Nothing therefore remains but to accept the doctrine of those who account for the reality of absolute space either by divine immensity or by the possibility of real ubications. But these authors, as a little reflection will show, though employing a different phraseology, teach substantially the same thing; for it would be absurd to imagine the possibility of infinite real ubications as extraneous to God, in whom alone all things have their possibility. We must, therefore, conclude that space, considered absolutely as to its quiddity, may be defined to be the infinite virtuality, or extrinsic terminability, of divine immensity.
A Corollary.—Absolute space is infinite, eternal, immovable, immutable, indivisible, and formally simple, though virtually extended without limits—that is, equivalent to infinite length, breadth, and depth.
Solution of Objections.—It may be objected that absolute space, being only a virtuality, can have no formal existence. In fact, the virtuality of divine immensity is the mere possibility of real ubications; and possibilities have no formal existence. Hence, to affirm that absolute space has formal being in the order of realities, is to give body to a shadow. It would be more reasonable to say that space is contained in divine immensity just as the velocity which a body may acquire is contained in the power of an agent; and that, as the power of the agent is no velocity, so the virtuality of immensity is no space.
This objection may be answered thus: Granted that the virtuality of divine immensity is the mere possibility of real ubications, it does not follow that absolute space has only a virtual existence, but, on the contrary, that, as the virtuality of divine immensity is altogether actual, so also is absolute space. The reason alleged, that “possibilities have no formal existence,” is sophistic. A term which is only possible, say, another world, has of course no formal existence; but its possibility—that is, the extrinsic terminability of God’s omnipotence—is evidently as actual as omnipotence itself. And in the same manner, an ubication which is only possible has no formal existence; but its possibility—that is, the extrinsic terminability of God’s immensity—is evidently as actual as immensity itself. If absolute space were conceived as an array of actual ubications, we would readily concede that to give it a reality not grounded on actual ubications would be to give a body to a shadow; but, since absolute space must be conceived as the mere possibility of actual ubications, it is manifest that we need nothing but the actual terminability of God’s immensity to be justified in admitting the actual existence of absolute space.
Would it be “more reasonable” to say, as the objection infers, that space is contained in divine immensity just as velocity is contained in the power of the agent? Certainly not, because what is contained in divine immensity is the virtuality of contingent ubications, not the virtuality of absolute space. There is no virtuality of absolute space; for there is no virtuality of possibility of ubications; as the virtuality of a possibility would be nothing else than the possibility of a possibility—that is, a chimera. Hence, the words of the objection should be altered as follows: “Contingent ubications are contained in divine immensity just as velocity is contained in the power of an agent; for, as the power of the agent is no actual velocity, so the virtuality of immensity is no actual contingent ubication.” And we may go further in the comparison by adding, that, as the formal possibility of actual velocity lies wholly in the power of the agent, so the possibility of actual ubications—that is, absolute space—lies in the virtuality of divine immensity.
Thus the objection is solved. It will not be superfluous, however, to point out the false assumption which underlies it, viz., the notion that the extrinsic terminability of divine immensity has only a virtual, not a formal, reality. This assumption is false. The terminability is the formality under which God’s immensity presents itself to our thought, when it is regarded as the source of some extrinsic relation, ut habens ordinem ad extra. Such a formality is not a mere concept of our reason; for God’s immensity is not only conceptually, but also really, terminable ad extra; whence it follows that such a terminability is an objective reality in the divine substance. Terminability, of course, implies virtuality; but this does not mean that such a terminability has only a virtual reality; for the virtuality it implies is the virtuality of the extrinsic terms which it connotes, and not the virtuality of its own being. Were we to admit that the extrinsic terminability of God’s immensity is only a virtual entity, we would be compelled to say also that omnipotence itself is only a virtual entity; for omnipotence is the extrinsic terminability of God’s act. But it is manifest that omnipotence is in God formally, not virtually. In like manner, then, immensity is in God not only as an actual attribute, but also as an attribute having an actual terminability ad extra, which shows that its terminability is not a virtual, but a formal, reality.
A second objection may be made. Would it not be better to define space as the virtuality of all ubications, rather than the virtuality of God’s immensity? For when we think of space, we conceive it as something immediately connected with the ubication of creatures, without need of rising to the consideration of God’s immensity.
We answer that absolute space may indeed be styled “the virtuality of all ubications;” for all possible ubications are in fact virtually contained in it. But such a phrase does not express the quiddity of absolute space; for it does not tell us what reality is that in which all ubications are virtually contained. On the contrary, when we say that absolute space is “the virtuality of divine immensity,” we point out the very quiddity of space; for we point out its constituent formality which connects divine immensity with all possible ubications.
True it is that we are wont to think of space as connected with contingent ubications; for it is from such ubications that our knowledge of place and of space arises. But this space thus immediately connected with existing creatures is relative space, and its representation mostly depends on our imaginative faculty. Hence, this manner of representing space cannot be alleged as a proof that absolute space can be intellectually conceived without referring to divine immensity.
A third objection may be the following. Whatever has existence is either a substance or an accident. But absolute space is neither a substance nor an accident. Therefore, absolute space has no existence, and is nothing. The major of this argument is well known, and the minor is proved thus: Absolute space does not exist in any subject, of which it might be predicated; hence, absolute space is not an accident. Nor is it a substance; for then it would be the substance of God himself—an inference too preposterous to be admitted.