The book is entitled, "The Science of Thought." This exposes an incompetent comprehension of the topic. The Science of Thought should be a mere branch of psychology. In logic, we of course, have an almost prime need of information concerning the anatomy and physiology of thought. But this is not the peculiar motive of logic. The raison d'être of logic is not the general economy of thought, but the phenomena of untrue, incompetent, or fallacious thought, or, in other words, erroneous thought. Did but the mind of man always supply him with true and competent thoughts he would find no need of seeking logical criteria, however much he might be interested in the phenomenology of thought in general.
Man being, however, what he is, informed by a mind, prone to error, and he, in consequence, frequently subjected to evils and misses that better information would have enabled him to avoid or mitigate, he naturally seeks to solve the causes of his errors, and to discover means of testing the worth of his thoughts and of deriving thoughts that are true and competent. This search is the study of logic; the true information relevant thereto is logic, and no other device of man ought to trespass upon the name. Using for this turn the word truth in a broader sense than usual, so as to include the sense of competence, we may say that Logic is the Science of Truth and Untruth in Thought,—take notice, in thought—for we are supposing that there neither is, nor can be, any other or further means of becoming aware of aught of the nature or features, of aught that is pure alternate to mind, than thought merely, and that, therefore, truth and untruth in thought exhausts all the proper possibilities of truth and untruth.
Following Hegel, and concurring with so many others, our author starts with Being as the proper primordial universal notion. Is this not taking note merely of the comprehensive meaning of thought, in ignorance of its denominate meaning? Prior, at least logically, to Being, Form, Mode, Limit, Relation, and the like, must there not be posited or supposed somewhat to be, to be formed, to be modulated, to be limited, to be related, etc? Must not Quality be quality of somewhat, and Quantity, quantity of somewhat? So it seems to us and we therefore posit Ground as primordial in thought. Ground as intended here is not the same as the Absolute Being of Hegel. It is in general independent of the notions either of existence or reality, being in general that of which aught is predicative either in discourse or thought. It is pure logical denomination free of all logical comprehension. The imaginary number and the ideal number of mathematics are each just as truly grounds according to this intent as is a house or a tree.
Ground is the seat or basis of Being, Mind, Form, Mode, Limitation, Relation, etc. Behind any momented thought, say Sun shines, Mind thinks, or It is, lies, it may be latent, but all potential, the mere thought stripped of all comprehension: Sun, Mind, or It. It is wholly irrelevant that a ground is manifest only by means of its comprehension if it be true that it must be supposed as the seat of that comprehension. Undistributed and therefore unrelated or absolute ground from its very nature admits of no other predicate than mere being. It is in general at once the All and Existence. Its negative or Naught has no ground, being, or comprehension whatever, and no proper denomination, its name being only quasi-denominative and for convenience of notation merely. Form or Thought breaks this barren universe of mere Ground and Being by the formation of modes of Ground and by the more or less arbitrary fiats and finds of Limitation.
By the formation of Mode emerge Form, Time, and Extent, and perhaps
Cause and Aim. By Limitation emerge Part and Whole, Number, and
Relation in all their manifold involutions. Attribute being only
degraded Relation, and Quantity being only one power of Relation.
It is a most notable peculiarity of thought that it has the ability and that it is its custom to take any form or phase of Being, and regard and deal with it as a ground.
Hence every momented thought (which in effect embraces every thought properly speaking) makes two distinct references, its ground reference and its being or predicate reference. This seems to be the bottom truth in respect to the much vexed topic of extension and comprehension. There would seem to be, therefore, in reality only two ultimate categories, Ground and Being.
As to how the categories, usually taken as such, and their complements, should be distributed between Ground and Being, would seem to be a matter requiring much pondering to arrange. Owing to the double quality of so many of the mental alternates, as in one regard Being and in another regard Ground, much difficulty might well be anticipated.
Neglecting this distribution we may say that very universal terms of thought are Ground, Being, Form, Mode, Limit, Number, Part, Relation. Epoch, Place, Alteration, Event, Cause, Effect, Aim, and the like.
The cardinal mental activities which produce thought seem to be, in order, Attention, Conception, Recognition, Induction, and Deduction. In all these operations there is opportunity for not only true, but erroneous thought, and logic in its office as the inspector and judge of thought in respect of its truth or error, should study all these operations and those which are subsidiary to them, and ascertain the causes of error and the means of truth, and perfect methods of deriving truth with certainty and ease.