In all this there is strongly emphasised the subjective contribution to Psychology,—the value of a discerning and critical introspection and the importance of the subject in all processes of sense, judgment, attention, association, and the like. The mind is not a passive receptacle of experiences, but is continually active, making and shaping, seizing and transforming, absorbing and assimilating the stimuli of its environment.
A second series of topics take up the perception of those general concepts, Time, 'Things,' Space, Reality, and Form, the largest and heaviest chapters in the work, amongst which, as if to whet the appetite, are distributed more concrete pages dealing with Memory, Sensation, and Imagination. The former devote much space to criticism, and would, perhaps, border upon the metaphysics that was to have been avoided, were it not that they spring from considerations much more concrete and provable; the latter group of chapters are amongst the most interesting of the volume, and though treating but a small and somewhat arbitrarily selected portion of each of the topics, treat them in a suggestive and inspiring way. Discerning and ingenious sketches of single mental traits and processes, happy illustrations, suggestive side issues make these pages a striking contrast to the usual text-book tone, and will attract students of all shades and grades of agreement or disagreement with the author's views.
The remaining chapters deal with Reasoning, Movement, Instinct, Emotions, Will, Hypnotism, Necessary Truths; in addition to the characteristics already indicated, we find here a wise use of the facts of Morbid Psychology, of the inferences from the abnormal to the normal. This naturally stands out prominently in the discussion of Hypnotism—so recent and yet so essential a department of mental science.
When we close the cover of the second volume we do so with the feeling that our mental horizon has been enlarged, our interests have been quickened, our attention has been held, our time agreeably spent,—and yet the result of all this reading seems intangible, diffuse, scattered, unsatisfactory. The scholar and the professor always retain the student feeling and the student habit of thought; and what is unpedagogic for the one is uneconomical for the other. A logical order of exposition, a unifying grouping of topics, a just perspective of details, a painstaking selection of facts, constitute much to convert useless knowledge into useful science; such works contain a large element of drudgery, must be impersonal in one sense of the term, and yet are not inconsistent with a high degree of originality, but it is such works that are enormously helpful, that form landmarks by which progress is measured and retained. These useful qualities we miss in Professor James's work. True, it does not pretend to possess them, but psychological text-books are not written every day, and when so influential a one appears, the wish that its utility shall reach a maximum demands expression. Finally, it is a work destined to be much quoted, to arouse considerable discussion, to excite quite different opinions from different critics, and so, every one interested in modern Psychology will find it necessary and profitable to learn at first hand this important American contribution to the science of Psychology.
J. J.
THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. By Charles Carroll Everett, D. D. Boston: De
Wolfe Fiske & Co. Revised edition.
An excellent manual of that which is accepted as logic. The author is a disciple of Hegel, and throughout conforms his treatment of the topic to the lines laid down by his master, although in various connections where these lines permit, the author contributes from his own resources, and from other masters, much needed supplementary matter.
The appearance of late of so many essays, manuals, and treatises professing to deal with logic and its affiliated topics is quite noteworthy, and is the manifestation of a need that has become, not merely a crying, but an absolutely groaning one. It is scarcely a metaphor to say that to-day the intellectual world is in great travail over its need of an organon. We are crying unto our logical desire from the depths of our souls and waiting for it as they that wait for the morning. This intensity of our want makes us intolerant of the old incompetences and sets us to fault-finding in the hope of better insight when the current obscurities shall have been dissipated. We scan each effort as it appears, and as it discovers no even single clear organic general principle around which the wealth of knowledge now ascertained can set in order we lay it aside with a feeling of being merely tantalised. We cannot but assimilate our condition to that of the Haunted Man in Bret Harte's clever travesty of Dickens: "'Here again?' said the Haunted Man. 'Here again,' assented the phantom, in a low tone. 'Another novel?' 'Another novel.' 'The old story?' 'The old story.' 'It won't do, Charles! It won't do!' and the Haunted Man buried his head in his hands and groaned."
When the singular difficulties of the search are considered, all this is, no doubt, void of that sweet reasonableness that should obtain. Still the interests of progress are too supreme to permit any compromise with error or incompetence.
So, although the excellent manual under notice makes no pretensions that are unwarrantable, according to the customs usually observed in such cases, it yet affords salient features, apt as texts for a course of comment that applies, not merely to the doctrine and treatment adopted in it but to the doctrine and methods of the accepted logic-books in general.