“This same night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Göring. General Von Reichenau is called back from the Cairo Olympic Committee. General Von Schobert is ordered to come as well as Minister Glaise-Horstenau, who is with the district leader, Gauleiter Bürckel, in the Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the facts at 9:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o’clock. I follow at 10:15, according to the wish of General Von Viebahn, to give him all drafts. ‘Prepare Case Otto.’
“1300 hours, General K.”—which I think plainly means Keitel—“informs Chief of Operational Staff and Admiral Canaris, Ribbentrop is being detained in London. Neurath takes over the Foreign Office. Führer wants to transmit ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet. A personal letter is dispatched to Mussolini and the reasons are developed which forced the Führer to take action.
“1830 hours, mobilization order is given to the Commander of the 8th Army (Corps Area 3), 7th and 13th Army Corps, without Reserve Army.” (Document Number 1780-PS, Exhibit USA-72).
Now, it is to be noted that Defendant Von Neurath was at this critical hour acting as Foreign Minister. The previous February the Defendant Ribbentrop had become Foreign Minister, and Von Neurath had become President of the Secret Cabinet Council. But in this critical hour of foreign policy the Defendant Ribbentrop was in London handling the diplomatic consequences of the Austrian transaction. As Foreign Minister in this hour of aggression, involving mobilization and movement of troops, use of force and threats to eliminate the independence of a neighboring country, the Defendant Von Neurath resumed his former position in the Nazi conspiracy.
I now offer in evidence our Document C-102 as Exhibit USA-74, a captured German document, top secret, the directive of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces, 11 March 1938. This directive by Hitler, initialed by the Defendants Jodl and Keitel, stated Hitler’s mixed political and military intentions. I quote Paragraphs 1, 4, and 5 of the directive. First the caption, “The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces” with some initials; “referring to Operation Otto; 30 copies.” This is the 11th copy; top secret:
“1. If other measures prove unsuccessful I intend to invade Austria with armed forces to establish constitutional conditions and to prevent further outrages against the pro-German population.
“4. The forces of the Army and Air Force detailed for this operation must be ready for invasion and/or ready for action on 12 March 1938 at the latest from 1200 hours. I reserve the right to give permission for crossing and flying over the frontier and to decide the actual moment for invasion.
“5. The behavior of the troops must give the impression that we do not want to wage war against our Austrian brother; it is in our interest that the whole operation shall be carried out without any violence, but in the form of a peaceful entry welcomed by the population. Therefore any provocation is to be avoided. If, however, resistance is offered it must be broken ruthlessly by force of arms.”
I also offer in evidence captured German Document C-103 as Exhibit USA-75. This was an implementing directive issued by the Defendant Jodl, and it provided as follows:
“Top secret; 11 March 1938; 40 copies, sixth copy.