The French appeared by no means disposed to drive Hussein to extremities; their squadron generally consisted of two frigates, and four or five smaller vessels, which hovered before the entrance to the bay, but offered little or no impediment to the passage of vessels either outwards or inwards. Within a few days after the declaration of war, several Algerine cruisers quitted the harbor, and committed great ravages upon the unprotected commerce of France, sending their prizes into various ports of Barbary, and even of Spain. The prisoners were generally spared and brought to Algiers, in consequence of the Dey's humane or politic proclamation, that he would give for each living Frenchman twice as much as for his head alone. The inactivity and want of skill thus displayed by the blockading squadron, at length encouraged Hussein to bolder attempts. By great exertions, he had been enabled at the end of September 1827, to have ready a frigate, two corvettes, two brigs and six schooners in addition to the vessels at sea; this force however not being sufficient either in size or in weight of metal, to authorize a regular engagement with the heavy ships of the French, his plan was to surprise some one of them at a distance from the others, and endeavor to carry her by boarding. With this intention, which was kept secret until the moment for carrying it into execution, a number of soldiers accustomed to the sea having on the morning of the 4th of October, been suddenly embarked in the vessels, they set sail immediately and bore down upon the nearest French ship. The movement was immediately perceived by the rest of the squadron, and a general action, or at least a general discharge of guns on both sides ensued; this having continued for some hours, without any notable damage to either party, the Algerine Commander found that it was impossible to board any of the French vessels as they had the weather gauge of him, and in consequence he returned with his whole force into port. This action is duly noticed in the French papers; the commander of the squadron in his despatch, compliments his officers highly for the success of their efforts in preventing the Algerine flotilla from getting out of the harbor, and assures the Minister of Marine, that nothing but the heaviness of the sea prevented his destroying the greater part of them.
In the following spring, (1828) an offer was made by Admiral Collet to renew the negotiations for peace; and after some difficulties, Captain Bézart who commanded one of the French brigs, was allowed to enter Algiers and communicate with the Sardinian Consul on the subject. He subsequently had a conference with the Algerine Minister of Foreign Affairs, the results of which induced the Admiral to despatch him to Paris, in order to receive the instructions of their Government.
The French government probably received with satisfaction, the account that the Algerines were disposed to treat for peace. The Martignac Ministry which had just come into power, were employing every means to secure the tottering throne of Charles the Tenth against the efforts of the Liberal party, and they were anxious for the adjustment of a dispute, which occasioned an enormous addition to the budget of expenses without any return whatever. Dignity, or rather the fear of wounding the vanity of the nation, however forbade their seeming to make any advances after the Dey's insulting rejection of the demands first proposed to him. Great care was therefore taken to avoid any appearance of direct communication with the Algerine government; but the Admiral was instructed unofficially to hint, that if the Dey would send an ambassador to Paris, the differences between the two countries might be accommodated.
With these instructions Bézart returned to the African coast. During his absence Admiral Collet worn down with disease had retired to Toulon where he shortly after died; Admiral Botherel de la Bretonniere who succeeded to the command, on learning the views of the Ministers, instantly wrote a letter to the Dey in the sense enjoined by them, and despatched the Captain with it to Algiers. He arrived there on the 11th of September 1828, but when it was known that he only bore a communication from the Admiral, he was not suffered to proceed farther than the landing place on the mole, where he was required to await the answer. A Barbary Prince of a more pliable character than Hussein, might probably have gratified the French Ministers by sending an Ambassador to Paris, who would have figured in the pages of the Moniteur as a supplicant for peace; but the Dey was made of stubborn stuff. He had expected a direct communication from the French government, and was indignant at being addressed instead, by one of its officers not even an authorized agent; moreover the letter contained a proposition that he should take a humiliating step, without any assurance that it would be attended with favorable results. Seeing at once through the whole manœuvre of the French government, his reply was a peremptory order to Bézart instantly to quit Algiers.
A few days after, the same proposition was conveyed more distinctly to the Dey through the Sardinian Consul, with an assurance on the part of the Admiral, that his Government no longer expected apology or reparation, but wished merely to place affairs between the two nations on their former footing. Hussein however remained firm in his refusal to make any advances, only telling the Consul, that after Peace had been signed at Algiers, he might perhaps to please the Ministers, send them an Ambassador. The French Government finding its recommendations thus treated, authorized the Sardinian Consul to inform the Dey, that no farther overtures would be made by it towards reconciliation, and that measures would be soon taken to obtain complete satisfaction for the injury committed against France. Hussein coolly answered, that he had men and ammunition in abundance, and that he preferred the fortune of war to making or seeming to make any apology.
The destruction of three Algerine feluccas of six guns each, was the next event worthy of note in the history of the war. These vessels were returning from a successful cruise and endeavoring to enter the harbor of Algiers on the 1st of October 1828, when they were discovered and chased into the adjacent Bay of Sidi Ferruch. The prize was soon recaptured; the other vessels took refuge close to the shore, under a small and ruinous battery mounting twelve guns, where they were attacked by the whole of the blockading squadron. After the first fire, the feluccas and the battery were abandoned; boats were then sent by the Admiral to destroy the vessels, which having been effected the fire was continued on the battery until it was nearly demolished. The loss on the side of the Algerines is believed to have been very small; the French had six men killed and seventeen wounded, by the bursting of a gun on board the Admiral's ship the Provence. This trifling affair was made the subject of a special report by the Minister of the Marine to the King of France, which may be found at length in the Moniteur of the 17th of October; it was so far important, as it enabled His Majesty to say in his Address to the Legislative Chambers in January following, that—"most striking examples had already taught the Algerines, that it was neither easy nor safe to brave the vigilance of his ships."
Another attempt on the part of the French to teach the Algerines prudence, was not attended with equal success; for on the 19th of June 1829, twenty-four of their men, who had landed in pursuit of the crew of a stranded Algerine vessel, were surrounded by Arabs and put to death. The heads of these unfortunate men were carried to Algiers, where the Dey paid for them according to the tariff established; they were however on the application of the Sardinian Consul immediately delivered to him for burial.
The Government of France was by this time convinced of the futility of the measures which had been for two years pursued with regard to Algiers. The blockade had produced none of the results which were anticipated; it had been maintained at an annual expense of more than seven millions of francs, and although the number of persons killed in action was small, yet many had fallen victims to the diseases occasioned by the climate; in return the Dey appeared less inclined than ever to agree to satisfactory terms of peace, and the commerce of France in the Mediterranean had been severely injured by his cruisers. The opposition had also taken advantage of the circumstances, and the Ministry were frequently denounced in the Legislature and in the public journals of Paris, for their vacillating and dishonoring conduct in the affair.
Unable to resist these demonstrations of their own inefficiency, the French Ministry prepared for more decisive operations, by assembling troops in the Southern Departments of the Kingdom and collecting vessels for their transportation. Before employing these extreme measures however, they were induced to make one more attempt at negotiation; the circumstances which led them thus to recede from the determination expressed in the previous year, are reported to have been the following.
The Dey had several times expressed to the Sardinian Consul, his admiration of the form and sailings of a brig called the Alerte belonging to the blockading squadron; something in his manner at length induced the Consul to inform M. de la Bretonniere, that possibly His Highness might be inclined to negotiate for peace, in the manner desired by the French Government, if it were understood that the brig would be presented to him after the signature of the treaty. The Admiral eagerly accepted this overture as he considered it, and authorized the Consul to say in general terms, that he had no doubt the Government of France would willingly accede to the Dey's wishes in this particular, if an arrangement of the difficulties between the two countries could be effected. Hussein's reply was encouraging, and the Admiral in consequence sailed for France to receive in person the instructions of his Government. He found the Ministers anxious to have the affair peaceably adjusted; they were ready to treat with the Dey provided it could be made to appear that he had himself proposed the negotiation, and were willing to promise the brig in return for the mission of an Algerine Ambassador to Paris. The Admiral was accordingly instructed to assure the Dey, that if he would comply with this formality, peace would be immediately signed and the brig would be presented to him; but in order that no proofs might exist of the advances made by the French Ministry, the whole negotiation at Algiers was to be conducted verbally, through an interpreter chosen for the purpose from the School of Oriental Languages at Paris.