But perhaps the most elaborate forgery in connection with this episode was the forgery of the log book of the U-30, which was responsible for sinking the Athenia; and I now submit that original log book to the Tribunal as Document D-662, which will be Exhibit GB-222, and an extract from the first and relevant page of it is found at Page 111 of the document book. I would like the Tribunal to examine the original, if you will be good enough to do so, because the Prosecution’s submission is that the first page of that log book is a forgery, but a forgery which shows a curiously un-German carelessness about detail. The Tribunal will see that the first page of the text is a clear substitute for pages that have been removed. The dates in the first column of that page are in Arabic numerals. On the second and more authentic looking page, and throughout the other pages of the log book, they are in Roman numerals.
The Tribunal will also see that all reference to the action of the sinking of the Athenia on the 3rd of September is omitted. The entries are translated on Page 111 of the document book for the Court’s assistance.
The log book shows that the position at 1400 hours, of the U-30 on the 3rd of September, is given as AL 0278, which the Tribunal will notice is one of the very few positions quoted at all upon that page, and which was, in fact, some 200 miles west of the position where the Athenia was sunk. The course due south, which is recorded in the log book, and the speed of 10 knots—those entries are obviously designed to suggest that the U-30 was well clear of the Athenia’s position on the 3rd of September.
Finally, and most curiously, the Tribunal will observe that Lemp’s own signature upon the page dealing with the 3rd of September differs from the other signatures in the text. Page 1 shows Lemp’s signature with a Roman “p” as the final letter of his name. On the other signatures, there is a script “p,” and the inference I submit is that either the signature is a forgery or it was made up by Lemp at some other, and probably considerably later date.
Now, in my submission, the whole of this Athenia story establishes that the German Navy under Raeder embarked upon deliberate fraud. Even before receiving Lemp’s reports, the German Admiralty had repeatedly denied the possibility that a German U-boat could be in the area concerned. The charts which showed the disposition of U-boats and the position of sinking of the Athenia, which Colonel Phillimore introduced, have shown the utter dishonesty of these announcements; and my submission upon this matter is this: Raeder, as head of the German Navy, knew all the facts. Censorship and information control in Nazi Germany were so complete that Raeder, as head of the Navy, must have been party to the falsification published in the Völkischer Beobachter, which was a wholly dishonorable attempt by the Nazi conspirators to save their faces with their own people and to uphold the myth of an infallible Führer backed by an impeccable war machine.
The Tribunal has seen that truth mattered little in Nazi propaganda, and it would appear that Raeder’s camouflage was not confined to painting his ships or sailing them under the British flag, as he did in attacking Norway and Denmark. With regard to that last matter—the invasion of Norway and Denmark—I think it is hardly necessary that I should remind the Tribunal of Raeder’s leading part in that perfidious Nazi assault, the evidence as to which has already been presented. I think I need only add Raeder’s proud comment upon those brutal invasions, which is contained in his letter in Document C-155 at Page 25 of the document book, which is already before the Tribunal as Exhibit GB-214. That document, which is a letter of Raeder’s to the Navy, part of which I have already read, states: “The operations of the Navy in the occupation of Norway will for all time remain the grand contribution of the Navy to this war.”
Now, with the occupation of Norway and of much of Western Europe safely completed, the Tribunal has seen that Hitler turned his eyes towards Russia. Now, in fairness to Raeder, it is right that I should say that Raeder himself was against the attack on Russia and tried his best to dissuade Hitler from embarking upon it. The documents show, however, that Raeder approached the problem with complete cynicism. He did not object to the aggressive war on Russia because of its illegality, its immorality, its inhumanity. His only objection to it was its untimeliness. He wanted to finish England first before going further afield.
The story of Raeder’s part in the deliberations upon the war against Russia is told in the Document C-170, at Page 37 of the document book, which has already been submitted as Exhibit Number USA-136. That document consists of extracts from a German compilation of official naval notes by the German naval war staff.
The first entry, at Page 47 of the document book, which bore the date of 26 September 1940, which is at Page 11 of Document C-170, showed that Raeder was advocating to Hitler an aggressive Mediterranean policy in which, of course, the Navy would play a paramount role, as opposed to a continental land policy. The entry reads:
“Naval Supreme Commander with the Führer. Naval Supreme Commander presents his opinion about the situation: The Suez Canal must be captured with German assistance. From Suez, advance through Palestine and Syria; then Turkey in our power. The Russian problem will then assume a different appearance. Russia is fundamentally frightened of Germany. It is questionable whether action against Russia from the north will then be still necessary.”