MR. WILSON was with MR. MADISON and GOVERNOR RANDOLPH, opposed to the election of Senators by state legislatures. Because he thought they ought “to lay aside their state connections and act for the general good of the whole,” and that the general government ought not “to be comprised of an assemblage of different state governments.” Mr. W. wished senators elected by districts. He wanted an independent national government, and thought the laying aside state connections incompatible with legislative elections, and that this mode would make the general government an assemblage of different state governments. He wished the senators to be by a DIFFERENT CONSTITUTION, precisely what Judge H. contends they NOW ARE, and Mr. W. contended that they could not be by our present system. Yet he is quoted to prove that under this constitution “the senators for each become the senators of all,” and that “the senators from Virginia become as independent of her as those of Massachusetts.” If Mr. W. thought so, he was arguing against himself. Nothing but instructions could possibly make the senate an assemblage of different state governments; and the doctrine of the senators from each state loosing their connection and becoming senators for all, made it the reverse, and a senate as strictly national and independent as Mr. W. could wish. The defeat of MR. WILSON proves that the convention did not wish senators to lay aside state connections, and did wish the senate to be an assemblage of state governments; and the reasoning of himself and his party proves that they thought such would be the operation of the present system if adopted. Thus we have the evidence of both majority and minority—the whole convention—against the opinions of JUDGE HOPKINSON, and his coadjutors of the present day.
MR. ELSWORTH wished the senate to have “wisdom and firmness, as a protection against the hasty and inconsiderate proceedings of the first branch;” and yet he wished an election by the legislatures. This speech was in opposition to MR. WILSON'S motion for the people to elect by districts. If he had wished the wisdom and firmness as a protection from the “wild and inconsiderate democracy of the state legislatures,” as the modern doctrines contend, would he have preferred that body as electors?
MR. MASON said, on the same proposition, “It is equally necessary to preserve the state governments, as they ought to have the means of self defence. On the motion of MR. WILSON the only means they ought to have would be destroyed.” On the debate as to equality of votes in the senate, a similar contest arose, with a similar result. In that debate JUDGE ELSWORTH remarks, “If the larger states seek security, they have it fully in the first branch of the general government. Small states must possess the power of self-defence or be ruined. Will any one say there is no diversity of interests in the states? And if there is, should not those interests be guarded and secured? But if there is none, then the large states have nothing to apprehend from an equality of rights.” This is all utterly inconsistent with the idea of the “senator for one being the senator for all,” so far as to set the interests and wishes of his own state at defiance. The states-rights-men, and the small states obtained this protection and security after an arduous and manly struggle—are they to lose it by construction and recreancy of representatives? It may be to the interest, perhaps, of the large states for a time, to establish this doctrine, but it would speedily swallow all in the federal Maelstrom. If, for instance, Pennsylvania should ever wish a national bank, it might be agreeable to turn the voices of New Jersey, Delaware and Rhode Island in opposition to the deliberate will of those states, by persuading their senators that they were senators for the union and not of those little states, and that the interest of Pennsylvania ought to be considered before that of their diminutive states. But it would be very unpleasant for her own senators to tell Pennsylvania, in spite of instructions, we voted money for a steamboat canal from the Ohio to Baltimore, because it would benefit all the western country, and we are senators for all.
After the vote was carried in favor of the legislative elections, GOVERNOR RANDOLPH moved to strike out the term of seven years, and make the senators go out in classes, as that body might possibly always sit, “perhaps, to aid the executive.” “The state governments will always attempt to counteract the general government.” Requiring that body, as a body, to act with firmness, does not imply the duty of a senator to resist his own state. The arrangement of classes shows what is meant. That arrangement gave no facilities for disobedience to instructions, and hence could not contribute to their firmness in that sense. But the arrangement in classes leaves the senate always ready to act—“it might possibly always sit”—“to aid the executive”—to act perhaps against a state which was attempting to counteract the general government, and the term of whose senators had expired, and which had refused to elect others. If all the senators had gone out at the same time there would have been none to act. GOVERNOR RANDOLPH had tried to make the individual senators independent of their states. Failing in this, he now tried to make the body as firm and strongly permanent as he could, by not allowing all to go out at the same time. If his object had been thus to defeat the previous vote, and render the senators independent, his amendment would have been rejected. A similar struggle was again raised upon the question of paying the senators, the length of their term, and a power of recall, but the friends of the states, and federative principles yielded these minor points, believing themselves secure in the elections and instructions and equality of votes in the senate. The leaving the pay of senators to depend upon the states, was making the federal government too degradingly dependent upon the states. Not to have power to pay its own officers, would have left it almost as powerless as the old confederation, and it was thought, too, that it would lead to federal corruption, and thus defeat its own object, by making senators look exclusively to the federal government for honor and emolument. This would have been an awkward and humiliating check upon the body, without giving much control over its members. The example of unpaid parliaments was quoted with effect. We learn, then, from the debates, that the convention meant the states to act as states in the senate, in all respects as they had done under the confederation, except that the senator had power to make a law instead of a treaty, and his action was final without a subsequent ratification by his state. They never meant to change, in any degree, the state power of directing him.
The national-government-men contended that the states would have too much power—the states-rights-men that they would have just enough for protection—the ultra states-rights-men that they would not be sufficiently protected, because there was no means of controlling a wilful senator. Without the right of instruction their disputes amount to nothing. The first class ought to have been satisfied, for they lost nothing; the second class ought to have seceded as they threatened, for they gained nothing; and the third class was guilty of the folly of asking a remedy for the violation of a right which did not exist. They were all mistaken—all wrong, and ignorant of what they asked and what they accepted, and we of the present day can see their errors! There is nothing new under the sun. The question we now discuss is the same under a new name which was discussed in the convention. A question of power between states and general government and large and small states. What was lost in constituting is to be regained by construction. What states refused to give up, is to be cozened out of their agents. In all the conventions however, our misguided ancestors considered the senate as the last remnant of the federative features of the old government, and that senators represented distinct sovereignties, and were on the footing of ambassadors or the members of the old congress as to their constituents, and only legislators as to the general government.1
1 Of this, abundant evidence may be adduced. Mr. Ames, in the Massachusetts convention, assigned the ambassadorial character of senators as a reason for the length of their term.
“The senators represent the sovereignty of the states; in the other house individuals are represented. The senate may not originate bills. It need not be said that they are principally to direct the affairs of war and treaties. They are in the quality of ambassadors of the states, and it will not be denied that some permanency in their office is necessary to a discharge of their duty. Now, if they were chosen yearly, how could they perform their trust? If they would be brought by that means more immediately under the influence of the people, then they will represent the state legislature less, and become the representatives of individuals. This belongs to the other house. The absurdity of this, and its repugnancy to the federal principles of the constitution, will appear more fully, by supposing that they are to be chosen by the people at large. If there is any force in the objection to this article, this would be proper.
“But whom in that case would they represent? Not the legislatures of the states, but the people. This would totally obliterate the federal features of the constitution. What would become of the state governments, and on whom would devolve the duty of defending them against the encroachments of the federal government? A consolidation of the states would ensue, which it is conceded would subvert the new constitution, and against which this very article, so much condemned, is our best security. Too much provision cannot be made against a consolidation. The state governments represent the wishes and feelings and local interests of the people. They are the safeguard and ornament of the constitution—they will protract the period of our liberties—they will afford a shelter against the abuse of power, and will be the natural avengers of our violated rights.
“A very effectual check upon the power of the senate is provided. A third part is to retire from office every two years. By this means, while the senators are seated for six years they are admonished of their responsibility to the state legislatures. If one third new members are introduced, who feel the sentiments of their states, they will awe that third whose term will be near expiring. This article seems to be an excellence of the constitution, and affords just ground to believe that it will be in practice, as in theory, a federal republic.”
The remarks of Mr. King in the same convention, upon the same subject, lead irresistibly to this conclusion, although it was attempted to be reasoned away by Judge H. in his first letter—“The senators,” said Mr. K. “will have a powerful check, in those men who wish for their seats, who will watch their whole conduct in the general government, and will give the alarm in case of misbehavior.” (This is one distinct check and Mr. K. proceeds.) “And the state legislatures, if they find their delegates erring, can and will instruct them. Will not this be a check? When they hear the voice of the people solemnly dictating to them their duty, they will be bold men indeed to act contrary to it.” (This makes obedience a duty, and the boldness and hardihood not of that virtuous kind which the Judge supposes.) “These will not be instructions sent them in a private letter, which can be put in their pockets; they will be public instructions, which all the country will see; and they will be hardy men indeed to violate them.” (This seems to suppose meanness enough to violate secret instructions, but not audacity enough to violate them in the face of day.) “The honorable gentleman said, the power to control the senate is as great as ever was enjoyed in any government; and that the members thereof will be found not to be chosen for too long a time. They are, says he, to assist the executive in the designation and appointment of officers; and they ought to have time to mature their judgment. If for a shorter period, how can they be acquainted with the rights and interests of nations, so as to form advantageous treaties?” If this is not our doctrine in full, we give it up. Here is length of term advocated, not to strengthen in disobedience, but to mature judgment as to officers, and acquire information as to treaties; but as to legislative proceedings, “if they are found erring, instruct them.” Instructions are given as the remedy for a term too long for legislators, but necessary to enable them to execute properly their executive duties.