Western Front, 1914
The struggle on the Western front began in earnest on the following day, when war was declared on France and the Germans captured Trieux, near Briey, and Lunéville was bombarded by German aeroplanes. The German system of mobilization had been quicker than the French and Russian, but the opening moves filled the Allied commanders with too-confident hopes. Although slower to mobilize than the Germans, a Russian army under Rennenkampf succeeded in invading East Prussia in force; the Belgians made a magnificent stand for their frontier fortresses when the Germans, denied the right of way which they had demanded, endeavoured to force the great highway of Western Europe which passes through Liége; and the French, besides checking the enemy at Dinant, had already recovered part of the lost provinces of Alsace-Lorraine.
On 16th Aug. the First British Expeditionary Force, under General Sir John French, completed its landing at Boulogne, and four days later had arrived and concentrated on the line Avesnes-Le Cateau, on the left or exposed flank of the French Fifth Army under General de Lanzerac. It consisted of 50,000 infantry with its artillery, and five brigades of cavalry—some 70,000 troops altogether, a mere drop in the ocean compared with the millions of men who were marching to battle for the great military powers, but destined to play a part in the forthcoming struggle out of all proportion to its size.
The position at this juncture was, briefly, as follows: the Germans having at length captured the last forts of Liége, with its gallant commander General Leman, were overrunning Belgium. Brussels had just been evacuated (20th Aug.), and the main Belgian army, menaced by greatly superior forces of the enemy, and disappointed in its hope of effective support from the Franco-British troops, was retiring to seek the protection of the forts of Antwerp. Having occupied Brussels on the 20th, the German Higher Command appointed Baron von der Goltz as Governor. A reign of terror in Belgium had already been inaugurated as part of Germany's deliberate policy of 'frightfulness', including the ruthless execution of civilians on unsubstantiated charges of shooting at the invaders.
The French armies, under the supreme command of General Joffre, who, like Lord Kitchener, had been an engineer student when the Franco-Prussian War broke out, and had been Chief of the General Staff since 1911, were now disposed for the double purpose of meeting the threatened German onslaught and preparing the counter-offensive on which French doctrines of strategy had been based. Starting from the Swiss frontier there were nine divisions forming the Alsace force, the main offensive group, consisting of the French First and Second Armies, being extended along the Lorraine frontier, and the Third Army about Verdun. The Fourth Army formed the mass of manœuvre held in reserve behind the centre, while the Fifth, whose left wing was now extended by the British Expeditionary Force, faced the Ardennes as far as the Belgian frontier.
Germany was not seriously alarmed by the spectacular advance of the French into their lost provinces. It suited the strategy of her War Staff to keep the French mass of manœuvre as far as possible from the point at which it would soon be sorely needed; and their feint attacks in the direction of Longwy, Lunéville, and Belfort were designed to strengthen the belief that their real offensive would come in the frontal assault which the French dispositions had assumed. Germany, however, had always intended to strike through Belgium when the time came to deliver the knock-out blow to France before Russia had time to mobilize her millions.
The German advance was proceeding according to the plan which had been worked out in detail as far back as 1904 by the soldier-scholar of the Garde-Ulanen, Count von Schlieffen, who
died two years before his great scheme was put into execution. Based on the assumption that Germany and Austria-Hungary would have to fight France, Russia, Great Britain, and Belgium without the aid of Italy, it provided for an immediate attack by the right wing of the German army of such weight and ferocity as to destroy the French left by a single blow, and then roll up the main French armies one after the other. The South and Russian fronts were meantime to be lightly held, everything being staked on the sudden, overwhelming blow in the north through Belgium. One of the bitter controversies in Germany, after the war, raged round the responsibility for the failure of this plan, the execution of which devolved on General von Moltke, nephew of the great strategist of the Franco-Prussian War. The Kaiser believed that the name of Moltke would strike terror into the hearts of Germany's enemies, but the second Moltke lacked the genius of his predecessor, and the course of events proved that he was not equal to the task of carrying out so prodigious a plan.
It was doubly necessary to strike at once with an immediate maximum of strength now that Britain had already ranged herself alongside the Allies. This maximum of strength was attained long before France had completed her mobilization, and enabled Germany to launch her unexpected blow with crushing effect. She had reckoned, however, without the stubborn defence of the Belgians in the opening moves of the game, a defence which clogged the wheels of her mighty war machine at the critical moment; and was wholly unprepared for Britain's great achievement in transporting her 'insignificant' but indomitable army, without a hitch, complete in every detail, and establishing it in its place in the line of battle, hundreds of miles from its base, in less than three weeks from the declaration of war. Clearly there was no time to be lost in solving the military problem on the Western front before the Russians could throw their full weight into the scales.
The secret of Germany's sudden attempt to overwhelm the Allied left by an outflanking movement was well kept. The position in Belgium was obviously grave; but Joffre still clung to the belief that if the Germans attacked the Allied left in force, they would leave their own position in front of the French Fifth Army so exposed as to give him an opening for a successful counter-stroke with de Lanzerac's troops in co-operation with the British. Up to the 22nd General French's preparations were all in the direction of offensive action on these lines; his two corps had taken up their positions through Binche and Mons and along the canal to Condé.