“Principle is that which contains the reason for the existence of something.... Cause is that which produces something, or which [pg 240] concurs in the production of something” (p. 85). These definitions are very vague and unsatisfactory, to say the least.
“The condition is the difficulty to be conquered in order to obtain the effect” (p. 86). By no means. Is the presence of the object a difficulty to be conquered in order to see it?
“The end ... has been improperly called the final cause” (p. 87). Why “improperly”?
“Modification ... is the substance appearing to us with such or such determined form” (p. 89). Quite absurd. Modification is not the substance, but the accidental form itself, no matter whether appearing or not appearing to us.
“Modification cannot exist without substance, nor substance without modification” (p. 90). This proposition is too universal. Would the author admit modifications in the divine substance?
“Some authors divide infinite into the infinite actu, or the actual infinite, ... and the infinite potentia, or the potential or virtual infinite, which can be infinitely increased or diminished. But certainly this division cannot be accepted, since the infinite and a substance which can be increased are two terms involving contradiction” (p. 91). What the author calls “some authors” are all the schoolmen. We put to him the following question: Will the human soul have a finite or an infinite duration? If finite, it must have an end; but, if it has no end, it cannot but be the contradictory of finite—that is, infinite. Yet this infinite duration is successive; it is therefore not actually, but potentially, infinite. Hence the division of the schoolmen can and must be accepted. The author thinks that the potential infinite is not infinite, but indefinite; but surely what has no end is infinite, not indefinite, although it is conceived by us indefinitely, because it transcends our comprehension. The indefinite is not that which has no end, but that of which the end remains undetermined.
“That we have in our mind the idea of the infinite is certain.... Evidently it has been placed in our mind by God himself, since the finite could not give the idea of the infinite” (p. 91, 92). We undoubtedly have a notion of the infinite; but the author gratuitously assumes that this notion is an idea placed in our minds from without, while the fact is that such a notion is not an idea, but a concept of our mind, or a result of intellectual operation. Of course, the finite cannot give us the idea of the infinite; but from the finite we can, and we do, form a concept of the infinite. This is the true and common doctrine. We cannot undertake to give in this place a refutation of ontologism; we only remark that the ontologistic theory is so generally repudiated that it should not find a place in a text-book for the use of schools.
“A material being is one which is essentially extensive and inert” (p. 92). If so, how can the author consider as “more acceptable” the view of Leibnitz, that “a monad is essentially unextensive”? (p. 93).
“Spiritual substance is quadruple—namely, God, the angels, the human soul, and the soul of the beasts” (p. 93). The soul of the beasts spiritual!—a nice doctrine indeed for the use of schools. Nor is this an oversight of the author; for we find that he endows beasts with intellect also (p. 170). [pg 241] What shall we say, but that we live in an age of progress?
“The properties of a being are those parts which constitute the being” (p. 93). We have already observed that the being is constituted by its principles, and not by its properties.