The Austrian operation, which received priority for political and strategic reasons, was carried out in February and March 1938. Thenceforth the Wehrmacht planning was devoted to “Fall Grün” (Case Green), the designation given to the proposed operation against Czechoslovakia.
The military plans for Case Green had been drafted in outline from as early as June 1937. The OKW top-secret directive for the unified preparation of the Armed Forces for war—signed by Von Blomberg on June 24, 1937, and promulgated to the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe for the year beginning July 1, 1937,—included, as a probable war-like eventuality for which a concentrated plan was to be drafted, Case Green, “War on two fronts, with the main struggle in the southeast.”
This document—our Number C-175, Exhibit USA-69—was introduced in evidence as part of the Austrian presentation and is an original carbon copy, signed in ink by Von Blomberg. The original section of this directive dealing with the probable war against Czechoslovakia—it was later revised—opens with this supposition. I read from the bottom of Page 3 of the English translation of this directive, following the heading II, and Subparagraph (1) headed “Suppositions”:
“The war in the East can begin with a surprise German operation against Czechoslovakia in order to parry the imminent attack of a superior enemy coalition. The necessary conditions to justify such an action politically, and in the eyes of international law must be created beforehand.”
After detailing possible enemies and neutrals in the event of such action, the directive continues as follows:
“(2) The task of the German Armed Forces”—and that much is underscored—“is to make their preparations in such a way that the bulk of all forces can break into Czechoslovakia quickly, by surprise, and with the greatest force, while in the West the minimum strength is provided as rear-cover for this attack.
“The aim and object of this surprise attack by the German Armed Forces should be to eliminate from the very beginning and for the duration of the war, the threat by Czechoslovakia to the rear of the operations in the West, and to take from the Russian Air Force the most substantial portion of its operational base in Czechoslovakia. This must be done by the defeat of the enemy armed forces and the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia.”
The introduction to this directive sets forth as one of its guiding principles the following statement—and I now read from Page 1 of the English translation, that is, the third paragraph following Figure 1:
“Nevertheless, the politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands constant preparedness for war on the part of the German Armed Forces:”—and then—“(a) to counterattack at any time; (b) to make possible the military exploitation of politically favorable opportunities should they occur.”