A similar view was taken by Mr. Parsons of Newburyport, who thought “suitable checks had been provided to prevent an abuse of power, and to continue their dependance on their constituents.” Mr. Neal asks, “If we should ratify the constitution and instruct our first members to congress, &c. &c., is there not the highest probability that every thing which we wish may be effectually secured?” Mr. Symmes finally withdrew his opposition, and would, “especially as the amendments were to be a standing instruction to their delegates, until they were obtained, give it his unreserved assent.”
So in the New York convention, Mr. Hamilton says, “It will be the interest of the large states to increase the representation. This will be the standing instruction to their delegates.” He then argues at length to prove that the will of the people must prevail over that of the members of congress, and thus speaks: “If the general voice of the people be for an increase, it undoubtedly must take place. They have it in their power to instruct their representatives; and the state legislatures, which appoint the senators, may enjoin it also upon them.”
In the same convention, Mr. Jay says, “The senate is to be composed of men appointed by the state legislatures: they will certainly choose those who are most distinguished for their general knowledge; I presume they will also instruct them; that there will be a constant correspondence supported between the senators and the state executive, who will be able, from time to time, to afford them all that particular information which particular circumstances may require.” He seems to have considered senators in the light of ambassadors, and never to have contemplated the contingency of a state executive's refusing to send instructions to senators!
There was an attempt made in this convention to carry an amendment, making senators ineligible for more than six years in a term of twelve, and subjecting them to a power of recall, but it was negatived—its opponents alleging that the states had as much power of control as any constituents ought to have, or as the people had in the other house, and that to render senators ineligible a second term would be highly impolitic—excluding useful and experienced citizens from office.
In the convention of North Carolina, Mr. Davie, in giving the reasons for the introduction of a vice president, says: “It was owing with other reasons, to the jealousy of the states, and particularly to the extreme jealousy of the lesser states, of the power and influence of the larger members of the confederacy. It was in the senate that the several political interests of the states were to be preserved, and where all their powers were to be perfectly balanced.” Hence, he concludes, the casting vote ought to be in the hands of a man, possessing the confidence of all the states in a great degree, and responsible to no particular one.
In the convention of Pennsylvania, Mr. Wilson, in answer to the fears of some as to the independence of senators, says: “In the system before you, the senators, sir, those tyrants that are to devour the legislatures of the states, are to be chosen by the state legislatures themselves. Need any thing more be said on this subject? So far is the principle of each state's retaining the power of self-preservation, from being weakened or endangered by the general government, that the convention went further, perhaps, than was strictly proper, in order to secure it; for in this second branch of the legislature, each state, without regard to its importance, is entitled to an equal vote.” Further on, he says: “The truth is, and it is a leading principle in this system, that not the states only, but the people also shall be here represented.” Again: “States now exist and others will come into existence; it was thought proper that they should be represented in the general government.”
Such were the opinions of those who “assisted in framing the government;” but the idea now is, that senators represent and protect, not their own states, but the whole union, even in opposition to the interest or safety, and expressed wishes of their states.
One remark of Judge H. will finish our consideration of this portion of his letter. “This (right of instruction) is practically to give the legislatures a power to recall their senators, as instructions may always be given, which must be disobeyed by an honest man.” Such could not be given by an honest man. This supposes a majority of each legislature always dishonest, and ready to pass dishonest instructions, not to effect legislation, but merely to eject an honest senator. What could induce this? only one could take the place, and the rest must be prostrated, unless the people too be dishonest. A new election would place honest men in power, they would give honest instructions to the dishonest senator, and by our rule he must obey and honest measures prevail, or give place to an honest man. So that the rule is likely to work as much good as harm in any contingency, unless honest men are necessarily corrupt state legislators, or a dishonest man an honest senator, or the people thoroughly corrupt. If the latter is true, unless we could find an honest king, we must be content with a corrupt government.
In his former letter the Judge complained that there was no mention of this right in the constitution,2 and now declares that “not a syllable can be found any where from any body which hints at this right.” I trust this popular periodical now bears many syllables from high authority having an “awful squinting” that way, and visible to the naked eye. But there is still higher evidence, not only of the knowledge of this right by our ancestors, but of the high value and sanctity of it in their estimation. It was incorporated into the first Virginia bill of rights, thence copied verbatim by the Virginia convention on the federal constitution, in a bill of rights which that body proposed to attach to the federal constitution, and copied again verbatim in the recommendations of amendments by the North Carolina convention on the constitution.3
2 Mr. Bowdoin. “The whole constitution is a declaration of rights. The rights of particular states and private citizens not being the object or subject of the constitution, they are only incidentally mentioned. In regard to the former, it would require a volume to describe them, as they extend to every subject of legislation not included in the powers vested in congress.”—Debates Massachusetts Convention.