Mr. Goodell, who drew the will, is a reputable and careful lawyer, and I feel sure that he would not have prepared this will or permitted the decedent to execute it except he felt it represented her real wishes. Nor do I think he would have permitted her to have executed this document if he for one moment conceived that she was making it for the sake of peace or to be rid of her visitors. That fact must also be considered in determining the question in hand.
It seems to me, therefore, that the more probable inference to be drawn from the facts in this case is one which requires the upholding of the document as the will of the decedent and that the contestants have not sustained the burden of proving undue influence.
The paper writing purporting to be the will of Elizabeth Marion is consequently admitted to probate.
WOMEN JURORS.
Does the right of suffrage entitle women to serve as jurors? This question has been answered in the affirmative in Michigan, where it was held, in People v. Barltz, 180 N. W. 423, 12 A.L.R. 520, that a constitutional declaration that every inhabitant of the State, being a citizen, shall be an elector and entitled to vote, makes women electors within the meaning of a statute requiring jurors to be drawn from the electors, and they are therefore entitled to perform jury duty.
This decision seems to stand alone. A contrary conclusion was reached in Re Grilli, 110 Misc. 45, 179 N. Y. Supp. 795, affirmed on opinion below in 192 App. Div. 885, 181 N. Y. Supp. 938, which involved the right of an enfranchised woman to compel the board of assessors and the commissioner of jurors to complete the county jury lists by including therein the qualified women voters of the county. The Court said: The only claim made by the petitioner in connection with her application is that jury service is incidental to and a part of suffrage, and since, by the recent amendment of the State Constitution, women are qualified to vote, they must be made jurors. The fallacy of this contention is found in an examination of the history of the jury system since the adoption of the first Constitution in the State of New York. While citizenship has always been a qualification of jury service, every voter has not been included within the jury lists. The various laws with reference to jurors show that men who were entitled to vote have been excluded from jury service.
In Illinois, the fact that women are legal voters for the election of statutory officers, and certain other purposes, is held not to make them eligible for jury service in criminal cases, in People v. Krause, 196 Ill. App. 140, and People v. Goehringer, 196 Ill. App. 475.
In Virginia, according to 6 Va. L. Reg. N. S. 780, Judge Gardner, in instructing jury commissioners, distinguished between the right to vote and the duty to render jury service, by stating that the former is a constitutional right conferred, while the latter is a legislative duty imposed. He concluded that women cannot lawfully serve as jurors under the Virginia statute, which limits that duty to male citizens over twenty-one years of age, until the legislature so modifies the statute as to make it applicable to all male and female citizens twenty-one years old.
The Court, in the Wyoming case of McKinney v. State, 3 Wyo. 719, 30 Pac. 293, 16 L.R.A. 710, seems to have been of the opinion that a constitutional provision that the rights of citizens of the state of Wyoming to vote and to hold office shall not be abridged or denied on account of sex, and that both male and female citizens of this State shall equally enjoy all civil, political, and religious rights and privileges, did not require that women voters be allowed to serve as jurors.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Re Opinion of Justices, 130 N. E. 685, answered questions submitted by the House of Representatives by holding that, under the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution and laws of Massachusetts, women are not liable to jury duty. The State statute subjects to jury service persons qualified to vote for representatives to the General Court. These words, while broad enough to include women, are held not to do so, when interpreted in connection with the history of the times and the entire system of which the statute forms a part. It was determined, however, that the General Court had constitutional power to enact legislation making women liable to jury duty.—Case and Comment