There have been several interesting cases before our Supreme Court illustrating the character of the jurisdiction I have been describing. Chicago built a sewage canal to drain her sewage with the aid of the waters of Lake Michigan into the Desplaines River, then into the Illinois, and then into the Mississippi, from which St. Louis and other Missouri towns derived their water supply. The Governor of Illinois was empowered to open the canal. The State of Missouri brought suit in the Supreme Court of the United States to enjoin the State of Illinois and the Sanitary District of Chicago from continuing the flow, on the ground that the impurities added to the Mississippi water had greatly increased the typhoid fever in Missouri. It was held that this was a subject matter capable of judicial solution—that Missouri was the guardian of her people’s welfare and had a right to bring such a suit, and, if she made a clear case, to enjoin such use of the Mississippi and its tributaries.
Mr. Justice Shiras, in upholding the jurisdiction (Missouri vs. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241), spoke for the Court as follows:
“The cases cited show that such jurisdiction has been exercised in cases involving boundaries and jurisdiction over lands and their inhabitants, and in cases directly affecting the property rights and interests of a State. But such cases manifestly do not cover the entire field in which such controversies may arise, and for which the Constitution has provided a remedy; and it would be objectionable, and indeed impossible, for the Court to anticipate by definition what controversies can and what can not be brought within the original jurisdiction of this Court.
“An inspection of the bill discloses that the nature of the injury complained of is such that an adequate remedy can only be found in this Court at the suit of the State of Missouri. It is true that no question of boundary is involved, nor of direct property rights belonging to the complainant State. But it must surely be conceded that, if the health and comfort of the inhabitants of a State are threatened, the State is the proper party to represent and defend them. If Missouri were an independent and sovereign State, all must admit that she could seek a remedy by negotiation, and, that failing, by force. Diplomatic powers and the right to make war having been surrendered to the General Government, it was to be expected that upon the latter would be devolved the duty of providing a remedy, and that remedy, we think, is found in the Constitutional provisions we are considering.”
This hearing was on demurrer. When the case came before the Court again on the merits, Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the judgment of the Court, and, while affirming the jurisdiction of the Court, pointed out the difficulties the Court has in exercising it and the care it must take in doing so. He said in the course of his opinion:
“It may be imagined that a nuisance might be created by a State upon a navigable river like the Danube which would amount to a casus belli for a State lower down unless removed. If such a nuisance were created by a State upon the Mississippi, the controversy would be resolved by the more peaceful means of a suit in this Court.”
Speaking of this provision in the Constitution extending the judicial power to controversies between States, Mr. Justice Bradley in Hans vs. Louisiana (134 U.S. 1-15) said:
“Some things, undoubtedly, were made justiciable which were not known as such at the common law; such, for example, as controversies between States as to boundary lines, and other questions admitting of judicial solution. And yet the case of Penn vs. Lord Baltimore (I Ves. Sen. 444) shows that some of these unusual subjects of litigation were not unknown to the courts even in Colonial times; and several cases of the same general character arose under the Articles of Confederation, and were brought before the tribunal provided for that purpose in those articles (131 U. S. App. 1). The establishment of this new branch of jurisdiction seemed to be necessary from the extinguishment of diplomatic relations between the States. Of other controversies between a State and another State, or its citizens, which, on the settled principles of public law, are not subjects of judicial cognizance, this Court has often declined to take jurisdiction.”
A very satisfactory discussion of the scope of the power of the Supreme Court to settle controversies between States is contained in Mr. Justice Brewer’s opinion in the suit brought by Kansas against Colorado to restrain the latter from absorbing so much of the water of the Arkansas River flowing from Colorado into Kansas as seriously to interfere with the supply of water from the river for irrigation purposes in Kansas. He said (206 U. S. 95, 99):
“When the States of Kansas and Colorado were admitted into the Union they were admitted with the full powers of local sovereignty which belonged to other States (Pollard v. Hagan, supra; Shively v. Bowlby, supra; Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U. S., 508, 519); and Colorado by its legislation has recognized the right of appropriating the flowing waters to the purposes of irrigation. Now the question arises between two States, one recognizing generally the common law rule of riparian rights and the other prescribing the doctrine of the public ownership of flowing water. Neither State can legislate for nor impose its own policy upon the other. A stream flows through the two and a controversy is presented as to the flow of that stream. It does not follow, however, that because Congress cannot determine the rule which shall control between the two States, or because neither State can enforce its own policy upon the other, the controversy ceases to be one of a justiciable nature, or that there is no power which can take cognizance of the controversy and determine the relative rights of the two States. Indeed, the disagreement, coupled with its effect upon a stream passing through the two States, makes a matter for investigation and determination by this Court....