With these instructions, and accompanied by M. Bianchi the interpreter, M. de la Bretonniere returned to the Bay of Algiers. The Sardinian Consul, who undertook to arrange the preliminaries of the negotiation proposed to the Dey that it should be conducted in conferences between His Highness and the French interpreter, who had arrived at Algiers for the purpose on the 23d of July. This, Hussein immediately refused to allow, and the Admiral was thrown into the very dilemma which he wished to avoid; that is to say he was obliged to write a letter, or to abandon the attempt at negotiation. In order to avoid this difficulty a letter was written in the Turkish language, proposing in very general terms the renewal of former relations between the two Governments, but saying nothing either about the Ambassador or the brig. Hussein in reply expressed his satisfaction at the offer which had been made by the French Admiral, whom he invited to come on shore and confer personally with himself on the subject. M. de la Bretonniere accepted this invitation, and accordingly entered the harbor on the 30th of September 1829, in his flag ship the Provence of eighty guns, accompanied by the brig which had been the proximate cause of the negotiation. He landed on the following morning, and had a long conference with the Dey, of which the particulars have not transpired. On the 3d of August they had another conference, which lasted but a short time; on this occasion it is said the Admiral insisted on the mission of an ambassador as an act of reparation to France, at which the Dey became so enraged, that he ordered him immediately to leave Algiers; certain it is that the conference was suddenly broken up, and the parties separated, each in a state of high excitement. M. de la Bretonniere immediately embarked, and sailed with his ships out of the harbor; on passing by the Mole the Provence received a shot from the fort, and although the flag of truce was displayed at her mast head, the firing was continued until she was beyond their reach. The ship is said to have received eighty balls; her port holes were however kept closed, for had she returned the fire, it is probable that she would have been sunk. That this flagrant violation of good faith was the result of the Dey's orders, no one in Algiers at the time for a moment doubted; Hussein however pretended that it arose from a mistake, and that he had only ordered a gun to be fired in case the ship should approach too near to the batteries, as a signal for her to keep off. He moreover dismissed from office the Minister of Marine, on whom the responsibility of the act rested; in so doing however, he only advanced one of his own ends, for the vacancy was immediately filled by the appointment of his son-in-law Ibrahim Kara-Dengirzli, the nephew of the Aga Ibrahim.
The feeble and distracted Ministry which authorized this negotiation, had been dissolved ere the news of its result arrived in France; and those who succeeded to power in that country, though possessing energy and union of purpose, were for some time wholly occupied in preparing to confront the liberal party at the ensuing session of the Legislature. No decisive measures were therefore taken with regard to Algiers during the remainder of 1829; the blockade was indeed maintained, but with so little rigor as to be scarcely more than nominal; the Algerine cruisers were spread over the western part of the Mediterranean, and occasionally appeared before Marseilles, while the French Admiral with the greater part of his ships remained generally at Port Mahon.
Attempts were made at this period, to effect an adjustment of the differences, by the Governments of Great Britain and Turkey, which were the most interested in preventing any change in the political condition of the Barbary States. When the British Government received the news of Hussein's flagrant violation of good faith, in firing upon the French Admiral, the Pelorus sloop of war was despatched to Algiers, where her commander Captain Quin united with the British Consul Mr. St. John, in endeavoring to prevail upon the Dey to propose terms of peace. This effort proving vain, the Pelorus sailed to Constantinople, where it was agreed between the Ambassadors of France and England, that the Sultan should be requested to interpose; to this the Turkish Government readily assented, and Halil Effendi a venerable and respectable Turk, who had long known Hussein and been much esteemed by him, was ordered to proceed to Algiers, and to entreat or command the Dey no longer to provoke the vengeance of his powerful enemies. Halil arrived in the Pelorus on the 28th of November at Algiers, where he was received with great kindness and affection by the Dey and by all classes of the inhabitants. His arguments and entreaties soon produced effects, from which the mediators augured the most favorable consequences; for Hussein after some days of reflection and consultation with his Ministers, agreed to propose to M. de la Bretonniere the renewal of the negotiations, offering him every assurance of honorable treatment in case he should come to Algiers, and as an earnest of the sincerity of his intentions, promising the surrender of all the French prisoners. The Pelorus sailed with these proposals on the 10th of December for Mahon, where she was detained nearly three months in expectation of the Admiral's reply; at length M. de la Bretonniere declared, that as he was still bound by the first instructions from his Government, he could admit of negotiation on no other terms, than the mission of an Ambassador to Paris to bear the explanations of the Dey. With this answer Captain Quin returned to Algiers on the 1st of April 1830; but no arguments could induce Hussein to adopt the measure proposed: "God is Great!" said he, "Let the French come."
In the mean time the French Ministry had taken a most serious determination. The insult offered by the Dey in firing upon M. de la Bretonniere, was concealed from the public as completely as possible; no mention of it was made in the Moniteur, yet it finally became known, and the opposition press of Paris eagerly seized the opportunity, to vilify the hated Ministry of Polignac for delaying to avenge the insulted honor of France. In this condition of things it became absolutely necessary for the Government to take some decisive step towards a conclusion of the war, in order to relieve itself from a heavy and increasing burthen of popular odium on this account. To effect this purpose, two plans were proposed in the Ministerial Council. Count de Bourmont the bold and active chief of the War Department, was in favor of an expedition sent directly from France, against the capital city of the offending Sovereign. Prince Polignac the head of the Ministry, was doubtful of the propriety of risking such an attempt upon a place defended by nature, by art, and above all by the savage fanaticism of the surrounding population; he moreover conceived that even if Algiers were to fall into the hands of the French, it would be impossible for them to retain it, without a constant expenditure of force and treasure, for which no return could be reasonably expected. His plan was therefore to arm against the Algerines, an enemy professing the same faith with themselves, who in the event of success might be bound by his interests, to pursue a policy accordant with the wishes of France and of Europe in general.
The ideas of Polignac were adopted by the King, and the French Ambassador at Constantinople was instructed to propose to the ambitious Pasha of Egypt, that he should undertake the conquest of Algiers, or even of all Barbary, in which France would under certain conditions aid him by the co-operation of its naval force. The Ambassador accordingly despatched M. Huder one of the officers of his Embassy to Cairo in order to submit this proposition to the Pasha; Mehemet Ali readily acceded to it, the projet of a Convention on the subject was drawn up, and the French agent arrived in Paris with it about the end of January 1830. The British Government had however by this time penetrated the secret of the negotiation, and ever jealous with regard to the occupation of the Barbary coast by any strong Power, its Ambassador at Paris was immediately instructed to protest against the plan. As the correspondence on this subject was never published, we have no means of knowing precisely the grounds of opposition taken by the British Ministry; they probably had reference only to the interests of the Sultan, which might be seriously affected by so great an addition to the force of his refractory Viceroy. Whatever may have been the influence of this opposition, the project of a co-operation with Mehemet Ali was abandoned, and it was determined that an expedition should with the least possible delay, be sent from France against Algiers.
Preparations for carrying this resolution into effect were immediately commenced in all the ports and arsenals in France, and they were prosecuted with a degree of vigor which excited the admiration of Europe. The various branches of the service were placed under the superintendence of the most experienced persons, apparently without reference to their known political inclinations; and all the resources of mechanical and medical, as well as military and naval science, were employed to add to the health and comforts of the soldiers and to give efficiency to their operations. Works relating to Northern Africa were examined with attention, and the records of preceding expeditions against Algiers were studied, in order to discover and provide against the circumstances which occasioned their failure. Toulon having been chosen as the place from which the armament was to sail, troops were collected in its vicinity, and prepared by peculiar exercises for the duties which they would be required to perform. Ships of war lying at the different naval establishments, were ordered to be fully equipped, and as soon as ready to be sent to the rendezvous, where a number of merchant vessels for the transportation of men and materials were bound by contract to assemble at the appointed time.
The object of these preparations after having been communicated in general terms to the Governments of the other great European nations, were publicly announced by the King in his address at the opening of the Legislative session on the 2d of March 1830. The reply made by the Chamber of Deputies, shewed clearly that the Ministry would find no favor with that body; this had been anticipated and the session was accordingly prorogued, with a view to the ulterior dissolution of the intractable Chamber. The Liberal Party having by this time taken the alarm, their journals which had been previously filled with invectives against the Ministers for their apathy under the insults of a Barbarian, now loudly condemned the objects of the expedition and prophesied that it would be fruitless. The violence of these denunciations induced the Ministry to insert an article in the Moniteur of April 20th, which although unofficial, was afterwards formally acknowledged to be the expression of the sentiments of the Government. This article was composed with much care, and although no one of its statements taken separately can be contradicted, yet their arrangement, the omissions of important circumstances and the studied obscurity of the language on certain points, renders the result of the whole the opposite of that which would arise from a candid exposition. General Alexandre de Laborde made an able reply in the Constitutionnel of the 26th of the same month; he fully demonstrated the unimportance of the African Concessions, the seizure of which was made the principal grounds of the difference, in the Ministerial declaration; he shewed that the bad faith of the Government and of its agents had given the Dey just cause of discontent, that the weakness and indecision of the late Ministry had provoked and encouraged his insults, and that the real end of the expedition then in preparation, was to subdue, not the barbarians of Africa, but the friends of true liberty in France. Motives of patriotism, and feeling for the honor of the country may indeed have influenced the Ministry in adopting this resolution; but there can be no doubt that its principal object was to sustain the despotic party in France, by reproducing in the people that admiration for military glory, which experience has shewn to be incompatible with respect for institutions founded on equality of rights.
To the announcement of its intentions with regard to Algiers, the French Ministry received the most satisfactory answers from many of the Powers of the European Continent. The British Government however, which had manifested its disapprobation of the plan for establishing the Egyptian authority in Barbary, was still more unwilling that France should possess a country, "which in the hands of a more civilized and enlightened Government, could not fail to exercise an important influence over the commerce and maritime interests of the Mediterranean Powers." The French Ambassador at London, when requested to explain more fully, replied by "the most positive assurances of the entirely disinterested views of the Cabinet of the Tuilleries;" and the British Ambassador at Paris on addressing the same demand to Prince Polignac, was informed "that a satisfactory answer would soon be given respecting the objects of the expedition, and the future destiny of the Regency of Algiers in case of success."
Accordingly on the 20th of March the French Ambassador at London communicated to Lord Aberdeen then Secretary for Foreign Affairs, a letter from Prince Polignac, in which after enumerating the various grievances suffered by France from Algiers, and stating the conviction of his Government that treaties would be of no avail in preventing their recurrence, he declared that his Sovereign had resolved to seek redress by force, and at the same time to advance the interests of humanity, by abolishing piracy, Christian slavery and the payment of tribute to the Barbary Regencies; "and if," concludes the Prince, "in the approaching struggle, the Government now existing at Algiers should be dissolved, the King whose views in this question are entirely disinterested, will concert with his Allies respecting the new order of things, which should for the greatest advantage of the Christian world replace the system overthrown, and be most proper to secure the ends thus proposed by His Majesty." This letter was considered by the British Cabinet, as "scarcely affording that entire satisfaction which might be reasonably expected;" and its Ambassador at Paris was in consequence instructed to insist upon an official assurance from the French Government, that it "renounced all views of territorial possession or aggrandizement." The despatch containing this instruction was read to Prince Polignac, who repeated in general terms that "the expedition was not undertaken with a view to obtain territorial acquisitions," adding however that "he had no objection to give any assurance, which might be calculated to remove the uneasiness of the British Government."
For this assurance Lord Aberdeen waited for some time in vain; on the 21st of April the French Ambassador read to him a letter from the Prince containing a declaration sufficiently explicit and satisfactory; but he was not authorized to give a copy of it, and applications were again made to the French Government. Polignac whose only object was to gain time, evaded these applications by the liberal employment of petty artifices; at length on the 17th of May, when the expedition was about to sail, the French Ambassador delivered to Lord Aberdeen an official copy of a despatch addressed to him by his Government in the form of a circular to the different courts of Europe. In this circular the King of France declared to his Allies that his objects were to obtain redress for the injuries committed by Algiers, to secure the French possessions in Africa from future aggressions, and to receive indemnification for the expenses of the war, as well as to effect the abolition of piracy Christian slavery and the exaction of tribute; and that until these ends should be attained and sufficiently secured he would not lay down his arms nor recall his troops from Africa. In case the existing Government of Algiers should be overthrown, he would immediately concert with the other Powers as to the new order of things to be there established, for the greatest advantage of the Christian world; and as it was probable that they might soon be required to give their opinions on this subject, he invited each Government without delay to furnish its Representative in France with the proper instructions. "His majesty," says the French Minister in the despatch, "will appear at these deliberations, ready to furnish every additional explanation which may be desired, disposed to take into consideration the rights and interests of all, not bound by anterior engagements, at liberty to accept any proposition which may tend to assure the attainment of the result indicated, and free from all feelings of personal interest."