This directive ordered further work on the plan for “mobilization without public announcement.” I quote:
“. . . in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to be able to begin a sudden war which will take the enemy by surprise, in regard to both strength and time of attack.”
This is, of course, a directive for staff planning, but the nature of the planning and the very tangible and ominous developments which resulted from it, give it a significance that it would not have in another setting.
Planning along the lines of this directive was carried forward during the fall of 1937 and the winter of 1937-38. On the political level, this planning for the conquest of Czechoslovakia received the approval and support of Hitler in the conference with his military commanders on 5 November 1937, reported in the Hossbach minutes, to which I have frequently heretofore referred.
In early March 1938, before the march into Austria, we find the Defendants Ribbentrop and Keitel concerned over the extent of the information about war aims against Czechoslovakia to be furnished to Hungary. On 4 March 1938, Ribbentrop wrote to Keitel, enclosing for General Keitel’s confidential cognizance the minutes of a conference with Sztojay, the local Hungarian Ambassador, who had suggested an interchange of views. This is Document 2786-PS, a photostat of the original captured letter, which I now offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-81. In his letter to Keitel, Ribbentrop said:
“I have many doubts about such negotiations. In case we should discuss with Hungary possible war aims against Czechoslovakia, the danger exists that other parties as well would be informed about this. I would greatly appreciate it if you would notify me briefly whether any commitments were made here in any respect. With best regards and Heil Hitler.”
At the 21 April meeting between Hitler and Keitel, the account of which I read last week and alluded to earlier this morning (Document 388-PS, Item 2), specific plans for the attack on Czechoslovakia were discussed for the first time. This meeting was followed, in the late spring and summer of 1938, by a series of memoranda and telegrams advancing Case Green (Fall Grün). Those notes and communications were carefully filed at Hitler’s headquarters by the very efficient Colonel Schmundt, the Führer’s military adjutant, and were captured by American troops in a cellar at Obersalzberg, near Berchtesgaden. This file, which is preserved intact, bears out Number 388-PS, and is United States Exhibit Number 26. We affectionately refer to it as “Big Schmundt”—a large file. The individual items in this file tell more graphically than any narrative the progress of the Nazi conspirators’ planning to launch an unprovoked and brutal war against Czechoslovakia. From the start the Nazi leaders displayed a lively interest in intelligence data concerning Czechoslovakian armament and defense. With the leave of the Tribunal I shall refer to some of these items in the Big Schmundt file without reading them. The documents to which I refer are Item 4 of the Schmundt file, a telegram from Colonel Zeitzler, in General Jodl’s office of the OKW, to Schmundt at Hitler’s headquarters.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you proposing not to read them?
MR. ALDERMAN: I hadn’t intended to read them in full, unless that may be necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid we must adhere to our decision.