This objection will soon disappear by observing that, although everything existing may be reduced either to the category of substance or to some of the categories of accident, nevertheless, it is not true that every existing reality is formally a substance or an accident. There are a great many realities which cannot be styled “substances,” though they are not accidents. Thus, rationality, activity, substantiality, existence, and all the essential attributes and constituents of things, are not substances, and yet they are not accidents; for they either enter into the constitution, or flow from the essence, of substance, and are identified with it, though not formally nor adequately. Applying this distinction to our subject, we say that absolute space cannot be styled simply “God’s substance,” notwithstanding the fact that the virtuality of divine immensity identifies itself with immensity, and immensity with the divine substance. The reason of this is, that one thing is not said simply to be another, unless they be the same not only as to their reality, but also as to their conceptual notion. Hence, we do not say that the possibility of creatures is “God’s substance,” though such a possibility is in God alone; and in the same manner, we cannot say that the possibility of ubication is “God’s substance,” though such a possibility has the reason of its being in God alone. For the same reason, we cannot say simply that God’s eternity is his omnipotence, nor that his intellect is his immensity, nor that God understands by his will or by his goodness, though these attributes identify themselves really with the divine substance and with one another, as is shown in natural theology. It is plain, therefore, that absolute space is not precisely “God’s substance”; and yet it is not an accident; for it is the virtuality or extrinsic terminability of divine immensity itself.
A fourth objection arises from the opinion of those who consider God’s immensity as the foundation of absolute space, but in such a manner as to imply the existence of a real distinction between the two. Immensity, they say, has no formal extension, as it has no parts outside of parts; whereas, absolute space is formally extended, and has parts outside of parts; for when a body occupies one part of space, it does not occupy any other—which shows that the parts of space are really distinct from one another; and therefore absolute space, though it has the reason of its being in God’s immensity, is something really distinct from God’s immensity.
To this we answer, that it is impossible to admit a real distinction between absolute space and divine immensity. When divine immensity is said to be the foundation, or the reason of being, of absolute space, the phrase must not be taken to mean that absolute space is anything made, or extrinsic to God’s immensity; its meaning is that God’s immensity contains in itself virtually, as we have explained, all possible ubications of exterior things, just as God’s omnipotence contains in itself virtually all possible creatures. And as we cannot affirm without error that there is a real distinction between divine omnipotence and the possibility of creatures which it contains, so we cannot affirm without error that there is a real distinction between divine immensity and the possibility of ubications which it contains.
That immensity has no parts outside of parts we fully admit, though we maintain at the same time that God is everywhere formally by his immensity. But we deny that absolute space has parts outside of parts; for it is impossible to have parts where there are no distinct entities. Absolute space is one simple virtuality containing in itself the reason of distinct ubications, but not made up of them; just as the divine essence contains in itself the reason of all producible essences, but is not made up of them.
As to the formal extension of immensity, Lessius seems to admit it when he says that “God exists in the space which his immensity formally extends.” Fénelon also holds that “immensity is infinite extension”; whilst Balmes does not admit that extension can be conceived where there are no parts. The question, so far as we can judge, is one of words. That God is everywhere formally is a plain truth; on the other hand, to say that he is formally extended, taking “extension” in the ordinary signification, would be to imply parts and composition; which cannot be in God. It seems to us that the right manner of expressing the infinite range of God’s immensity would be this: “God through his immensity is formally everywhere, though by a virtual, not a formal, extension.” In the same manner, space is formally everywhere, though it is only virtually, not formally, extended. And very likely this, and nothing more, is what Lessius meant when saying that immensity “formally extends” space. This phrase may, in fact, be understood in two ways; first, as meaning that immensity causes space to be formally extended—which is wrong; secondly, as meaning that immensity is the formal, not the efficient, reason of the extension of space. This second meaning, which is philosophically correct, does not imply the formal extension of space, as is evident, unless by “formal extension” we understand the “formal reason of its extending”; in which case the word “extension” would be taken in an unusual sense.
Lastly, when it is objected that “bodies occupying one part of space do not occupy another,” and that therefore “space is composed of distinct parts,” a confusion is made of absolute space, as such, and space extrinsically terminated, or occupied by matter, and receiving from such a termination an extrinsic denomination. Distinct bodies give distinct names to the places occupied by them; but absolute space is not intrinsically affected by the presence of bodies, as we shall see in our next article; and, therefore, the distinct denominations of different places refer to the distinct ubications of matter, not to distinct parts of absolute space. As we cannot say that the sun and the planets are parts of divine omnipotence, so we cannot say that their places are parts of divine immensity or of its terminability; for as the sun and the planets are only extrinsic terms of omnipotence, so are their places only extrinsic terms of immensity. Such places, therefore, may be distinct from one another, but their possibility (that is, absolute space) is one, and has no parts. But this subject will receive a greater development in our next article, in which we intend to investigate the nature of relative space.
TO BE CONTINUED.
CORPUS CHRISTI.
Not lilies here, their vesture is too pale,