“As Congress cannot make compacts between the States as it cannot in respect to certain matters by legislation compel their separate action, disputes between them must be settled either by force or else by appeal to tribunals empowered to determine the right and wrong thereof. Force under our system of government is eliminated. The clear language of the Constitution vests in this Court the power to settle those disputes. We have exercised that power in a variety of instances, determining in the several instances the justice of the dispute. Now, is our jurisdiction ousted, even if, because Kansas and Colorado are States sovereign and independent in local matters, the relations between them depend in any respect upon principles of international law? International law is no alien in this tribunal....

“One cardinal rule, underlying all the relations of the States to each other, is that of equality of right. Each State stands on the same level with all the rest. It can impose its own legislation on no one of the others, and is bound to yield its own views to none. Yet, whenever, as in the case of Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S., 208, the action of one State reaches through the agency of natural laws into the territory of another State, the question of the extent and the limitations of the rights of the two States becomes a matter of justiciable dispute between them, and this Court is called upon to settle that dispute in such a way as will recognize the equal rights of both and at the same time establish justice between them. In other words, through these successive disputes and decisions this Court is practically building up what may not improperly be called interstate common law.”

Controversies between one State and another, or its citizens, which are not justiciable or capable of judicial solution find examples in the suits brought before the Supreme Court. One case of which the Supreme Court refused to take jurisdiction was Wisconsin vs. the Pelican Insurance Company (1 U. S.), in which the State of Wisconsin sought to enforce against a Louisiana insurance company a judgment rendered in a Wisconsin court for penalties imposed by a Wisconsin statute upon foreign insurance companies for failure to comply with statutory regulations of its business. It was held that neither under international comity nor law was one nation required to enforce extra-territorially the criminal law of another nation, and that therefore the controversy presented was not one of which as between the States of the Union the Supreme Court could take cognizance. Again, in Louisiana vs. Texas, 176 U. S., 1, Louisiana sought to restrain the Governor of Texas from so enforcing a quarantine law as to injure the business of the people of Louisiana. The law itself on its face was a proper one for the protection of Texas. In dismissing the suit the Court said:

“But in order that a controversy between States, justiciable in this Court, can be held to exist, something more must be put forward than that the citizens of one State are injured by the maladministration of the laws of another. The State cannot make war, nor enter into treaties, though they may, with the consent of Congress, make compacts and agreements. When there is no agreement, whose breach might create it, a controversy between States does not arise unless the action complained of is State action, and acts of State officers in abuse or excess of their powers cannot be laid hold of as in themselves committing one State to a distinct collision with a sister State.

“In our judgment, this bill does not set up facts which show that the State of Texas has so authorized or confirmed the alleged action of her health officer as to make it her own, or from which it necessarily follows that the two States are in controversy within the meaning of the Constitution.”

CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN INDEPENDENT NATIONS SUGGEST THEMSELVES WHICH ARE NOT CAPABLE OF JUDICIAL SOLUTION AND YET ARE QUITE CAPABLE OF LEADING TO WAR

Thus suppose C nation in the exercise of its conceded powers admits to its shore, and indeed to its citizenship, the citizens or subjects of A nation and excludes those of B nation from both. The discrimination is certainly within the international right of C nation, but it may lead to acrimony and war. This is not a justiciable question, nor one that could be settled by a court.

The so-called General Arbitration Treaties negotiated by Secretary Knox with France and England used the word “justiciable” to describe the kind of questions which the parties bound themselves to submit to arbitration. They defined this to include all issues that could be decided on principles of law or equity. The issue whether a question arising was justiciable and arbitrable was to be left to the decision of a preliminary investigating commission. The term justiciable and indeed the whole scheme of these treaties were suggested by the provision for settling controversies between States in the Federal Constitution and the construction of it by the Supreme Court. The controversies between States, decision of which was not determined by rules furnished by the Constitution or by Congressional regulation, were strictly analogous to questions arising between independent nations, and were to be divided into justiciable and non-justiciable questions by the same line of distinction. The treaties were not ratified by the United States Senate, but their approval by England and France and by the Executive of this country constitutes a valuable and suggestive precedent for the framing of the Constitution and jurisdiction of an arbitral court to be one of the main features of a league of peace between the great nations of the world.

Now, is it idle to treat such a league as possible? Well, let us take England and Canada. For a hundred years we have been at peace. For that century we have had a frontier between us and Canada four thousand miles long which is entirely undefended by forts or navies. We have had issue after issue between the two peoples that because of their nature might have led to war. But we have settled them by negotiation, or, when that has failed, by arbitration, until now it is not too much to say that the “habit” of arbitration between us is so fixed that a treaty to secure such a settlement in future issues would not make it more certain than it is. I concede that conditions have been favorable for the creating of such a customary practice. The two peoples have the same language and literature, the same law and civil liberty and the same origin and history. Each had a wide domain, in the settlement and development of which their energies and ambitions have been absorbed. The jealousies and encroachments of neighbors in the thickly populated regions of Europe have not been present to stir up strife. And yet we ought not to minimize the beneficent significance of this century of peace by ignoring the fact that many of the issues which we have settled peaceably seemed at the time to be difficult of settlement and likely to lead to war. The Alabama Claims issue and the Oregon Boundary dispute were two of this kind.

It is interesting to note that we now have two permanent arbitral English-American Commissions settling questions. One of them is to determine the equitable rules to govern the use of waters on our national boundary in which both nations and their citizens have an interest, and to apply them to causes arising. The analogy between the function which the Supreme Court performed in the Kansas and Colorado case in regard to the use of the Arkansas River and that of this Commission in respect to rivers traversing both countries and crossing the border is perfect. Having thus reached what is practically the institution of a League and Arbitral Court with England and Canada for the preservation of peace between us, may we not hope to enlarge its scope and membership and give its benefits to the world?