“It appears difficult to reconcile the immutability of God with his liberty. Three systems have been formed for this purpose, but they are not satisfactory” (p. 124). If the author had considered that God's liberty is all ad extra, and not ad intra, he would have seen that he had no right to qualify as he does the theological solution of the present difficulty. Each of the three solutions is satisfactory, at least in this sense: that each of them sets at naught the objections of the opponents. This is all we need. As to which of the three solutions is the best, it is not our duty to decide.
“Immensity means the same as omnipresence” (p. 130). This is not true. Omnipresence is relative, and its range is measured by the actual existence of creatures, as it does not extend beyond creation; while immensity is absolute, and transcends all created things.
“S. Thomas says that God also sees future free and contingent [pg 242] things in their essence—that is, that he sees them in his eternal and immutable decrees” (p. 133). Does the author mean that S. Thomas considers the essence of contingent things as equivalent to the eternal and immutable decrees?
“But Molina and his disciples contend that with such a system (S. Thomas's) it is impossible to defend human liberty” (p. 133). Here Molina and his disciples are represented as the decided adversaries of the Angelic Doctor. It is not fair. The author should have remembered that S. Thomas's doctrine is variously explained by various writers, and that it is possible to be a follower of S. Thomas without being a Thomist in the usual sense given to this word.
“Veracity consists in this: that a being can neither deceive nor be deceived” (p. 134). Shall we deny the author's veracity because he has been sometimes deceived?
“Justice is the attribute according to which we give to others what belongs to them” (p. 135). Justice with us is a virtue, not an attribute; with God, justice is an attribute, but does not consist in giving to others what belongs to them; it consists in giving to others what the order of reason demands.
“Providence is, therefore, a continuous creation” (p. 137). The mistake is evident. It is conservation, not providence, that is thus defined.
“The action of God upon us during life is constant, and this is what we mean by his providence” (p. 137). This is another mistake. The author confounds the notion of providence with that of concursus.
“In regard to its wrong use (of liberty), God cannot have an immediate, but only a mediate, influence on man's actions, in the sense that he has granted liberty of which a bad use is made against his suggestions. His sanctity forbids that he should act immediately in that case” (p. 138). Not at all. God immediately concurs to all our actions, whether good or bad, as every theologian knows, inasmuch as they are physical actions; and concurs neither immediately nor mediately to their badness, because their badness is nothing but a privation, and therefore requires no efficient cause.
The author misrepresents (pp. 138, 139) the doctrine of the Molinists concerning the influence (concursus) of God upon our actions. He says that this influence, according to the Molinists, “is positive and direct, but not on our will,” and “consists in affording a concourse of circumstances the most suitable for the determination.” The author may have found this interpretation of Molina's doctrine in some old book; but it is known that the Molinists have always admitted God's influence “on our will,” though they never admitted the physical predetermination; and it is no less certain that none of them maintain that “a concourse of circumstances” suffices to explain God's influence on our free actions.