COL. PHILLIMORE: I don’t quite get what you said would have been the correct action to take. You were saying the correct thing to do would have been. . .
MOEHLE: The right thing to do would have been to attack the air crew as it was not possible to bring back the crew or these specialists, for it could be expected that that crew would be found and rescued within a short time by British reconnaissance forces, and in given circumstances might again destroy one or two German U-boats.
The second example. . .
COL. PHILLIMORE: Did he give you any second example?
MOEHLE: Yes, the second example I am going to recount now.
Example 2. During the first month of the U-boat warfare against the United States a great quantity of tonnage—I do not recollect the exact figure—had been sunk in the shallow waters off the American coast. In these sinkings the greater part of the crews were rescued, because of the close proximity of land. That was exceedingly regrettable, as to merchant shipping not only tonnage but also crews belong, and in the meantime these crews were again able to man newly-built ships.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You have told us about the ambiguity of the order. Are you familiar with the way Admiral Dönitz worded his orders?
MOEHLE: I do not quite understand the question.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Are you familiar with the way Admiral Dönitz normally worded his orders?
MOEHLE: Yes. In my opinion, the order need only have read like this: It is pointed out anew that rescue measures have to be discontinued for reasons of safety for the submarines. This is how, I think, the order should have been worded—if only rescue measures had been forbidden. All. . .