Will not the exhaustion in which all the belligerents, whether victors or vanquished, find themselves after this awful sacrifice of life and wealth make them wish to make the recurrence of such a war less probable? Will they not be in a mood to entertain any reasonable plan for the settlement of international disputes by peaceable means? Now, can we not devise such a plan? I think we can.
The Second Hague Conference has proposed a permanent court to settle questions of a legal nature arising between nations. But the signatories to the convention would under such a plan not be bound to submit such questions. Nor were the conferring nations able to agree on the constitution of the court. But the agreement on the recommendation for the establishment of such a court shows that the idea is within the bounds of the practical.
To constitute an effective League of Peace we do not need all the nations. Such an agreement between eight or nine of the Great Powers of Europe, Asia, and America would furnish a useful restraint upon possible wars. The successful establishment of a Peace League between the Great Powers would draw into it very quickly the less powerful nations.
What should be the fundamental plan of the League?
It seems to me that it ought to contain four provisions. In the first place, it ought to provide for the formation of a court which would be given jurisdiction by the consent of all the members of the League to consider and decide justiciable questions between them or any of them, which have not yielded to negotiation, according to the principles of international law and equity, and that the court should be vested with power, upon the application of any member of the League, to decide the issue as to whether the question arising is justiciable.
Second—A Commission of Conciliation for the consideration and recommendation of a solution of all non-justiciable questions that may arise between the members of the League should be created, and this Commission should have power to hear evidence, investigate the causes of difference, and mediate between the parties and then make its recommendation for a settlement.
Third—Conferences should be held from time to time to agree upon principles of international law, not already established, as their necessity shall suggest themselves. When the conclusions of the Commission shall have been submitted to the various parties to the League for a reasonable time, say a year, without calling forth objection, it shall be deemed that they acquiesce in the principles thus declared.
Fourth—The members of the League shall agree that if any member of the League shall begin war against any other member of the League, without first having submitted the question, if found justiciable, to the Arbitral Court provided in the fundamental compact, or without having submitted the question, if found non-justiciable, to the Commission of Conciliation for its examination, consideration, and recommendation, then the remaining members of the League agree to join in the forcible defense of the member thus prematurely attacked.
First—The first feature involves the principle of the general arbitration treaties with England and France, to which England and France agreed, and which I submitted to the Senate, and which the Senate rejected or so mutilated as to destroy their vital principle. I think it is of the utmost importance that it should be embraced in any effective League of Peace. The successful operation of the Supreme Court as a tribunal between independent States in deciding justiciable questions not in the control of Congress nor under the legislative regulation of either State furnishes a precedent and justification for this that, I hope, I have made clear. Moreover, the inveterate practice of arbitration, which has now grown to be an established custom for the disposition of controversial questions between Canada and the United States, is another confirmation of the practical character of such a court.
Second—We must recognize, however, that the questions within the jurisdiction of such a court would certainly not include all the questions that might lead to war, and therefore we should provide some other instrumentality for helping the solution of those questions which are non-justiciable. This might well be a Commission of Conciliation—a commission to investigate the facts, to consider the arguments on both sides, to mediate between the parties, to see if some compromise cannot be effected, and finally to formulate and recommend a settlement. This may involve time, but the delay, instead of being an objection, is really one of the valuable incidents in the performance of such a function by a commission. We have an example of such a Commission of Conciliation in the controversy between the United States and Great Britain over the Seal Fisheries. The case on its merits as a judicial question was decided against the United States, but the world importance of not destroying the Pribiloff Seal herd by pelagic sealing was recognized and a compromise was formulated by the arbitral tribunal, which was ultimately embodied in a treaty between England, Russia, Japan, and the United States. Similar recommendations were made by the court of arbitration which considered the issues arising between the United States and Great Britain in respect to the Newfoundland Fisheries.