She executed the papers purporting to be her will between five and six o’clock, P. M., on the 21st day of December, 1920. She died about one A. M., the succeeding day. She received the last rites at eleven o’clock in the morning of the day she made the will. At three o’clock in the afternoon, two or three hours before she made her will, she inquired of her daughter where certain insurance papers were, and, being told that they were in possession of the daughter and that the insurance had been paid, she seemed relieved and said she did not want any trouble over her affairs. The daughter then asked her whether she had a will and received a reply in the negative. The daughter, Mrs. Appleton, followed this with an inquiry whether the decedent wanted to have things fixed up, and the decedent did not answer her. The daughter, nevertheless, thinking, as she said, that the employer and friend of her mother, Mrs. Hill, had a will, called up Mrs. Hill and, apparently, either told Mrs. Hill that the decedent wanted a lawyer to make a will, or that she had no will and was dying, for, in any event, Mrs. Hill, shortly after the telephone call, came to the decedent’s house with Mr. Edwin B. Goodell, a lawyer of Montclair, to prepare a will for the decedent. The decedent was not asked whether she wanted to make a will prior to this time, and did not in anyway, so far as the testimony shows, request the attendance of Mr. Goodell or anyone else to make a will. When Mr. Goodell acquainted the decedent with the reason for his attendance, she said she did not want to make a will “tonight,” or words to that effect; indicating, as Mr. Goodell put it, that she would prefer not to make a will that night.

At that time there were in the room with the decedent, who was in bed, very sick, a Mrs. Fischer, Mrs. Wickham, who was holding her up or propping her up in bed, Mrs. Appleton, the daughter, Mrs. Hill and Mr. Goodell. In an adjoining room was a son of the decedent with his child or children.

Someone of the persons in the room—the testimony does not agree as to who it was, and it may be that it was more than one—urged and encouraged the decedent to make a will after her remark that she did not want to make one that night. Mr. Goodell says he did not, although he felt that the decedent wanted to make a will, and that if she did not make it that night she would never make it, because he thought she would die before morning. In any event, a short time after she said that she did not want to make a will that night, Mr. Goodell inquired of her what she wanted to do with her property, and someone in the room, he thinks it was Mrs. Wickham—but Mrs. Wickham says it was not, although all seem to agree that it was not Mrs. Appleton—suggested that she wanted to leave her house, the one in which she was then living with her daughter and grandchildren, to the three grandchildren. The decedent assented to this. But Mr. Goodell took the precaution to ask her directly whether she wanted her house to go that way and reminded her it would tie up the sale of the property, because the children were minors. The decedent, in replying to this, said that was what she wanted to do; she wanted it so that it could not be “spent.” Mrs. Hill and Mr. Goodell agree as to this testimony, and Mrs. Wickham, the only other person in the room, who was interrogated on this point, said that she had no recollection one way or the other. Then Mr. Goodell inquired of the decedent what she wanted to do with the residue of her estate, and again someone volunteered that she wanted it to go equally among her children. Whereupon Mr. Goodell, having interrogated the decedent, she replied that she wanted the residue to go in that way.

Mr. Goodell’s recollection is that the decedent nominated the executor, herself, although he said it is possible that someone else in the room suggested it and that the decedent assented thereto.

Thereupon, the will having been read, paragraph by paragraph, the decedent and the witnesses duly executed it.

The burden of proving undue influence, of course, rests upon the person or persons charging undue influence, and, as was said in the case of Schuchhart v. Schuchhart, in the fourth syllabi, 62 Eq. 710, 49 Atl. 485: “When undue influence is claimed to be established by inference from certain facts proved, and, upon all the facts proved, an equally justifiable inference may be drawn that the will executed was what testator would have made under the circumstances, the burden on contestants is not supported.” See also In re Richter’s Will, 89 N. J. Eq. 162.

The inference which the contestants would have the Court draw from the facts is that the decedent intended to die intestate, so that her property would go to her children equally, and that her objection to making a will that night indicated her desire to die intestate, for she knew that her end was near and believed that if the making of the will were put off until the next day she would be dead and dead intestate.

This is an inference which may be drawn from the facts, but an equally justifiable inference is that the decedent had the all-too-common disinclination to draw a will; that she sought to shirk the responsibility of deciding what disposition to make of her property, to avoid making and executing a will; that when brought face to face with her responsibility she yielded to the advice and suggestions of her friends, and, although originally preferring not to make the will, determined to discharge her responsibility and make the will. In no other way can the statement of the decedent that she wanted to tie up the house, so the children could not spend it, be reconciled. That remark indicated that the decedent had aroused herself to the task of making her will, had overcome her disinclination, determined to perform the duty of making a will and had considered the question of the disposition of her property.

It is true that others made the suggestion as to what the decedent wanted to do with the property, and I am inclined to think that everyone in the room knew from talking with the decedent that she wanted to leave her property as she actually did leave it, although there is no direct testimony on this point, but the remark about preventing the children from spending the property was the product of the decedent’s own mind; she initiated the remark, and thereby revealed her state of mind, both as to the matter of making a will at all and as to how she wanted her property to go. And it is not strange that she wanted the property to go in this way, for she knew it was her grandchildren’s home (and we all know the wonderful love that grandparents have for grandchildren); she knew that they could not depend upon a father for support and upbringing and that their mother was the breadearner. Her own children were grown up, married, most of them, and so far as the record shows not to need of assistance. That the devise of the house to the grandchildren is a natural, normal one, is emphasized by her disposition of the residue of her estate, for, having taken care of her grandchildren, assured them of a home during their minority at least, she proceeded to give to her children everything else that she had; and I am inclined to think she believed that the residue of the estate would be much larger than it actually is; that the return she would get from the estate of Timothy Arnold would be larger than it actually was.

It is undoubtedly true that, except for the presence of the lawyer, which was brought about by Mrs. Hill and Mrs. Appleton, and except for the advice and encouragement to make a will and at once by those in the room to the decedent, she would have died without a will. But, instead of the presence of the lawyer and the said advice and encouragement dominating the deceased and destroying her free agency, it seems only to have served to arouse in her the necessity for making a will, if she would protect her grandchildren, to re-awaken and revive her apparently dormant and pre-existing desire to provide a home for her grandchildren, to do this and to give her the opportunity to carry out such desire or intention, which opportunity she seized and made the best of, for how else can her response to Mr. Goodell, that she wanted to tie up the house so that it could not be “spent,” “That is what I want to do,” be accounted for? Certainly acts which produce such a result cannot be said to be acts of undue influence. Stewart v. Jordon, 50 N. J. Eq. 733-741. And it is well settled that it is not the exercise of undue influence to advise, encourage, or urge the making of a will. In re Barber’s Will, 49 Atl. 826; In the matter of Seagrist, 1 N. Y. App. Div. 615; 37 N. Y. Supp. 496; Aff. 153 N. Y. 682; 43 N. E. 1107.