Neglect in such a matter in the country of a Wundt appears striking at first glance; yet it has its good reasons. The labors of the school of Wundt were antagonistic to the Herbartian psychology and the pedagogics founded thereon, to the extent that a goodly portion of the old theory of the faculties has been re-introduced into those labors. The English association-psychology could have counted on a much more welcome reception. Happily, there has appeared within the last few months a remarkably clear, and withal handy, volume which will succeed in introducing into the pedagogical circles of Germany this association-psychology. It bears the modest title of Leitfaden der physiologischen Psychologie (The Elements of Physiological Psychology, Jena, Fischer, 1891), and consists of lectures delivered by PROF. DR. ZIEHEN at the University of Jena. In many respects the book of Ziehen is like the recent work of Dr. Paul Carus[145]: except that everything of a speculative character is lacking in the former, of which from our point of view we cannot approve.
[145] The Soul of Man, Chicago, 1891.
Now that I am speaking of pedagogics particularly, I will mention still another work of Lindner, to whom I referred above, which is the first of its kind in Germany. Its peculiarity appears from its title: Grundriss der Pädagogik als Wissenschaft, auf Grund der Entwickelungslehre und der Sociologie neu aufgebaut (Outlines of Pedagogics as a Science, Newly Constructed on the Basis of the Doctrine of Evolution and of Sociology, Vienna, 1890). The endeavor of the author of this work has been, to make fruitful within the domain of the Herbartian system the principles of evolution and of the science of sociology; and though he has not been successful in this respect as regards all the details of educational methods, the book nevertheless represents a good beginning.
CHRISTIAN UFER.
BOOK REVIEWS.
OUTLINES OF A CRITICAL THEORY OF ETHICS. By John Dewey. Ann Arbor:
Register Publishing Company. 1891.
The title of this very thoughtful book expresses well the author's method of comparing opposite one-sided views with the aim of discovering a more adequate theory. In carrying out this aim not only is an analysis given of the main elements of the theory of ethics, but the main methods and problems of contemporary ethics are considered also. Professor Dewey rejects both Hedonism and Kantism. He rejects Hedonism because pleasure fails as a standard of ethics, and he rejects Kantism because it is a barren abstraction. Kant's "ought" does not root in and does not flower from the "is." Professor Dewey says:
"Hedonism finds the end of conduct, or the desirable, wholly determined by the various particular desires which a man happens to have; Kantianism holds that to discover the end of conduct, we must wholly exclude the desires. Hedonism holds that the rightness of conduct is determined wholly by its consequences; Kantianism holds that the consequences have nothing to do with the rightness of an act, but that it is decided wholly by the motive of the act. From this contrast we may anticipate both our criticism of the Kantian theory and our conception of the true end of action. The fundamental error of Hedonism and Kantianism is the same—the supposition that desires are for pleasure only. Let it be recognised that desires are for objects conceived as satisfying or developing the self, and that pleasure is incidental to this fulfilment of capacities of self, and we have the means of escaping the one-sidedness of Kantianism as well as of Hedonism. We can see that the end is neither the procuring of particular pleasures through the various desires, nor action from the mere idea of abstract law in general, but that it is the satisfaction of desires according to law" (pp. 82-83)
The author acknowledges his indebtedness to the writings of the late Professor Green and others for the "backbone" of his theory, which he states to be "the conception of the will as the expression of ideas, and of social ideas; the notion of an objective ethical world realised in institutions which afford moral ideals, theatre and impetus to the individual; the notion of the moral life as growth in freedom, as the individual finds and conforms to the law of his social placing." Among the specific forms which the author calls particular attention to, as giving "a flesh and blood of its own" to that backbone, are the idea of desire as the ideal activity in contrast with actual possession; the analysis of individuality into function including capacity and environment, and the statement of an ethical postulate.
This postulate may be regarded as summing up the ethical theory as presented by Professor Dewey. It is thus expressed: In the realisation of individuality there is found also the needed realization of some community of persons of which the individual is a member; and, conversely, the agent who duly satisfies the community in which he shares, by that same conduct satisfies himself. We have here postulated a community of persons, and a good which realised by the will of one is made public. In "this unity of individuals as respects the end of action, this existence of a practical common good," we have what is called "the moral order of the world." This view would seem to satisfy the requirements of both Individualism and Socialism, but is it consistent with the law of progress elsewhere insisted on by the author? He affirms, as against the Hedonism of Spencer, that moral ideals are always developing. Progress is itself the ideal, since "permanence of specific ideals means moral death." But this progress must originate with the individual, who by the formation of the new ideal ceases to be in perfect accord with the community, and will continue to be in disaccord with it until the community has accepted his ideal. A perfect realisation of individuality in the community would be the "fixed millennium" which the author properly objects to, and to escape which it is necessary, that the equilibration towards which the individual, as well as the social, organism is ever tending shall never be actually attained. Its attainment would mean stagnation and death.