I quote briefly from Page 7 of the English text, the paragraph beginning on Page 11 of the German original:
“The Landesleitung received word about the planned plebiscite through illegal information services, on 9 March 1938 at 10 a.m. At the session which was called immediately afterwards, Seyss-Inquart explained that he had known about this for only a few hours, but that he could not talk about it because he had given his word to keep silent on this subject. But during the talks he made us understand that the illegal information we received was based on truth, and that in view of the new situation, he had been cooperating with the Landesleitung from the very first moment. Klausner, Jury, Rainer, Globocnik, and Seyss-Inquart were present at the first talks which were held at 10 a.m. There it was decided that:
“First, the Führer had to be informed immediately; secondly, the opportunity for the Führer to intervene must be given to him by way of an official declaration made by Minister Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and thirdly, Seyss-Inquart must negotiate with the Government until clear instructions and orders were received from the Führer. Seyss-Inquart and Rainer together composed a letter to Schuschnigg, and only one copy of it was brought to the Führer by Globocnik, who flew to him on the afternoon of 9 March 1938.
“Negotiations with the Government were not successful. Therefore, they were stopped by Seyss-Inquart in accordance with the instructions he received from the Führer. . . . On 10 March all the preparations for future revolutionary actions already had been made . . . and the necessary orders given to all unit leaders . . . . During the night of the 10 to 11, Globocnik returned from the Führer with the announcement that the Führer gave the Party freedom of action . . . and that he would back it in everything it did.”
—That means the Austrian Nazi Party.
Next, Germany’s actual preparations for the invasion and the use of force.
When news of the plebiscite reached Berlin, it started a tremendous amount of activity. Hitler, as history knows, was determined not to tolerate the plebiscite. Accordingly, he called his military advisers and ordered the preparation of the march into Austria.
On the diplomatic side he started a letter to Mussolini indicating why he was going to march into Austria, and in the absence of the Defendant Ribbentrop (who was temporarily detained in London), the Defendant Von Neurath took over the affairs of the Foreign Office again.
The terse and somewhat disconnected notes in General Jodl’s diary give a vivid account of the activities in Berlin. I quote from the entry of 10 March:
“By surprise and without consulting his Ministers, Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or preparation. The Führer is determined not to tolerate it.