The German tide which now swept through the plains of Belgium entirely upset the Allied calculations. General French woke on 22nd Aug. to find the troops of the French Fifth Army on his right in unmistakeable retreat. The full force of the German blow, delivered by von Buelow's Second Army, had been felt by de Lanzerac's troops on the Sambre at daybreak, and had pressed them back from the river. The British position held by the 1st Corps (1st and 2nd Divisions) under General Sir Douglas Haig, the 2nd Corps (3rd and 5th Divisions) under General Sir H. Smith-Dorrien, and the Cavalry Division under General Allenby, became isolated by the retreat of de Lanzerac—"the most complete example", as Lord French long afterwards described him, "of the Staff College pedant whose 'superior education' had given him little idea of how to conduct war". De Lanzerac asked General French if he would attack the flank of the German columns which were pressing him back from the Sambre, but the British Commander, who had received definite instructions from Lord Kitchener that his command was to be an entirely independent one, "and that you will in no case come in any sense under the orders of any Allied general", replied that with his own position so seriously threatened by the retreat of de Lanzerac's troops such an operation was impracticable, but he agreed to retain his present position for the next twenty-four hours.
The British army fulfilled this pledge, and the barrier thus held and maintained during the subsequent retreat, though shattered in parts, saved the French left from being outflanked by the invading right wing of the Germans under von Kluck. The whole situation became extremely critical on the following day (23rd Aug.). Namur, the forts of which had been regarded as impregnable, fell before the crushing attack of the heavy Austrian howitzers brought up by the advancing Germans; the French thrust into Alsace-Lorraine had just been countered by the German Fifth Army under the Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, which compelled the French to retreat from all but a corner of Alsace; and the main German attack, launched at the other end of the line, forced the French back both from the Sambre and the Meuse. The French Fifth Army, the position of which was considerably weakened by the fall of Namur, was attacked both by von Buelow's army in front, and by a Saxon army under von Hausen on its right. It was forced back until von Hausen found a gap on its right flank, through which he proceeded to pour his Saxons with the object of rolling up the French Third and Fourth Armies under Ruffey and Langle de Cary. These retreated in turn, to recover alignment with de Lanzerac's Fifth Army, which had retreated from the British right. The British army was thus left 'in the
air', outflanked not only on the right, where von Buelow was now advancing on it from Charleroi, but also on the left, where von Kluck's right wing was sweeping down in full force from the north-west.
The onslaught on the British front began shortly after noon with a bombardment of some 600 guns along the whole line of 25 miles; followed by a great frontal attack in mass formation. The British troops, all experts at musketry, used their rifles with such deadly effect that the frontal attack crumpled up. The line held; but with the German tide surging round on either flank the position became increasingly critical. Under the threatened turning movement General Smith-Dorrien withdrew from the Mons salient, and before nightfall took up a fresh line some 3 miles south of the canal. The advanced troops of the 1st Corps had not been seriously engaged, and held their ground. It was not until late that night that the desperate situation on his right was fully revealed to General French; and when news also arrived from Joffre that the British army would probably be attacked the next day by at least three German corps and two cavalry divisions, it became clear that a general and immediate retirement was inevitable. What actually happened was that the enemy attacked with no fewer than four corps, and at least two cavalry divisions.
The Retreat from Mons
The great retreat began shortly after dawn on the 24th with a feint attack by the 1st Division, under cover of which the 2nd Corps moved back 5 miles, and then stood in turn to protect the retirement of the 1st Corps. Further withdrawals were effected that day by alternate corps, covered by heavy rear-guard actions, until the 1st Corps had reached the line between Maubeuge and Bavai, with the 2nd Corps extending the line from Bavai to Bry. Von Kluck's army, though kept in check by the retreating troops, followed closely on their heels and round their left flank, their design apparently being to turn the British left and press them back on Maubeuge, the fortress close on their right rear, which, well fortified and provisioned as it was, offered, as General French afterwards pointed out (in 1914), a terrible temptation to an army seeking shelter against overwhelming odds. Bazaine's example at Metz in 1870, and a shrewd suspicion that the German move was deliberately planned with that end in view, proved sufficient reasons for avoiding the trap. A further retreat was accordingly ordered to the line Le Cateau-Cambrai, some miles farther back.
Tournai, which was held by a French Territorial brigade, fell that day. There was nothing apparently to prevent the German host at this juncture from continuing its course to the coast and seizing the Channel ports as far as the Seine. That, doubtless, would have been included in the programme had the Germans anticipated a campaign of any considerable duration. The Kaiser, however, had promised his troops that they should be home again "before the leaves fall"; and to bring this about it was necessary to settle with the Allied army once and for all. Where von Moltke failed, according to Ludendorff and other critics after the war, was in not striking farther to the north or north-west, and in not throwing still more weight into the scale from his left wing.
On the 25th the French were still retreating all along the line save at Maubeuge, the garrison of which held out until 7th Sept., and at Longwy, north of Verdun, which fell on 28th Aug. The British army, battle-worn and suffering severely from the heat, but resisting all the German efforts to turn its western flank, marched stubbornly back, gallantly assisted by Allenby's cavalry. The French were a day's march ahead of them when the British reached the Le Cateau position. General French decided, therefore, that, sorely as the troops needed rest, there was nothing for it but to resume the retreat at daybreak, and issued orders to that effect. The hardest fighting on the 25th had fallen to the 1st Corps at Landrecies, where Haig's weary troops were violently attacked at nightfall, before they could snatch any rest, by fresh enemy troops sent forward in pursuit in motors and lorries. The German infantry paid dearly for their temerity in advancing through the narrow streets of the town in close order, two or three British machine-guns mowing them down in hundreds. The attack was a disastrous failure.
The 2nd Corps did not reach Le Cateau until ten or eleven o'clock that night, thoroughly exhausted after a hard day's fighting and marching. Smith-Dorrien had lost heavily in the operations, and was so convinced that his troops were unfit to resume the march at daybreak that he elected to stand and abide by the result. The magnificent fight put up by his troops on the following day, assisted by Allenby and Sordet's cavalry, and two divisions of French Territorial troops under d'Amade, which had been detailed to guard the British left flank, saved the situation, and averted, in the considered opinion expressed by General French five years later, "a stupendous repetition of Sedan". The actual result was a total loss of some 14,000 officers and men, about 80 guns, and numbers of machine-guns, as well as quantities of ammunition and material. According to General French, these losses heavily
handicapped the British army in the subsequent stages of the retreat, and were felt throughout the first battle of the Marne and the early operations on the Aisne. In his dispatch of Sept., 1914, the British Commander-in-Chief had written of this battle in eulogistic terms. It was not till some time later, he explains, that he came to know the full details of the battle and to appreciate it in all its details. For General Smith-Dorrien it is urged that his stand at Le Cateau broke the full force of the German pursuit, and checked its course in time.