MOEHLE: Yes, that is the order.
COL. PHILLIMORE: From the time when you were captured until last Friday had you seen that order?
MOEHLE: No, Sir.
COL. PHILLIMORE: It follows, I think, that the account of the order in your statement was given from recollection?
MOEHLE: Yes, only from recollection.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, after you got that order did you go to Admiral Dönitz’ headquarters?
MOEHLE: Yes, at my first visit to headquarters after receipt of the order, I personally discussed it with Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch who was a specialist on the staff of the U-boat command.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Will you tell the Tribunal what was said at that meeting?
MOEHLE: At that meeting I asked Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch how the ambiguity contained in that order—or I might say, lack of clarity—should be understood. He explained the order by two illustrations.
The first example was that of a U-boat in the outer Bay of Biscay. It was sailing on patrol when it sighted a rubber dinghy carrying survivors of a British plane. The fact that it was on an outgoing mission, that is, being fully equipped, made it impossible to take the crew of the plane on board, although, especially at that time, it appeared especially desirable to bring back specialists in navigation from shot-down aircraft crews to get useful information from them. The commander of the U-boat made a wide circle around this rubber boat and continued on his mission. When he returned from his mission he reported this case to the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of U-boats. The staff officers reproached him, saying that, if he were unable to bring these navigation specialists back with him, the right thing to do would have been to attack that crew, for it was to be expected that, in less than 24 hours at the latest, the dinghy would be rescued by British reconnaissance forces, and they. . .