This is an extension of the international police idea of visionaries who only a short year ago were still telling the world that conflicts between great powers were at an end and that establishments for the prosecution of war might henceforth be limited to police armaments for keeping in order the smaller and less civilized nations such as the Balkan states and Mexico. Naturally the European war has smashed this illusion. But it has not discouraged the illusionists.
A very important defect in the League of Peace scheme is that it cannot be guaranteed to work, and a plan of this sort which cannot be guaranteed is likely to become a greater menace to peace through backfire than no agreement at all. It means a close association and conflict of unmixable interests and ambitions which are sure to create friction of a most inflammatory sort.
Suppose the United States and Japan and the great powers of Europe and the A. B. C. alliance join this league. Suppose after the league is duly organized two of the most powerful states, states relatively as strong as Germany and Russia were at the outset of the present war, get into a wrangle. Suppose they disregard their promises and incontinently go to war. How are they to be stopped and disciplined? Only through a general world war beside which the one now in progress might sink into insignificance. The whole population of the globe might be obliged to fight in order to keep the peace.
A great defect in all these schemes of peace promotors and disarmament enthusiasts is that they hope to create an artificial condition of placidity without natural incentive, and fail to take into account the element of self-interest which alone can make a peace pact of practical value. Alliances, ententes and treaties among nations having common interests have played large parts in the history of the world and have led to prolonged periods of peace as well as to bloody wars, but they generally have been enduring and valuable in close proportion to the strength of their appeal to self-interest among the parties concerned.
THE IDEALS OF PEACE AND THE REALITIES OF WAR
WAR AND THE IDEALS OF PEACE. By Henry Rutgers Marshall, L. H. D., D. S. published by Duffield & Co. New York.
“War and the Ideals of Peace,” is rather an abstruse study of the mental and psychological processes which form human character and lead to human action. It is mainly a discussion of the validity of the contention that recurrent wars are inevitable because man is governed by the inexorable laws of nature, which compel him to contend for dominance. The author admits that man is by nature a fighting animal, but contends that he possesses also “creative spontaneity,” and may by his own efforts mould and shape ideals that will enable him to triumph over the natural bent of his disposition. Thus individuals may be led in the ways and thoughts of peace and mould the policy of nations to peace rather than war.
This is obviously true. It is shown in the history of nations, in the fact that through enlightened public sentiment many nations, especially during the past one hundred years, have been impelled to peace when there was temptation to war. The exceptions, when wars have occurred, have been due to the fact that enlightened public sentiment suffered a relapse or reversion and favored war. The antidote for war undoubtedly lies in developing the individual conscience, setting its creative spontaneity to work to formulate peace ideals—in short, to get the mass of men to think peace instead of war. Public sentiment is simply the superior weight of individual opinion, and if public sentiment is decisively for peace, the nation in which such public sentiment prevails will not go to war except to repel aggression.
This leads us to a point of disagreement with the author of the book in his practical application of his theories to the correct policy for this country to pursue. That we should stand at all times for the principles of peace no right-thinking man will deny. But that to realize these principles it is the duty of this nation to disarm without a simultaneous agreement of the other great nations to do likewise, we emphatically deny. Dr. Marshall says:
“We are a specially privileged people, free at present from enemies who might wish to attack us, and able to arm without too long delay should we see signs of growing danger of aggression. If we failed of alertness we might by a bare chance be caught unprepared by some enemy not now in sight, but it were surely better to take this small risk than to waste our energies in what is likely to be uncalled for preparation. Protected as we are by our broad ocean boundaries we have a unique opportunity to show to the world the benefits accruing to a state that does not spend a large proportion of its resources upon implements of the construction of implements of destruction and upon the training of large bodies of citizens to their employment. Did I, as an individual, find living at some distance from me a first class prize fighter, marvelously efficient, but at the time thoroughly exhausted, it would surely appear stupid for me to take my time and energies from the pursuits for which I seem fitted in order to devote myself to the attempt to become what could not at best be more than a second rate prizefighter, really because of fear that the first rate prizefighter might regain his strength and at some future time run amuck and do me injury.”