which the mind tends to adhere firmly to the known truth” (p. 50). But this is a great mistake. First, the act of adhering to truth is an act of judging, not an act of certitude. Secondly, the state of certitude is not a disposition by which the mind tends to adhere to truth. So long as the mind tends to adhere, there is no adhesion, and therefore no certitude. Certitude is the rest of the mind in the known truth.
“Reason is a perception” (p. 62). It is superfluous to remark that reason is a faculty, and no perception is a faculty.
“Consciousness cannot be deceived, although it may deceive” (p. 62). How can consciousness deceive? And if it can deceive, on what ground does the author immediately add: “Hence consciousness gives true certitude”?
“The evidence of senses is that invincible propensity which induces us to refer our sensations to the bodies which, according to our conviction, have been the cause of them” (p. 63). We observe, that our propensity cannot be our evidence. Our evidence must be objective, whilst our propensity is a subjective disposition. The evidence of senses is the evident perception of an object acting on the [pg 239] senses. The invincible propensity is nothing but the necessity of yielding to that evidence.
“Common sense is nothing else than that general knowledge of first notions or principles which is found in all men” (p. 65). Common sense, according to Webster, is that power of the mind which, by a kind of instinct or a short process of reasoning, perceives truth, the relation of things, cause and effect, etc., and hence enables the possessor to discern what is right, useful, or proper, and adopt the best means to accomplish his purpose. This definition, or rather description, is wonderfully correct. That kind of instinct, in fact, which the Scotch philosophers wrongly consider as blind, is really nothing less than a short process of reasoning, which carries evidence within itself. Reasoning, when formal—that is, when its premises and its conclusion present themselves distinctly and in a logical form, as in the scientific demonstration—carries within itself what may be styled reflex evidence; and, when informal—that is, when the conclusion and its grounds present themselves as implied in one another without assuming the formal shape of an argument—it carries within itself what may be called direct evidence; and because it is in this second manner that men commonly acquire their first convictions, this shorter and informal process of reasoning is called reasoning of common sense. Accordingly, common sense is not merely “a general knowledge,” but a source of general knowledge, extending to all conclusions that are evident but informal, and especially to moral dictates, such as “Good is to be done,” “Evil is to be shunned,” “God is to be honored,” etc., which in fact have ever been known by the special name of judgments of common sense—sensus naturæ communis.
“The laws of nature, considered individually, are contingent” (p. 76). Would they cease to be contingent if they were not considered individually?
“Metaphysics literally means above nature, and nature here signifies the material world” (p. 81). These two assertions do not agree with the common notion of metaphysics, and have been refuted in The Catholic World for December, 1873.
“Special metaphysics has been called pneumatology” (p. 81). Pneumatology is only a part of special metaphysics. Every one knows that cosmology and anthropology belong to special metaphysics no less than natural theology.
“In this dissertation (ontology) we consider being as abstracted from existence” (p. 81). Ontology does not consider being as abstracted from existence, but considers being as such, and therefore as existing either in the order of things, or at least in the order of ideas. It is as impossible to conceive being as abstracted from existence as to conceive a circle as abstracted from rotundity.
“Some existence must have existed before any possibility” (p. 84). We do not like the expression “existence exists,” as we would not like this other, “velocity runs.” Moreover, possibilities are co-eternal with God; it is therefore incorrect to say that some existence must have existed before them.