We have not space to say more of Professor Dewey's book than that it is a very thoughtful work, most so in its critical parts, and will form an excellent help for the student of ethics.
Ω.
AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY. By John S. Mackenzie. New
York: Macmillan & Co. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co. 1890.
We have here, in an enlarged form, the substance of the Shaw Lectures delivered by the author, at the University of Edinburg, in January, 1889. The work is professedly, not a systematic treatise on the subject dealt with, but only a slight contribution to the discussion of it; and it is said to be "not so much a book as an indication of the lines on which a book might be written." The force of these apparently deprecatory remarks depends entirely on the result attained. If an introductory study is based on true principles it may be of more general value than an elaborate work, because it will probably present the conclusions of the latter in a simpler and less technical form. This presupposes, however, a knowledge of previous inquiry, and, therefore, the use of the term "Introduction" is somewhat of a misnomer. Mr. Mackenzie remarks, indeed, that his inquiry may be thought to belong to the end rather than to the beginning of philosophic study.
The leading idea of Mr. Mackenzie's work is embodied in the sentence just quoted. The value of social life depends on the ultimate end to be attained, and the author sets himself to discover what is the true aim of society. The existence of a society of human beings cannot be accounted for without the conception of purpose, for to whatever element of accident may be due the bringing of those human beings into relation to each other, "the particular direction in which their relations become developed is obviously due to certain aims by which they are guided." The inquiry into the principles which determine the nature of those aims, and as to the ideal to which such principles lead, is what constitutes Social Philosophy. This falls within the third of Hegel's chief divisions of philosophic study, the Philosophy of Spirit, which is concerned with objects in so far as they are themselves creations of thought; and the objects of Social Philosophy may be described as the relations of men to each other, their relations to the material world, and the development of individual character in so far as that is affected by these relations. Before treating of the aim which constitutes the social ideal, our author states the conditions of the social problem, those of difficulty on the one hand, and of hope on the other, and he finds that the general state of society for a number of generations back has been one of "tumultuous progress." There is a great improvement in the condition of nearly all classes of people and "a very great brightening of our general outlook." But life has become in many directions more chaotic and uncertain. What is now wanted is "some principle which will enable us to bring about a more perfect connection between the parts of our society, to form new links and ties, so that men may no longer be subject to the directions of iron laws over which they have no control. We have to overcome individualism, on the one hand, and the power of material conditions, on the other." To do this will be the chief step towards the realisation of the social ideal, which is dependent on the nature of society and on the nature of men.
The recognition of the fact that everything deepest in nature, and especially in human nature is a product of growth has, says Mr. Mackenzie, "passed over into popular thought, and become a part of our intellectual atmosphere." Nature is thus regarded as organic, by which our author means "a systematic unity, in which neither the parts exist independently of the whole nor the whole independently of its parts." This view is distinguished from that of Monadism, which regards the world as a collection of mutually independent parts, and of Monism, according to which Mr. Mackenzie declares the world is a single system, in which the nature of every part is predetermined by the whole. According to the organic view the world is a real unity, though it is a unity which expresses itself through difference. It goes without saying that there is no Monism of Mr. Mackenzie's description. No Monist would ever deny that the unity of the world expresses itself through difference.
Whether or not our author is right in rejecting what he describes as the monistic view of nature, does not really affect the conclusion as to the nature of Society. This he declares to be organic, and it is shown that society possesses the three conditions which belong essentially to the nature of an organic system; that is, the relations of the parts which form the whole are intrinsic, changes in it take place by an internal adaptation or growth, and its end forms an element in its own nature. This conclusion would, indeed, seem to be required by the fact that society consists of a number of individuals who are themselves organic units. At the same time it might be objected that, although many of the lower animals dwell together in societies, these can hardly be regarded as organic. This consideration gives rise to the thought that the organic nature of human society depends on the conditions by which man is differentiated from other animals. In treating of this point, Mr. Mackenzie shows that there are several stages in the development of the "self," and he concludes that although an animal is conscious of a self, yet that it is not conscious of "the unity of its individual life, the connected system of its experiences as a whole, in which each single experience has a definite place," being that which constitutes the highest development of self, and which is the distinguishing self-consciousness of humanity.
This faculty of self-consciousness might be reduced to simpler elements, but it is that by which, as Mr. Mackenzie shows, we are enabled to understand the organic nature of human society. The recognition of the fact that the universe is a systematic whole constitutes an ideal, which, although consciously aimed at by few, gives a progressive character to the general mind. Man is the only creature that has an ideal, because he has been able to catch a glimpse of a kind of consciousness of that which he has not attained, but which he is bound to strive to attain. He begins with vague impressions and animal impulses, "and his whole life is a struggle towards clearness—clearness in the conceptions which he applies to things in knowledge, clearness in the conception of ends of which he makes use in conduct." The struggle between the immediate experience of what is present in sense and "the 'still small voice' of the ideal, which bids us have regard for the Universal," would be fruitless, however, if the individual were alone. Society is necessary for the proper development of the more ideal elements in human nature, as it provides the rational environment required for a rational being. This leads to a consideration of the ultimate end of society. In the course of the discussion of this question the author deals with the different views entertained as to the principles by which we are guided in conduct and by which human progress is determined. He points out that what we seek is some definitely ascertainable end, which we recognise as good, and which is the happiness or well-being of persons. He rejects, however, the Utilitarian theory, showing that pleasure cannot be the end of conduct, and concludes that, if "we have any rational end at all, it must consist in some kind of realisation of our nature as a whole"; of knowledge, and will, and feeling, taken together. The true end is in fact self-realisation, and this includes society, for we cannot suppose that the ideal should be realised within our lives. It is conceivable only "by our being able to see the world as a system of intelligent beings who are mutually worlds for each other." The true nature of man's end is thus necessarily a social one, and it includes everything that belongs to the highest good. It embraces the realisation of Reason, Order, and Beauty in the world; the realisation of Life; the perfection of Knowledge and Wisdom, of Will and of Feeling.
We have given so full a summary of Mr. Mackenzie's argument that we can add only a mere outline of what he considers "the form of social union in which, under given conditions, the progress will be most rapid and most secure towards that good which we must regard as the ultimate end." The social ideal is said to depend on three chief elements of well-being, Individual Culture, Subjugation of Nature, and Social Organisation; which give rise to the one-sided ideals of Liberty, Equality, and Aristocracy, not of birth but of talent. The Organic ideal, which is that of Fraternity, is the true one, and it consists in constant progress. This progress includes the three elements of human well-being, personal development being the most important, as education reacts on social life generally, by bringing new ideals of life as well as a new sense of duty. In leaving Mr. Mackenzie's excellent work, we may say that it deals in a clear and logical manner with the important questions considered, and that it fully justifies the author's remark that "Social Philosophy is a subject which at present will repay a careful study."